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The aim of th~s thesis is to critique two approaches to explaining the 
relation between representational and phenomenal content. The first 
approach, representationism, holds that phenomenal content is entirely 
constituted by intentional or representationalcontent. The second approach, 
phenomenism, holds that phenomenal content is not entirely constituted by 
intentional or representational content. There is something ’more’ to 
phenomenal content than just intentional content. Two types of 
consideration are considered in order to evaluate these two approaches as 
follows: The first, considers two ’metaphysical speculations’, inverted 
spectra and inverted earth: The second, considers causal and explanatory 
implications of adopting either of these two approaches. Inverted spectrums 
and inverted earth provide prima facie grounds for rejecting 
representationism(Block, 1990, 1996; Shoemaker; 199 1); however, it will 
be demonstrated that both ‘speculations’ do not demonstrate 
representationismto fail. This thesis will argue that existing responses to 
inverted earth, for example, Lalor (1999), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1994, 
1995b, 1998b) are inadequate. However, it provides a new response to 
inverted earth on behalf of the wide representationist. Narrow content 
representationism, which holds that phenomenal contents are functions that 
map contexts onto contents, will be demonstrated to fail. Doubt is also 
cast upon teleological approaches to phenomenal content. Causal and 
explanatory constraints present a problem to both wide representationism 
and phenomenism. Wide representationalist theories have traditionally 
faced a challenge from attempting to explain how relational properties can 
be casually relevant (Fodor, 1987). These problems apply also to 
representationist theories of phenomenal content. Two current proponents 
of wide causation are considered, Wilson (1997) and Yablo (1997); their 
accounts are found to be problematic. Phenomenism either faces a 
troublesome ‘explanatory gap’ or a problematic commitment to type-type 
physicalist identity theories. Finally a proposed kture direction for these 
two theories is suggested. 
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JACK: You really love me, Gwendolen? 
GWENDOLEN: Passionately! 
JACK: Darling! You don’t know how happy you’ve made 
GWENDOLEN: My own Ernest! 
JACK: But you don’t really mean to say that you would 
not love me if my name wasn’t Emest? 
GWENDOLEN: But your name is Emest. 
JACK: Yes, I know it is. But supposing it was 
something 
else? Do you mean that you couldn’t love me then? 
GWEND0LEN:eZibly): Ah! that is clearly metaphysical 
speculation, and like most metaphysical speculation 
has very little reference to the actual facts of life, as 
we know them. 
me. 
Oscar Wilde The Importance of Being Earnest 
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Part I 
Inverted Spectrums and Inverted Earth 
Chapter 1: Inverted Spectrums 
1.1.1 Introduction 
This thesis develops and critically evaluates two approaches to explaining 
the relation between representational and phenomenal content, 
representationism and phenomenism. Ever since Franz Brentano ( 1  874) 
described intentionality as the “mark of the mental,” scholarship has 
attempted to explain the mind in terms of intentional content. 
representationism has emerged and developed out of Brentano’s claim about 
the intentionality of the mental. The intentionality of mental states is a 
technical way of describing the fact that mental states are directed towards or 
about something; for example, beliefs, desires and perceptions, are beliefs 
about ‘the weather’, desires for ‘a cup of tea’ and perceptions of ’a tree’. 
The intentional aspect of experienceis characterisedby Robert van Gulick 
(1995): 
When I have a visual experience of my office laid out 
before me, my mental state is clearly about something or 
directed at something in the intentional sense. My 
experienceis an experienceof my office (p.27 1). 
If one maintains that all mental states are necessarily intentional states, then 
all mental states are never just mental states, but, rather, mental states 
directed towards some object. Alternatively one might subdivide the class 
of mental states into distinct categories such as intentional and non- 
intentional mental states; for example, beliefs desires and perceptions might 
be classified as intentional while sadness, happiness and pain might be 
described as non-intentional. A further classification of mental states might 
be made as follows: phenomenal mental states are those mental states that 
are directly present to our awareness such as a sharp pain; and non- 
phenomenal mental states, for example, a belief about some fact or other 
The object that the mental state is directed towards is sometimes described 1 
as the intentional or representationalcontent of the mental state. 
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that might be brought to your attention now, but a few minutes earlier is a 
belief of which you had no awareness. 
It is, however, one thing to describe either some or all mental states as 
intentional, it is arguably another to claim that the intentional relation 
between the mental state and its contents entirely constitutes the mental 
state. According to the representationist theory of mind that develops out 
of Brentano’s claim, the intentional relation is the mental state; for 
example, if someone believes that the sun is shining, they possess a mental 
state, the belief, which is entirely constituted by the ’aboutness’ relation 
between the mental state and the ‘sun shning’. 
This thesis will develop and evaluate two approaches to phenomenal mental 
states. The first theory, representationism,2 holds that phenomenal mental 
states are entirely constituted by their aboutness, their intentional content, 
or their representational content. The second theory, phenomenism, 
maintains that phenomenal mental states are not entirely constituted by their 
aboutness, their intentional content, or their representati~nalcontent.~ 
Phenomenal mental states appearto have a certain feature that distinguishes 
them from other non-phenomenal mental states. Phenomenal states are the 
mental states that are present and at the forefi-ont o f  awareness. For 
example, sensations might be described as phenomenal states, because in 
Nagel’s words, “there is something that it is like” to be undergoing that 
sensation. Van Gulick (1995) expresses the phenomenal aspect to 
perceptual experiencethus: 
My experience has a subjective phenomenal aspect; in 
Thomas Nagel’s evocative phrase, there is %omething that 
it is like” to have such an experience. From my first 
person perspective as the one having or undergoing the 
experience, my office is present to me in a way that 
involves a rich array of phenomenal qualities @.27 1). 
Sometimes described as intentionalism or representationalism and 2 
examples of proponents of this view are Dretske (1999,  Harman (1990), 
Lycan (1996), Tye (1995a, 1995b, 1998a, 1998b). 
Burge(1996), Loar (1990), McGinn (1991), Peacocke (1983). 
Examples of proponents of this view are Block (1990, 1996), 
1 1  
There is something that it is like to undergo a sharp pain, for example, 
before one goes into an exam, one undergoes a specific feeling in the pit of 
one’s stomach that has a distinct phenomenal character. The 
representationist maintains that these phenomenal states are all intentional 
states; and furthermore, most importantly, the phenomenal content of these 
mental states is entirely constituted by representational or intentional 
content. 
The second theory, phenomenism, maintains that phenomenal content, or 
the phenomenal characterof mental states is not entirely constituted by 
intentional content. The phenomenist might argue that there are certain 
mental states that possess no intentional content, but only phenomenal 
character; one of Ned Block’s favourite examples of a non-representational 
sensation is an orgasm (Block, 1996). Alternatively, the phenomenist 
might argue that all phenomenal mental states, including some sensations 
such as fear, are directed at objects so they do possess a phenomenal 
content, but the intentional content of the mental state does not entirely 
constitute the phenomenal content. 
I think that sensations - almost always - perhaps even 
always - have representationalcontent in adhtion to their 
phenomenal character. What’s more I think that it is often 
the phenomenal character itself that has the 
representational content. What I deny is that 
representational content is all there is to phenomenal 
character.. . . So the question is better taken as: is there 
anythtng mental in experience over and above its 
representational content? I say yes, the representationist 
says no (Block, 1996, p.20). 
One example that the phenomenist might provide of a mental state that has 
both a clear intentional content and a phenomenal content is the 
phenomenal content one undergoes when one looks at a ripe tomato. 
According to the phenomenist, the phenomenal mental states that are 
directed towards objects are constituted by something more than a mere 
aboutness relation. They possess a phenomenal content or phenomenal 
characterthat goes beyond mere intentional content. According to the 
phenomenist, mental states that have a phenomenal content are not entirely 
constituted by intentional or representationalcontent. 
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1.1.2 Motivations for representationism 
One implicit motivation for representationism arises from taking belief 
states as a paradigm for all mental states. Phenomenal states are merely one 
subset of all mental states; and thus, one might generalise across all mental 
states. The claim that intentionality entirely constitutes the mental is a 
simple, but further, development from noting that intentionality is the 
“mark of the mental.” Therefore, the aboutness relation also entirely 
constitutes the phenomenal character of these mental states. The 
representationist, however, clearly requires some argument to carry this line 
of reasoning through to the conclusion; specifically a justification for why 
some mental states are phenomenal and others are not. 
Another motivation for representationism is to focus on the apparent 
meaninglessness of the terms that putatively refer to the phenomenal 
characterof our mental states as only some lund of private intrinsic, non- 
relational property of our internal mental states to which we have a 
privileged and intimate access. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1 953, 1980) might 
be interpretedas providing a series of argumentsthat serve to undermine the 
meaninaness  of linguistic concepts that refer only to private, inner 
processes. If‘ someone attempts to claim that their ‘pain’ refers only to 
some kind of strongly private inner sensation, this cannot be correct because 
this inner process would have no outward criteria and the term would be 
essentially meaningless to another language user -- ‘pain’ would then mean 
nothing to another language user. 
This line of reasoning perhaps entails a curious form of representationism 
that maintains that sensation terms and any other concepts describing 
mental states have the public meanings of these terms when applied by a 
certain lingustic community. This generates what might be described as 
‘semantic’ representationism! When two language users discuss their 
mental states and are part of the same linguistic community, their pains, 
beliefs and desires, refer not to private inner mental states, but to whatever 
~ 
Rey (1 998, p.442) explicitly describes this representationism as 4 
‘semantic’, and subsequently argues that it fails. 
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the linguistic community takes these terms to mean? This semantic type 
of representationism faces some considerable problems when confronted by 
the arguments of the next chapter. 
A further motivation arises from the consideration that as soon as one tries 
to focus on the phenomenal aspect of one’s mental states, one only has 
accessto the intentional content of those mental states. When staring at a 
patch of red paint, it is not possible to attend to the mere phenomenal 
characteror phenomenal content of the experience because one’s attention 
leaps out into the world.6 This is sometimes described as the transparency 
of our mental states (Harman, 1990, Tye, 1995b). 
When you see a tree, you do not experienceany features as 
intrinsic features as intrinsic features of your experience. 
Look at the tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic 
featuresof your visual experience. I predict that you will 
find that the only features there to turn your attention to 
will be features of the presented tree. (Harman, 1990, 
p.39). 
It is arguably one further step to conclude that phenomenal content is 
entirely constituted by intentional content, but transparency at least offers a 
prima facie motivation for thinking this. 
A final motivation arises out of an accusation that the phenomenist 
commits what is sometimes described as a phenomenological fallacy. The 
phenomenist when considering the fact that an object looks a certain way, 
mistakenly identifies the ’look’ of something as an independent object that 
in turn is something of which perceiver is aware (Harman, 1990, p.35). It 
is not clear that representationism immediately follows from this 
consideration and arguably the phenomenist can get around this point by 
claiming that the mental states with phenomenal content nonetheless have 
intentional content. However, it is not the intentional content that 
constitutes the phenomenal content, but the way that the intentional content 
~ ~ ~~~~~~ 
Malcolm (1984, pp.49-66) draws on an interpretation of Wittgenstein to 
just.@ a rejection of the ‘what it is like’ or phenomenal character having any 
reference to an inner private object. 
metaphor of experience as ‘transparent’ or ’diaphanous’. 
argument. 
5 
G.E. Moore (1922, p.26) is usually given credit for employing the 




is presentedthat constitutes the sense in which an object looks a certain way 
(Block, 1996). According to the phenomenist, it is not the intentional 
content that entirely constitutes the phenomenal content, but the manner in 
which the content is presented that constitutes the phenomenal content. 
1.1.3 Types of representationism 
A semantic style of representationism emerges out of Wittgensteinian 
considerations, but a variety of other dxtinct representationisms emerge 
depending on the specific account of intentional content given by the 
representationist. Another type of representationism maintains that 
intentional content of a mental state is determined by the current causal 
roles that those mental states play in the normal functioning of an 
organism. This type of representationism is motivated by an attempt to 
offer a naturalised account of the intentional relation between mental states 
and objects in terms of the hnds of objects that typically cause those 
mental states and the kinds of effects that are typically caused by those 
mental states. (Tye 1995b). T h s  type of representationism might be 
described as a current long-arm functional representationism for the 
following reasons: First, the kinds of objects that cause the mental states are 
usually a part of the environment of the organism, and therefore, the inputs 
are long-arm and the kinds of effects of the mental states impact on the 
environment, and thus, the outputs of the mental states are long-arm. 
Second, the inputs and outputs are the immediate inputs that cause the 
mental sate and the effects of the mental states are immediate, hence the 
inputs and outputs are current. Third, the causal roles of the mental states 
determines the mental states, hence this is a functionalist type of 
representationism.B It is this type of representationism that faces a 
particularly sharp, although not unanswerable, challenge from the two 
metaphysical speculations that are considered the next chapters as well as 
later in this chapter - inverted spectrums and Inverted Earth. 
A representationistmight not, however, only appeal to current functional 
roles of mental states to determine the intentional content of mental states; 
Armstrong (1984, pp. 169-91) provides a good example of a functionalist 8 
account of phenomenal qualities. 
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the representationistmight appeal to the causal roles and the function that 
the mental states have played in the past to determine the intentional 
content of those mental states. Different types of historical long-arm 
functional representationismvary depending on the type of history that is 
deemed relevant. For example, the representationist might think that it is 
the manner in whch the mental state has developed in individuals within a 
specific species as that species evolves in its natural habitat that determines 
the intentional content of those mental states (Lycan, 1996, Tye, 1995b). 
Alternatively, the representationist might hold that it is the more recent 
fhction for which a mental state has been selected as it arises out of a 
process of learningand conditioning (Dretske, 1981). It is argmbly not so 
much the inverted spectrum argument, which is discussed in h s  chapter, 
that is pertinent to the historical type of representationism, but the argument 
contained within the next two chapters. Historical accounts of intentional 
content as entirely constituting phenomenal characteme demonstrated to be 
problematic in chapterthree. 
A further type of representationism arises out of an attempt to make a 
distinction between two types of intentional content, wide and narrow (Rey, 
1998, Tye, 1994). This account of intentional content is developed partly 
in this chapter and more completely in next chapter as a response to the 
metaphysical speculation - Inverted Earth. But narrow contents are 
ultimately rejected as an adequate account of phenomenal content. 
1.1.4 Metaphysical speculations and motivations for phenomenism 
One problem that concernedBrentano was how something could be believed 
if the intentional content or object of the belief does not exist. If the mental 
state is constituted by the aboutness relation, and one of the relata of the 
aboutness relation does not exist, how can the aboutness relation, and hence 
the mental state exist? A belief about no thing is no belief. But we can 
clearly possess beliefs about non-existent things. This problem led 
Brentano to speculate that the apparently non-existent objects that beliefs 
can sometimes be directed at are not nonexistent, but inexistent. Whether 
this reply is successful or not is not a concern of this thesis; however, two 
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further problems arise out of an appeal to phenomenal mental states being 
entirely constituted by representationalcontent. 
First, it appearsthat mental states can stand in the same intentional relation 
to the Same objects, yet these states might be different with regards to their 
phenomenal content. The metaphysical speculation concerning inverted 
spectrums that emerges from this intuition is considered in this chapters 
The second problem is that it appears that the intentional content of mental 
states c a n c m e ,  yet this change is consistent with there being no change 
the phenomenal content of the mental states. It is this latter problem that 
forms the grounds for the Inverted Earth argument that is presented against 
the representationist in the second and third chapters of ths thesis. l0 
These metaphysical speculations arguably motivate phenomenism; however, 
they do not conclusively demonstrate either the falsity of representationism 
or the truth of phenomenism. They do, however, serve an invaluable 
heuristic role in both c l a m n g  phenomenism and the distinct types of 
representationism that emerge as they respond to the inverted spectrum 
scenarios and Inverted Earth. The overall aim of the first part of this thesis 
is to examine how some of the above representationisms might be 
employed as a response to, or are even motivated by, the metaphysical 
speculations considered in ths and the next two chapters. As they are 
developed further as responses, in chapters two and three, some of these 
representationismswill be argued to be problematic on grounds independent 
of the metaphysical speculations. By the end of part one, the argument for 
phenomenism based on metaphysical speculations will be deemed 
inconclusive, but only one type of representationismwill be deemed to be 
plausible as an adequate account of phenomenal content or character. In part 
two, another set of considerations will be developed to help critically 
evaluate representationism and phenomenism - the casual and explanatory 
role of phenomenal content. 
Originally seen in Locke (1680,II, xxxii, 15), more currently examined in 
Lycan (1973), Shoemaker (1975), Block (1990, 1996, 1999). 




Inverted spectrum scenarios face a host of negative reactions based on 
downright scepticism that any such fantasies are of any use to doing ‘real 
philosophy. ’ Or as Gwendolen puts it: ”metaphysical speculations have 
very little reference to the actual facts of life.” Reactions to inverted 
spectrums might be motivated out of a pure wearisome reaction, something 
like: ”oh no, not inverted spectrums again!” Or a patronising “haven’t you 
read your Wittgenstein?” More serious concerns might be grounded on 
claims that these kinds of arguments are based on assumptions that “beg the 
question.” One’s reaction to the scenario depends entirely on the starting 
assumptions and intuitions. It is perfectly possible to deny the underlyng 
assumptions thus rejecting the supposed conclusions. However, it can be 
accepted that thought experiments such as inverted spectrums do not serve 
to conclusively demonstrate the hoped for conclusions, but they are still 
worth discussing becausethey are invaluable in helping to clm the basic 
assumptions of a theory challengedby the speculation. The reaction to the 
scenario reveals a plethora of subtle distinctions between positions. To not 
confront a thought experiment is to lose an opportunity to explicate a 
theory. 
1.2 Inverted Spectrums 
Imagine the possibility that two individuals could be looking at the same 
ripe tomato, yet one individual undergoes a ‘red’ phenomenal character 
while looking at the tomato, and the other undergoes a ‘green’ phenomenal 
character,while looking at the same tomato. Call ‘red’ how ripe tomatoes 
look to you and ‘green’ how unripe tomatoes look to you. It therefore really 
doesn’t matter exactly how tomatoes look to you, all that matters is that 
someone else sees the colour of ripe tomatoes the way the colour of 
cucumberslook to you. Let us assume ths first person has a mental state 
whilst looking at the tomato with phenomenal characterx, and the other 
person has a mental state with phenomenal charactery. Let us also assume 
that these two individuals are colour inverted completely around the colour 
spectrum.” These two individuals have mental states that are clearly 
distinct with regards to their phenomenal content or character. 
If the two individuals were to look at a traditional colour wheel, each 
colour would look to the other as the colour on the opposite side of the 
1 1  
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What if, however, it is possible that these two individuals have mental 
states with identical intentional content, despite having distinct phenomenal 
contents or charactersto their mental states? If they have mental states with 
distinct phenomenal contents or characters, is it possible that they have 
mental states with identical intentional contents? 
This is where the intuitions start to pull apart. What possible scenario 
could be constructed that would even begin to allow for these individuals to 
have mental states with identical intentional content? Arguably, the first 
thing is to assume that the individuals behave in an identical manner. Why 
does behaving in the same way matter? If intentional contents are 
determinedby the current long-arm functional roles of a mental state, then 
the way the individuals behave, matters: 
The content of a perceptual representation is functionally 
defined in part by the ways in which this representation 
normally arises in perception and in part by the ways in 
which the representationis used to guide actions (Harman, 
1990, p.46). 
One long-arm functional role of a mental state is the same as another ‘long- 
arm’ functional role of another mental state If both the inputs into the first 
mental state arethe same as the inputs into the second mental state, and the 
outputs from the first mental state are the same as the outputs of the other 
mental state. According to this account of content, behaviour matters 
because it is just one form that the output of mental states takes. If we 
assume that the two individuals are behaviourally identical (if they behave 
the same way in the same current environmental context), and their inputs 
are the same (if they are in the same current environmental context), then we 
have to assume that the current long-arm functional roles of the two 
indwiduals are identical. They have the same input, i.e., when they see the 
same red tomato, and they have the same output, they interact and respond 
to the same red tomato in all the same ways. They both exclaim: “look at 
~ ~ 
colour wheel: purples to yellows, reds to greens, all the way around the 
wheel. 
the intentional content is the same across the two individuals, but the 
phenomenal content or character is distinct (1990, pp.53-59). 
Block argues that inverted spectrums are decisive in demonstrating how 12 
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the tasty red tomato.” They both reflect a week later: ”how nice the red 
tomato looked the other day.” If both of them believe that they would like 
to eat a ripe tomato, then the role their perceptual state plays in i d e n w n g  
the tomato as ripe is the same, and combined with their desire for the ripe 
tomato, they walk over to the ripe tomato, pick it up and eat it. Their 
perceptual states play identical current ’long-arm’ functional roles. The 
functional roles are wide because the properties of the tomato are part of an 
external input into the cognitive system of the perceiver. The outputs are 
wide because the resulting behaviours involve an interaction with objects in 
the environment. Given an identity in all respects to wide functional roles, 
we can assume that the two individuals have mental states with identical 
current long-arm functional roles. 13 
If this current functional identity, combined with a phenomenal Merence, 
seems a little implausible, can the current functional identity between 
individuals be made any more credible? Arguably the best attempt to make 
the story more plausible is to consider another variant of the inverted 
spectrum scenario where the change in phenomenal characteroccurs within 
an individual at a certain point in his Me, and then the functional role of his 
mental states can be compared, within the person, before and after the 
phenomenal change.14 This is the ‘four stage intra-personal spectrum 
inversion’ (Block, 1990, pp.60-62): 
Stage one, an indwidual normally interacts with objects and describes ripe 
tomatoes as “red.” Stage two, this individual has colour inverting lenses 
inserted permanently into his eyes.” He is somewhat surprised and starts 
describing ripe tomatoes as ”green.” Stage three, he readjusts all hs 
behaviours, including his language, to fit into his linguistic community, so 
that he starts behaving just as he &d before the phenomenal characterof hs 
T h s  is how Block formulates an identification of intentional content 
Various versions of intrapersonal spectrum inversions can be seen in the 
13 
with long arm functional roles (1990, p.58). 
literature such as Gert (1965), Lycan (1973), Shoemaker (1969, 1975), 
Taylor ( 1966). 
No actual prisms could really be constructed that systematically swap the 
look of every colour onto its inverted opposite. These lenses have to be 
assumed to be some lund of mechanism that functionally achieve this task; 
perhaps they digitally project a changed image onto the retina that swaps 
every colour onto its inverted opposite: purples to yellows; yellows to 




experienceschanged. Stage four, he is gven selective amnesia, so that he 
forgets that there was ever a point where his phenomenal character was 
switched. This individual behaves in all the Same ways as he used to 
behave before the lenses were inserted. His mental states fulfil all the same 
functional roles that they fulfilled before the switch, yet the phenomenal 
content or characterof hs mental states is switched from before and &er the 
lens insertion. 
If the mental states of the individual, compared with stage one and stage 
four, have identical current ‘long-arm’ functional roles, then we can assume 
that the intentional contents of those mental states are identical; however, 
the phenomenalcontent or characterof the two mental states are Merent,  
compared between stage one and stage four. Therefore, phenomenal content 
or characteris distinct from intentional content; representationismis false. 
1.3.1 What are the possible representationist replies? 
One first reaction might be to allow the possibility of the scenarios, but 
discount it as unverifiable metaphysical speculation. We live in the real 
world where these kinds of scenarios are not a “fact of life,” but mere 
exercises in imagination. Ths reply might become more subtle by 
distinguishing between types of possibility, whereby the scenario outlined 
is indeed a ‘logical’ possibility, but resides in a possible world too far away 
from our world to be of any practical use. If the possibilities resided in a 
nomologically possible world ‘closer to home, ’ then the metaphysical 
speculation might be of some use, but they do not. Daniel Dennett is one 
philosopher who is extremely unsympathetic to such metaphysical 
speculation; he claims that there is just no way to vex@ whether these 
inverted individuals really are phenomenally inverted. It is in fact 
constituted in the assumptions of the scenario that it is empirically 
unverifiable as to whether there are any phenomenal differences between 
functionally isomorphic individuals (Dennett, 1988). 
Dennett, however, misses anopportunity to clarify his theory by offering a 
more specific reason as to why the phenomenal content or characterof the 
individual does not change if there is genuine functional isomorphism, or 
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why there is not fhctional isomorphism between the two individuals. Is 
the onus on him to reply? No, but it would help clarrfL his position if he 
would. 
Another denial of the inverted spectrum speculation is motivated out of a 
reaction that the whole concept ‘phenomenal’ actually refers to ‘nothing’ 
(Malcolm, 1984, Dennett, 1988). This arises out of Wittgensteinian 
reflections on beetles in boxes (1958, p.101) and the public function of 
language. These kinds of considerations rely on the fact that sensation 
terms such as ‘pain’ or ’phenomenal’ do not refer to ‘inner objects’. The 
meaning of such terms is instead determined by the way the term functions 
in a common language, a language shared by a linguistic community and a 
sharedexternalenvironment (Putnam, 1975a, p. 175). 
If this is correct, then as long as two individuals share a common language 
within a community and they share a common environment, then those 
individuals mean the same thing when they express such concepts. If two 
individuals’ colour terms function in the same manner and assuming that 
they are both part of the same lingustic community and the same 
environment, then we cannot suppose that one individual when describing 
the tomato as ’red’ could mean something else when another person also 
describes the tomato as ‘red’. If two individuals are part of the same 
linguistic community and agree with all their colour ascriptions, then 
inverted spectra are not possible across two individuals. 
In the next chapter this ’semantic’ style of representationism will be 
considered further. The next chapter, narrows the representationist field 
down and assumes that we are dealing with a representationism more 
sympathetic to at least the concept ’phenomenal character’and that it might 
refer to ‘somehng.’ If it does refer to ‘something,’ this something is 
entirely constituted by intentional content. This line is reflectedin David 
Armstrong’s reply to NormanMalcolm in which he claims that it is at least 
an intelligible hypothesis that there may exist something such as 
‘phenomenal character’and it would be dubious philosophy to rule its 
existence out just because of considerations motivated by the way language 
works (Armstrong & Malcolm, 1984, p215-6). When the Inverted Earth 
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experiment is considered in the next chapter, it is precisely these hnds of 
anti-private language considerations that motivate one premise of the 
argument. 
Another reaction to the original inverted spectrum scenario is to at least 
engage with the metaphysical speculation, but simply to deny the 
possibility of functional isomorphism between the two individuals, 
combined with a difference in phenomenal character. To assume functional 
isomorphism between the individuals begs the question against the 
representationist : 
I suggest that [the] inverted spectrum hypothesis will 
seem evident only to someone who begins with the prior 
assumption that people have an immediate and direct 
awareness of intrinsic features of their experience (Harman, 
1990, p.49). 
To even state as a premise in the argument that there could be the 
possibility of functional isomorphism across the two spectrally inverted 
individuals begm with the assumption that intentional contents could be 
distinct from phenomenal character. This is all very well for the inter- 
personal functional isomorphism combined with phenomenal difference, but 
how about the intra-personal spectrum inversion? At what stage does this 
‘imagined’ experiment break down? Harman is probably right, but it is in 
responding to the argument that the representationist positions might be 
clarified. 
Choices emerge as possible responses to the intra-personal scenario, and 
different choices might reflect different types of representationism. 
Something strange might be happening at stage two, and stages three and 
four appear somewhat tenuous and thus might be taken to be begging the 
question. One representationist reply might be to offer an account of 
intentional content not based on current long-arm functional roles, but 
historid long-arm functional roles; therefore, there are factors entirely 
independent of current functional roles that might be determining content. 
There are two more interesting lines of defence at this point which might 
start to differentiate types of representationism depending on how they 
respond to this scenario as follows: stubborn denial of functional 
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isomorphism for the mental states at the early (stage one) and later stages 
(threeand four) in the indwiduals life, or the possibility of phenomenal re- 
inversion starting at stage two. 
1.3.2 Phenomenal re-inversion 
If the functional roles of mental states really do change as the inhvidual 
starts to readjust to his new experiences,perhaps the phenomenal content or 
character,after the initial switch after the lens insertion, starts to revert back 
to the original phenomenal content or character!6 Therefore, before the 
functional isomorphism is complete, the phenomenal content or character 
remainsdstinct at stage two, but as the functional isomorphism begms to 
establish itself, the phenomenal content or characterof the mental states 
begrn to correspond with the earlier states. 
During stage 2 and part of stage 3, interactivity and 
feedback fiom the world about the colours of things 
allows pre-inversion green-detectors to adapt and become 
red-detectors. At the point in stage 3 at whch the 
informational properties of the perceptual systems reach 
isomorphism with stage 1, the subject would experience 
current perceptions as coherent with stage 1's pre- 
inversion perceptions; both as representing fire trucks as 
red and clover as green. They would be seen as red and 
greenagain. By the time the intentional is back to usual, 
so is the phenomenal (Lalor, 1999 p.268). 
This lund of reply might even be supported by an appeal to real experiments 
in perception, where individuals wearing spatial inverting lenses, start to 
phenomenally re-invert (Lalor, 1999, p.269). l 7  However, thls phenomenal 
re-inversionoccurs in an indwidual only after the individual undergoes self- 
motivated gross behavioural readjustment. In actual experiments it was 
discovered that if an individual wearing spatial inverting spectacles does not 
interact, in a self-motivated manner, with their environment, then they 
It is the possibility of phenomenal re-inversion that Dennett takes to be 16 
unverifiably inhstinguishable fiom phenomenal change with identical 
behaviour that leads Dennett to conclude that the concept qualia is 
meaningless (1988). 
world such that things that would normally look to be on your left would 
look to be on your right; and things that would look to be on your right 
would in fact be on your left. For example: if you were wearing these 
lenses, you might try to reach out for an object to your left but to your 
surprise your hand would go out to the right. 
Spatially inverting lenses are lenses that left-right re-orient the look of the 17 
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undergo no adaptation. Experimental subjects wearing spatially inverting 
spectacles were split into two groups: one group were wheeled around in 
carts; they underwent no behaviourd adaptation; however, the individuals 
who could actively interact with their environments by their own 
motivation adapted (Held & Blossom, 196 1). 
This reply to inverted spectrums based on phenomenal re-inversion involves 
an explicit commitment to a wide representationism that relies on the 
current long-arm functional roles of mental states determining content. Here 
we have, as a response to inverted spectrums a more clearly defined 
representationism. Does the inverted spectrum show that thls position is 
false? No, however, when another thought experiment is considered in the 
next chapter, Inverted Earth might well present a challenge to this theory If 
this theory appeals to phenomenal re-inversion j u s ~ e d  by empirical 
experiments. It will be argued that the empirical evidence drawn on to 
support phenomenal re-inversion when applied to these inverted spectrum 
scenarios is not applicable to the Inverted Earth scenario. Addhonally, 
further grounds will be presented as to why phenomenal re-inversion is 
problematic in the Inverted Earth scenario. However, there are additional 
representationist replies to intra-personalspectrum inversions. 
1.3.3.1 Denial of functional isomorphism 
The representationist may attempt to reply to the intra-personal scenafD by 
assuming that the phenomenal characterdoes change while at the same time 
denying that there is current functional isomorphism between the individual 
at stage one, and either stage three or stage four. This reply might be 
motivated by the mere assumption of representationism (cf. Harman, 1990), 
or this denial of current functional isomorphsm might be given some 
justification. 
1.3.3.2 Fine-grained functional differences 
If there are fine-grainedfunctional differences between the individual at stage 
one, and the individual at stage four, some of their subtler behaviours might 
not be the same. 
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In each case, a range of coarse-grained functional 
isomorphism is assumed, from which it is concluded that 
overall there is complete functional identity. Patently, 
however, there can still be some salient fine-grained 
functional differences(Tye, 1995b, p.202). 
Michael Tye describes these fine-grained functional differences as ’narrow’ ; 
this terminology might lead to a serious misunderstanding as to what kind 
of account of content he is attempting to give, especially given his earlier 
adherenceto a ‘narrow’ account of content in an earlier paper (Tye, 1994); 
therefore, this reply might be described better as an appeal to lingering fine- 
grained functional differences that superficially do not appear when 
considering the latter stages of the inter-personalinverted spectrum scenario. 
Incidentally, if only broad functional differences are considered, fine-grained 
differences do not emerge, despite their presence, also in inter-personal 
inverted spectrum scenarios. 
The representationist argues, as part of this response, that an essential 
premise of the intra-personal spectrum argument is that there are absolutely 
no behavioural differences, as a result of the mental states, between the 
individual at an earlierand later stages in his life, otherwise his outputs 
might be different. According to this representationist response, if any 
differencesarise concerning the outputs of mental states, then these mental 
states have different contents. This complete functional isomorphism 
requires that the individual at the early stage and at the later stage have 
coextensive discriminability : 
Jack and Jill must have coextensive colour 
discriminations and judgements, so that for any two 
stimuli x and y, Jack finds x indiscriminable from y if 
and only if Jill does as well. Jack and Jill must also 
make precisely the same judgements of relative similarity, 
so that Jackjudges x to be more similar to y than to z if 
and only if Jill does as well (Clark, 1985, p.43 1). 
However, given the way our perceptual systems actually work, there might 
still remain fine-grained functional differences that do not appear on a 
superficial inspection of  this individual’s behaviour at stage four. 
Gwendolen might also be pleased by the attempted j m c a t i o n  for this line 
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of response to inverted spectrums because it is also grounded by “facts of 
life. ” 
The representationistwho appeals to the relevance of fine-grained functional 
differences also assumes that the type of spectral inversions in these 
scenarios are complete colour inversions around the colour space; for 
example, purples go to yellows; greens go to reds. These complete spectral 
inversions are then problematic for functional isomorphism, if our colour 
spaces are asymmetrical. Given an asymmetric colour space, assuming a 
complete inversion, coextensive dlscriminability will be lost across the two 
individuals. 
Interestingly, the need for coextensive discriminations 
shows that the supposition of spectrum inversion is 
contrary to fact. Between any two individuals there is 
likely to be some part of the spectrum for which one o f  
the individuals has better discriminations than the other, 
so that there are at least two colours x and y such that one 
individual can discriminate x from y while the other 
cannot (Clark, 1985, p.432). 
Our colour spaces are asymmetrical. What tlus means is that we are able to 
make finer dlscriminations between certain ranges of colours depending on 
the areaof the colour space; furthermore, no symmetrical inversion, through 
an axis, or even a point rotation, could possibly be constructed, given the 
‘shape’ of our colour space, which would maintain coextensive 
discriminability (Clark, 1985). Therefore, these fine-grained functional 
differences across our two individuals can be verified by testing 
discriminable abilities between individuals. For example, suppose, we are 
able to identdj more shades of purple, than of yellow. What does this 
imply for an individual who undergoes a colour inversion, fiom purple to 
yellow? Subtle fine-grainedbehavioural differencesbetween this indlvidual, 
at an early stage, and at a later stage show up. Where once our individual 
was able to distinguish between many types of sky, by the time he reaches 
stage two of Block’s process, he is not. By the time he reaches stage four, 
he is still not able to discriminate between the types of  blue sky that he 
used to. Whereonce our individual was only able to discriminate between 
limited shades of ripe bananas, by the time he reaches stage two, he is able 
to discriminatebetween many more shades of ripe bananas. By the time he 
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reaches stage four, he is still able to discriminate between many more 
shades of ripe bananas. 
However, what if these kinds of fine-grainedfunctional differences are really 
not relevant to content differences? Tye (1995b) just assumes that fine- 
grained functional differences are salient to the representationist. Block 
(1999), on the contrary, argues that finegrained functional differences 
arising from a failure of coextensive discriminability are not salient to the 
representationist . 
He argues that there are in fact differences in all of us concerning the 
symmetry of our colour spaces, especially between women and men, young 
and old, black and white, but these differencesdo not usually appear. This 
suggests a possible, alternative, kind of inverted spectrum argument that 
makes use of these fine-grained functional differences to j u s m  actual, 
spectrurn shlfs that are prevalent between individuals in the real world. If 
the representationist does not have the means to deal with fine-grained 
functional differences, then this functional argument might be used against 
this representationist. This is precisely the line that Block (1999) takes in 
his latest argument: 
The representationism this paper is directed against is 
referential; the experience of red consists in its 
representingsomething as red. Although the kind of 
inverted spectrum needed to refute functionalism requires 
behavioural (and functional) isomorphism, 
representationism can perhaps be refuted empirically 
without these isomorphisms (p.41). 
Block assigns to the representationist under consideration an appeal to a 
type of content that does not have the recourses available to handle the fine- 
grained functional differencesunder consideration. The contents he assigns 
to the representationist are limited to expressible concepts that cannot 
capture these fine-graineddistinctions: 
The representztionist may suppose that the very evidence 
that I have appealed to for phenomenal difference also 
supports a representationaldifference.. . But it remains to 
be shown that we have visual representational resources 
capable of expressing such fine-grained differences. No 
doubt there are differences in dispositions which could be 
made explicit. . . But these representationalresources have 
been constructed, and the representationist has not shown 
that such resources are available at the moment of 
perception, i.e. on the fly (pp.45-46). 
If Block’s argument is sound, then the mere appeal to fine-grained 
functional differencesis going to commit the representationist to an account 
whereby inexpressible contents are determinersfor the type of content that is 
grounded by fine-grained functional differences. Therefore, if the 
representationist maintains that contents can be explicated by somethmg 
like our course linguistic concepts, th~s  representationism faces a problem 
when presentedwith Block’s argument. 
Asymmetry in the colour space is not the only possible fine-grained 
functional differences that might arise from inverted spectrum scenarios. 
Further subtle fine-grained functional differences might arise in the 
individual concerning brightness associations with specific colours, such as, 
light and dark (Tye, 1995b). At stage one of the inter-personal spectum 
inversion scenario, bananas looked bright, at stages two, three and four, 
bananaslook dark. As noted earlier, the spectrum inversion of the type 
under consideration is a complete spectral inversion. However, if the 
inversion is merely a slight spectral shift, then these subtle associations 
present no problem to the above argument. However, if the spectrum is 
only shifted slightly, t h ~ s  increases the plausibility of the previous 
representationist reply based on phenomenal re-inversion in the individual 
after the lenses have been inserted. 
The appeal to fine-grainedfbnctional differences as a response to inverted 
spectrums, is grounded on real experimentation, which is a plus in 
Gwendolen’s eyes. If the representationist only appeals to fine-grained 
functional differences and i f  Block is right, then this rules out a type of 
representationismthat holds that an individual’s current linguistic concepts 
‘on the fly’ are sufficient for determining the contents of their mental states. 
If the appeal to functional differencesrelies only on a break down of broader 
co-extensive discriminations, such as between purple, black and yellow, it 
is easy to mod@ the account so that it relies on a more moderate spectral 
shift rather than a complete spectral inversion; however, this does increase 
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the plausibility of spectral re-inversion as the individual interacts with his 
environment. 
A representationistreply to inverted spectnuns need not, however, appeal to 
phenomenal re-inversions or functional differences. A distinct 
representationist reply identifies phenomenal content or character with the 
narrowintentional contents of mental states; this allows for the possibility 
that an individual undergoing an a spectrum inversion has mental states 
with distinct narrow intentional contents whilst having mental states that 
have the same wide intentional contents (Tye, 1994). 
1.3.4 Narrow contents 
Tye in 1994 had a very Merent response to inverted spectrums, based on 
the idea of narrow content.” Accordmg to Tye the inverted spectrum 
argument does successfully refute wide intentional content representationism 
but does not refute narrow intentional content representationism. A colour 
inverted individual having, for example, a phenomenal content or character 
green while behaving in a ‘normal red like manner’ is not sufficient for h s  
individual’s states to represent the ripe tomato as red. The narrow 
intentional contents of that individual’s perceptual experience represent the 
ripe tomato as green. 
Tye justifies a narrow content, or indwidualistic, view of phenomenal 
content by formulating the following three Twin Earth scenarios: in the first 
scenario, Jones looks at a real tiger on Earth; in the second, Twin Jones on 
Twin Earthlooks at a tiger that is genetically and biologically distinct from 
Earth tigers; on the third Twin Earth, an identical Jone’s brain is stimulated 
This is in stark contrast to later Tye: “The lesson of the problem of 18 
transparency is thatphenomenology ain ’t in the head . . To discover what 
it’s like, you need to look outside the head to what brain states represent. 
Phenomenology is, in this way, externally based. So systems that are 
internally physically identical do not have to be phenomenally 
identical”(Tye, 1995b, p.151, italics his). “It seems to me, that we should 
resist the idea that phenomenal content isnarrow, if by that is meant that 
phenomenal content is ultimately metaphysically fixed by what goes on 
physically inside the brain independently of everythmg else”(Tye, 1995b, p. 
155, italics his). 
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so it is in the same psycho-chemid state as the other two. 
subsequently argues: 
Tye 
It follows fiom the argument I have given that the three 
experiences share a range of intentional features, namely 
those pertaining to directly observable properties (e.g., 
colour and shape). These features constitute the specific 
phenomenal character of the experiences. So, visual 
experiences have intentional features that are independent 
of the environments in which the subjects of the 
experiences are located. So, visual experiences have, in 
one clear sense of the term, narrow intentional contents @. 
168-9). 
But the narrow content of a perceptual experience does not 
exhaust its intentional content. For visual experiences. . . 
have wide contents too @. 169.). 
This is demonstrated by considering Jones and twin Jones experiences of 
Tigers; thus: 
(They have) experiences with identical narrow contents 
(and thereby identical phenomenal characters) but 
Merent wide contents (in virtue of their different 
environments) @. 169). 
Then he concludes by explicitly rejecting Harman and Dennett’s wide 
representationism. 
(This account) is in one respect, importantly ddferent 
from the views of Dennett and Harman. For they 
maintain that the relevant content is wide. The result is 
that, while I reject visual Qualia, I still agree with such 
philosophers as Shoemaker and Block that what it is like 
supervenes on what is in the head (p, 169). 
Tye appeals only to an intuition about the supervenienceof mental states on 
internalphysical constitution to motivate his account of narrow intentional 
content. He applies his distinction to inverted spectrums thus: 
It may be objected that I haven’t explained how Tom’s 
experience can represent green when, as I noted above, it 
is an experienceof the subjective sort that is normally 
produced in him by viewing red objects, and that 
normally produces in him the belief that something red is 
present. My reply should be obvious. wide 
functionalism cannot analyse the narrow content of visual 
experience, and this is a case of narrow content. So the 
tomato canlook greento Tom so long as his brain is not 
in the same physical state (p. 171, italics mine). 
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The success of this reply is dependent on the success of the notion of 
narrow content and whether it is applicable to phenomenal content or 
character. Tye’s 1994 response to inverted spectnuns does not sufficiently 
motivate a narrow content account based on his three Twin Earth scenarios. 
He offers a hastily arguedaccount of narrow contents, grounded only on the 
intuition that narrow intentional contents supervene on intrinsic physical 
states. If individuals are spectrum inverted, they must be physically 
different, thus they have different narrow contents. But it is not clear that 
his appeal to his three Twin Earth scenarios is an adequate justification for 
narrow intentional content. 
It is arguably as a response to Inverted Earth, a thought experiment 
considered in the next chapter, that a more plausible account of narrow 
intentional content might be thought to be applicable to phenomenal 
content or character, The lund of narrow intentional content account that 
will be presented is largely drawn from Jerry Fodor’s (1990) account of 
MROW content, but nstead of narrow intentional contents being functions 
that map contexts onto truth conditions, narrow contents will be defined as 
functions that map contexts onto contents. The narrow intentional content 
of a mental state is what is shared by the two mental states when they are 
transferredto distinct wide contexts. Whentwo individuals are in the same 
context and they have mental states with the same narrow content, then they 
will have mental states that sharea wide intentional content. In the case of 
the inverted spectrum scenario, the two individuals share a wide context, 
but it is understated as to whether they do, or do not, share narrow 
intentional contents; despite any physiological difference between the two 
individuals. If the two individuals, who, when in the same context share 
mental states with both narrow and wide intentional contents, are moved to 
different contexts, they will then have mental states that share a narrow 
content, but the wide intentional contents of their mental states will differ. 
This account of narrow intentional content will be developed and clarified in 
the next chapter as a representationist response to Inverted Earth. 
1.3.5 Relativity 
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Another possible ‘reply’ to inverted spectrums is based on the idea that the 
phenomenal content or charactersof mental states might still be intentional 
content states, and they are relational, but not with respect to inputs and 
outputs. They might be relational with regards to each other, and this 
might be described as the Frege-Schlick view. “The Frege-Schlick view 
holds that qualitative properties are relational - part of a purely relational 
structure” (Stalnaker, 1999, p.392). Robert Stalnaker (1999) presents an 
analogy with examples of relational structures, one of these being a 
relational theory of space: 
Thereare, on thls view, no absolute locations, one can 
still talk meaningfully about the spatial location of 
things, but this is just a framework for talking about the 
spatial relations between thlngs. . . The analogies support, 
I think, the coherenceof a purely functionalist account of 
qualia that takes phenomenal characterseriously, but treats 
it as a relational feature of our experience. Such a 
conception of qualia . . . might be grounded on . . . 
discriminatory capacities and judgements of similarity and 
Werence up.  3 93 -4). 
Stalnakerwas not the first to apply such an analogy to qualia and inverted 
spectrums. As Austen Clark (1985) argues: 
Qualia identification is in many ways analogous to 
identdkation of ~1aces . l~  (Indeed, for the functionalist, 
qualia is a sort of spatial identification, where the “space” 
is that defined by the order yielded by qualitative 
similarities and dissimilarities).*’. . . Corresponding to 
spectrum inversion is spatial inversion. One can imagine 
a universe wluch is spatially symmetric, so that relative to 
some locus every object has an exact spatial inverse. In 
such a universe, two places would satisfj the same spatial 
structural description, even when the spatial relations in 
which each stands are expanded to include every object in 
the universe. If the coordinate scheme is appropriately 
symmetric, every n-tuple of coordinates may be 
ambiguous in this way. But such a possibility fails to 
show that spatial location is not relational - that one can 
idenm some “absolute” location independently of the 
network of spatial relationships in which it stands. . . If 
ambiguity persists, we can disambiguate by ostension. . . 
Similarly, even if the structure of qualitative similarities 
is symmetric, locations in it can be disambiguated by 
ostension to samples. . . Green qualitative contents are 
those qualitatively similar to those qualitatively similar to 
Clark attributes this analogy to @ne (1969, pp. 49-51). 19 
2oSee Nelson Goodman (1977, pp 200-01). 
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the one occasioned by that (pointing). This identification 
can succeed for everyone, even under the supposition of 
spectrum inversion. The friend of qualia may question 
whether such a description picks out the same qualitative 
content in everyone. Here too the response is that once 
such relations are fixed, there is no further fact of the 
matter; the respective sensations satis@ all the 
determinatesenses of qualitative similarity and no other 
sense has been provided. To further query identity of 
qualiais analogous to querying identity of location, once 
spatial relations to some ostended place have been 
provided. 
Just as with spatial location, therefore, the fimctionalist 
holds to a relational theory of qualitative content. To 
spec@ the content of the sensory state is just to spec@ 
its place in a network of relationships of relative 
similarity and discriminability. To query its qualitative 
content in any more absolute way is as meaningless as 
querying location after co-ordinates have been given 
(pp.44 1-2). 
Applying Stalnaker’s analogy, it would be meaningless to compare one 
universe with another universe that was shifted three feet to the left. The 
relations are left intact, and therefore nothing really changes. To apply 
Clark’s analogy, it would be meaningless to compare two locations between 
a spatially inverted universe with a universe the right way up. The relevance 
of these analogyes should be fairly clear with regards to the inverted 
spectrum scenarios. Given two functionally identical individuals, there 
really are no grounds for claiming that their phenomenal characters are 
Merent if the relations between their mental states are kept intact. But 
what about the lenses in the intra-personalspectrum scenario? Surely these 
lenses do something to the phenomenal content or character of an 
individual. 
However, according to the zlativistic account, in the intra-personal scen ri0, 
the internal relations between an inhvidual’s mental states stay the same 
despite the insertion of colour lenses. These lenses maintain all the internal 
relations between mental states; so, for instance, when the individual at 
stage two has spectral inverting lenses inserted, all the phenomenal content 
or characterof his mental states only appear to be rearrangedwith respect to 
each other, but all the relations between the phenomenal content or 
charactersof hs mental states stay the same; thus, the rearangement of the 
phenomenal content or characters stays constant with regards to their 
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relations to each other. Therefore nothing phenomenal really changes after 
the immediate insertion of the lenses. Thereis no reason to believe that the 
individual will behave any differently from the way he did before these 
lenses were inserted. These lenses do not change the internal relations; 
therefore, the lenses change nothing. 
A curious feature of this account is that the functions relied on are not 
functions from inputs to mental states to outputs, but functions that rely on 
some kind of internal similarity/dissimilarity relations, although to what 
degree these comparisons are internal is not clear. A phenomenal content is 
not a mental state that stands in a relation to an objective feature of the 
world, but ‘something’ that stands in a complex similarity/dissimilarity 
relation to every other phenomenal content. There is a sense in whch 
phenomenal content or characteris made redundant because there is no 
objective phenomenal content or character, only similarity/dissimilarity 
relations constitute the phenomenal content. 
Is the above account of colour really plausible? The proponent of this 
relativistic account of colour appeals to his own brand of unsubstantiated 
metaphysical speculation. There is arguably a fairly strong intuition that 
colours really are monadic properties of objects or are constituted by 
monadic phenomenal contents ratherthan a complex relational property that 
any one colour really stands in a host of relations to other colours. 
One reply to the above relational account is to use the asymmetry of colour 
spaces against such an argument and resurrecta spectrum shifted argument 
along the lines of Blocks. In other words allow that the lenses change the 
similarity and discriminability functions. This allows for a violation of 
coextensive discriminability . The dwriminability functions are changed in 
a manner sufficient for there to be a change in phenomenal content or 
characterfor the individual after the lenses are inserted, but these changes are 
slight to not change any of the broader behaviours. Or if the cruder 
behaviours are changed, due to more substantial relational changes, after 
time the individual’s crude behaviours revert to a pattern similar to before 
the lens insertion. This allows for the plausibility of the above relational 
analysis, but uses functionalism against the representationist. 
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1.3.6 Current wide-functional roles are not the only determinersof 
content 
Another strategy for the representationist is to argue that historical wide- 
functional roles are also relevant. It is perhaps ironic that the 
representationists, who maintain that historic, wide-functional roles are 
determiners of content, are confronted by their own version of an inverted 
spectrum argument (Tye, 1995b, p. 206). It is possible that two beings 
could have perceptual contents determined by distinct historical functions; 
furthermore, these beings could in fact be physically identical. 
Now consider a creature that is a micro-physical duplicate 
of the first. The second creature is also a narrow 
functional duplicate. Might it undergo a different 
sensation?. . . , the answer to this is yes. All that we 
need to suppose is that the evolutionary histories and 
natural habitats of the two creatures are different, and that 
the brain states that realize sensations in the first creature 
are causally correlatedwith different external features from 
those the same brain states are causally correlatedwith in 
the second creature. In these circumstances, their 
sensations will have different representationalcontents and 
Merent phenomenal characters (Tye, 1995b, p.206). 
Tye still insists that these creatures have to be in distinct ‘natural habitats’ 
so their mental states also have distinct current wide-functional roles.*l 
Problems arise when historical wide-functional roles compete with current 
wide-functional roles. If phenomenal content or character is entirely 
determined by intentional content, wluch is only determined by historical 
long-arm functional roles, and if these historical long-arm functional roles 
aredistinct in the two creatures,and if these beings are moved to the same 
‘natural habitat,’ then these two creatures could still have distinct 
representationaland phenomenal characterdespite having mental states with 
identical current wide-functional roles. 
With only the relevanceof wide-functionalroles, it is not entirely clear how 
this point is applicable to the inter-personalspectrum inversion scenario. It 
~~ 
I am assuming that when Tye refers to the causal correlations with 
external features, these occur both in the history of the creature and with 




is hard to see what, if any, the historical long-arm functional roles of the 
mental states of  an individual, plays, when he has had lenses inserted. 
This representationist position has, however, considerable relevance when 
the thought experiment of the next chapter is considered. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Just as Jack responds to his ‘metaphysical speculation’ about whether 
Gwendolen could only love a man named Ernest, ‘metaphysical 
speculations’ about inverted spectrums raise a whole host of possible types 
of representationists, as they attempt to respond to the argument. Perhaps 
the clearest type of representationist who faces a challenge from the inverted 
spectrum is the representationistwho holds that current long-arm functional 
roles determine content. Is their theory shown to be false? No, but it looks 
as if, when confronted by the inter-personal spectrum inversion, they might 
well have to argue for some lund of phenomenal re-inversion. Alternatively 
they might try to appeal to fine-grainedfunctional differences between both 
the individual at an early stage of his life and at the latter stage of his life. 
But these fine-graineddistinctions must then be relevant to this person’s 
wide intentional contents. If the representationis can only appeal to coarse 
fimctional differences that result in the application of broader linguistic 
concepts, ’on the fly,‘ then the appeal to fine-grainedfunctional Merences 
is not only redundant, it, ironically, suggests a way in which a shifted 
spectrum argument might be presented, not as mere metaphysical 
speculation, but as an argument against the representationist based on ‘facts 
of life’ (Block, 1999). 
An alternative representationist response attempts to ground phenomenal 
character on intemal similarity/dissimilarity relations. But these relations 
seem to ignore the importance of the relations between these states and the 
world; however, it is not easy for the phenomenist to adopt such a response 
to internal relations. But, it is not clear whether the representationist can 
consistently maintain such a relativistic account of colour given their 
insistence that colour really is a property of objects that constitutes the 
intentional content of the mental state. Another phenomenist response to 
these internal relations is to claim that the subtleties of  these internal 
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relations may result in functional differences, but these fine-grained 
differences are not sufficient for establishing differences in intentional 
content. Finally the relativistic account relies on its own brand of pure 
‘metaphysical speculation’. 
In the next chapter another ‘metaphysical speculation’ is considered: 
Inverted Earth. Ths metaphysical speculation motivates a 
representationism that appeals to narrow intentional contents as functions 
that map contexts onto contents. Inverted Earth also motivates a 
representationist account of intentional content that relies on historical long- 
arm functional roles. Ultimately the Inverted Earth argument will be 
demonstrated to fail as a conclusive refutation of representationism, but 
Inverted Earth is instrumental in showing how some of the representationist 
replies to inverted spectrums, are not so easily applicable to Inverted Earth. 
Indeed some of these replies to inverted spectrums motivate the very 
premises of the Inverted Earth argument against the representationist. 
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Chapter 2: Inverted Earth 
2.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter various replies to inverted spectrum scenarios were 
considered and distinct types of representationism were introduced emerging 
out of possible replies to the inverted spectrum scenario. There were some 
representationist replies that by their non-engagement with inverted 
spectrums left much to the imagination as to the type of representatiorism 
being sustained by the objectors; however, there were some types of 
representationism that were more revealing. A ‘linguistic-conceptual’ type 
of representationismemergesout of a reply to inverted spectrums based on 
the meaninglessness of sensation terms zf sensation terms are taken to only 
refer to some kind of private inner object. It is precisely this type of 
consideration that partly motivates Block’s presentation of the Inverted 
Earth argument (Block, 1990). A current long-arm functional role 
representationism also motivates Block’s presentation of inverted spectrum 
arguments and his presentation of Inverted Earth; that is, current long-arm 
(or wide) functions of mental states determine the intentional contents of 
mental states. 
In this and the next chapter, the representationist replies to inverted 
spectrums will be critically evaluated with specific reference to their replies 
to Inverted Earth; thus elaborating on some of the representationisms 
already encountered. For example, is an appeal to phenomenal re-inversion 
applicable to Inverted Earth? Two further types of representationism, partly 
motivated as possible replies to Inverted Earth, will be considered: narrow 
content representationism and historical wide functionalist 
representationism. The former will be &scussed in this chapter, the latter in 
the following chapter. The narrow content representationist account of 
phenomenal characterwill be demonstrated to fail on grounds independent 
of Inverted Earth. The hstorical wide representationist response will be 
rejected for the following reasons: first, because of problems inherent with 
these types of accounts when applied to phenomenal content; and second, 
because of the availability of a superior response to Inverted Earth. Finally, 
in the next chapter, this superior wide representationist response to Inverted 
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Earth will be presented as the most adequate representationist response to 
Inverted Earth. 
2.2.1 Inverted Earth 
Inverted spectnuns were presented in the last chapter as an attempt to 
describe a case where an individual might have identical intentional contents 
to his mental states as another individdor himself at an earlier stage, but 
these two indwiduals have distinct phenomenal contents or charactersto 
their mental states. Block (1990, 1996) presents Inverted Earth as an 
attempt to describe an intuitively plausible scenario whereby an individual 
has distinct intentional contents with another person, or himself at an earlier 
stage, but has identical phenomenal content to his mental states. 
I will describe a case. . . of inverted intentional content . 
. . combined with identical qualitative content. . . I will 
describe a case of two persons/stages whose experiences 
are qualitatively the same but intentionally . . . inverted 
(Block, 1990, p.62). 
For example, an individual, Ed, shares the intentional content of his mental 
states with another individual, Ted. Ted, however, clearly has mental 
states with intentional contents distinct from the intentional contents of 
Ed’s mental states at an earlier time in Ed’s life. Thus, the intentional 
content of Ed’s mental states changebetween an early stage in hs life and a 
later stage in hs life. However, the phenomenal contents or character of 
Ed’s mental states stays the same throughout his life. Therefore, intentional 
content is Qstinct from phenomenal content or character; representationism 
is false. 
The phenomenal contents or characterof Ed’s mental states stays the same 
for two reasons. First, InvertedEarth is a place where all the colours of 
objects are inverted: Bananas really are purplehlue and fire engnes are 
green, grass is red and the sky is yellow. Second, Ed travels to Inverted 
Earth, but has lenses inserted that re-invert the look of all the colours of 
objects. 22 Therefore, the phenomenal characterof Ed’s mental states stays 
All Ed’s colour pigments are changed so that his skin does not look a 22 
funny colour, as are his bodily fluids. 
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the same. Nothing changes phenomenally for Ed after he arrives on Inverted 
Earth. For Ed the sky looks just as blue and the grass looks just as green. 
Block (1990) describes the inversion process and the constancy in 
phenomenal content or characterin the Earthling’s mental states thus: 
A team of mad scientists knock you out. While you are 
out cold, they insert color inverting lenses into your eyes, 
andchangeyour body pigments so you don’t have a nasty 
shock when you wake up and look at your feet. They 
transport you to Inverted Earth. . . You wake up, and 
since the inverting lenses cancel out the inverted colors, 
you notice no differenceat all. . . For example the Yellow 
sky looks Blue to you. , . As far as the qualitative aspect 
of your mental life is concerned, nothing is any different 
from the way it would have been had you stayed at home 
(p.63). 
Why does the intentional content of Ed’s mental states change? The type of 
representationist under consideration determines the specific motivation for 
thrnking that the intentional content of Ed’s mental states change. 
2.2.2 Linguistic agreement 
Let us start with a type of linguistic-conceptual or ‘semantic’ 
representationism motivated out of the ‘anti-private language’ reply to 
inverted spectrums. Ted is an inhabitant of Inverted Earth; however, he is 
part of a linguistic community that has an unusual language. Ted’s colour 
terms are inverted relative to Earth: what we would call ’red,’ Ted would 
call ’green,’ what we would call ’yellow,’ Ted would call ’blue’. Ripe 
tomatoes on Inverted Earth do happen to be green; therefore, Ted describes 
ripe tomatoes on Inverted Earth as ‘red. ’ The curious implication of all this 
is that when Ed arrives on InvertedEarth and has lenses placed in his eyes, 
he appears to be in complete linguistic agreement with Ted concerning hs 
usage of all his colour terms and the way these colour terms are ascribed to 
objects. Why does linguistic agreement matter to the content of mental 
states? Well, if we recall from the last chapter, it might be argued that 
Wittgensteinian considerations suggest that colour terms do not refer to 
‘inner private objects,’ but only derive their meaning from use within a 
linguistic community in a shared environment. Ed and Ted share a 
languagethat agrees with the meaning of their colour terms and they share 
an environment. However, comparing Ted to Earthling’s on Earth, there 
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appears to be a substantial linguistic disagreement between Earthlings and 
Invertlings as to the meaning of colour terms. Therefore, the referents of 
Ed’s colour terms must change. 
If this is so, and the ’semantic’ representationism is assumed, then the 
contents of Ed’s mental states necessarily change. His belief that ripe 
tomatoes are ’red’ must change since he now belongs to a linguistic 
community where the meaning of the term ‘red’ has changed. Maybe it 
takes a while to become embedded in a linguistic community before there is 
complete linguistic agreement. However, if so, this is no threat to the 
argument. This is no threat to the argumentbecause all that has to be done 
to mod@ the scenario is to allow Ed to stay on Inverted Earth until he 
becomes embedded in his new linguistic community. 
Nonetheless, according to me, after enough time has 
passed on InvertedEarth, your embedding in the physical 
and linguistic environment of Inverted Earth would 
dominate, and so your intentional contents would shift to 
be the same as those of the natives (Block, 1990, p.64). 
But, however long Ed stays, the phenomenal characteror content of his 
mental states will not change; whilst the intentional contents of his mental 
states will change. 
So, one major motivation for thinking that Ed shares intentional contents 
with Ted is grounded on the anti-private language considerations to which 
the representationist might have appealed in order to rule out inverted 
spectrums. The difference between the intentional content of Ted’s mental 
states and Ed’s mental states at an earlier stage in Ed’s life are also 
grounded on the anti-private language considerations that the 
representationist might have appealed to in order to rule out inverted 
spectrums. Therefore, a change in the intentional contents of Ed’s mental 
states is also motivated out of anti-private language considerations. 
However, there are extremely good grounds for thinking that the 
phenomenal characteror content of Ed’s mental states do not change, 
between himself at an early stage of his life and himself at a later stage in 
his life, because of the lenses. Thus, the intentional content of this 
individual’s mental states change whilst the phenomenal characteror content 
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of this individual’s mental states do not. Therefore, intentional content 
does not entirely constitute phenomenal content or character; ‘ semantic’ 
representationismis false. 
2.2.3 Current long-arm functional roles 
However, anti-private language considerations are not the only motivation 
for arguing that the intentional content of Ed’s mental states change. If the 
representationistmaintains that it is the current long-arm functional roles 
that determine content, then the Inverted Earth scenario need make no appeal 
to either anti-private language considerations or a third party individual in 
order to establish a change in intentional content in Ed’s mental states. 
Ed at an early stage in his life has mental states with certain current 
functional roles and Ed at a later stage in his lrfe has mental states with 
distinct current functional roles. An appeal to the current wide functional 
roles of Ed’s mental states thus motivates a change in content in Ed’s 
mental states. On Earth, the mental states of Ed, whch once tracked ripe 
tomatoes, fulfilled a certain current function that enabled him to describe red 
tomatoes as ’red’ and ident@ red objects. The inputs to Ed’s mental states 
with red intentional content, on Earth, were red objects such as ripe earth 
tomatoes, but after the move to Inverted Earth, the current mental states that 
once served to ident@ ripe tomatoes as ‘red’, now function to ident@ 
green objects. The inputs to Ed’s mental states of ripe tomatoes on Inverted 
Earth arise from green objects; thus the inputs to Ed’s mental states change. 
The outputs of Ed’s mental states also change because the mental states that 
once caused an interaction with red objects now cause interactions with 
greenobjects. Both the inputs and the outputs to Ed’s mental states change 
after the move to Inverted Earth; thus the current long-arm functional roles 
of Ed’s mental states changeafter he moves to InvertedEarth: 
M o u  are in a state produced in a natural and immediate 
way by blue things, one that plays the aforementioned 
familiar role controlling your responses to blue things. 
At the same time, Twin [or yourself at an earlier time] is 
in a state produced by yellow things, one that plays the 
same familiar functional role in controlling his [or 
yourself at an earlier time] responses to yellow things 
(Block, 1990, p.66). 
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The current long-arm functional roles of Ed’s mental states change; thus the 
intentional content of Ed’s mental states changes. Yet, the phenomenal 
content or characterof Ed’s mental states does not change because of the 
inverting lenses; therefoe, current long-arm functional representationism is 
false. 
Alternatively, a third party might be introduced to demonstrate a change of 
intentional content based on long-arm functional roles. Ted might be re- 
introduced. Ted, the InvertedEarthling, has mental states with a current 
functional role identical to Ed’s after Ed arrives on Inverted Earth. This is 
because the kmds of input that enters Ted’s mental states when Ted looks at 
a ripe tomato on Inverted Earth are the same kmds of input that enters EM’S 
mental states when Ed looks at a ripe tomato on InvertedEarth. The output 
of Ted’s mental states when he responds to the ripe tomato are the same as 
the outputs of Ed’s mental states when he responds to a ripe tomato on 
Inverted Earth. There is no functional difference between Ted and Ed. 
However, Ted’s mental states serve a current functional role clearly distinct 
from the functional role Ed’s mental states used to play. Therefore, the 
current long-arm functional role of Ed’s mental states change$ thus, 
according to a representationist that holds that current long-arm functional 
roles determine intentional content, Ed’s intentional contents change. Yet, 
Ed undergoes no phenomenal change because of the lenses. Therefore, 
intentional content does not entirely constitute phenomenal content or 
character;current wide representationism is false. 
Just as one might consider linguistic embedding to take some time, after Ed 
arrives on Inverted Earth, one might argue that a change in the long-arm 
fknctional roles of Ed’s mental states takes some time to establish after Ed 
arrives on Inverted Earth. It might be argued that it is not the immediate 
inputs and outputs of mental states that determines the intentional content 
of these mental states, but causal co-variations between the mental states 
and what they ’track’ now and what they used to truck determines the 
intentional content of mental states. These causal co-variations might take 
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some time to establish.23 This lund of account of intentional content 
begins to move away from what might be described as current long-arm 
functional representationism. It is how mental states have functioned in the 
past that begins to be relevant as to the intentional content of these mental 
states. Once again, however, this is no threat to the Inverted Earth 
argument. It merely has to be maintainedthat however long Ed stays on 
Inverted Earth, even after his mental states have started to CO-vary with 
objects on Inverted Earth, the phenomenal character of Ed’s mental states 
stays constant. 
2.2.4 Summing up the Inverted Earth argument 
It appears difficult for the representationist to argue that the phenomenal 
characterof the Earthlings mental states does not stay the same after the 
move to Inverted Earth because of the strange colours on Inverted Earth, and 
the insertion of colour-inverting lenses into the eyes of the Earthling. 
Therefore the first premise is established: there is no change in the 
phenomenal content or character of the Earthling ’s mental states between 
before he arrived on InvertedEarth, after he arrived on Inverted Earth and 
for however long the Earthling stays on Inverted Earth. However, the 
intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states changes. 
The intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states changes because he 
becomes embedded in a new linguistic community on Inverted earth where 
colour terms referto different colours. If there are no ‘private inner objects’ 
or intrinsic properties to which these colour terms refer, then it must be 
assumed that as the Earthling’s colour terms start to become synonymous 
with the language of his current community, the meanings of his colour 
terms change. The intentional contents of his mental states likewise 
change. Alternatively the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental 
states changebecause the current long-arm (or wide) functional roles of his 
mental states change. If current long-arm functional roles determine 
intentional content, then the intentional content of the Earthling changes. 
The second premise is established: either by the ‘anti-privatelanguage’ reply 
See Dretske ( 198 1,1995) for an account of causal co-variation determining 23 
intentional content. 
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to inverted spectrums, or by the representationistappeal to the current long- 
arm functional roles of mental states; the intentional content of the 
Earthling changes either after his immediate arrival on Inverted Earth, or 
however long it takes to become embedded in the linguistic community, or 
however long it takes for his mental states to start to causally co-vary with 
the properties of objects in his new environment 
The phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling’s mental states stays 
constant; the intentional content of the Earhtling’s mental states changes; 
therefore, representationismis false. 
2.3.1 The representationist replies 
There appears to be two general strateges open to the representationist : first, 
to deny that the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states really 
changes. If the intentional content does not change then, there is no 
problem with the phenomenal character of the mental states staying 
constant. Perhaps there is something in the history of the Earthling that 
fixes the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states, Alternatively, 
perhaps the Earthling’s narrow intentional content stays the same while the 
Earthling’s wide intentional content changes. These replies will be 
discussed in due course. 
The second representationist strategy is to deny that the phenomenal content 
or characterof the Earthling stays constant after he arrives on Inverted Earth. 
If the phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling’s mental states re- 
inverts, as the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states changes, 
then there is no reason to assume that phenomenal characteris anythmg over 
and above intentional content. If the repraentationist maintains that the 
intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states changes as soon as the 
earthling arrives on Inverted Earth, then there must be an immediate 
phenomenal re-inversion. If the representationist maintains that the 
intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states slowly changes after he 
lives on Inverted Earth for a while, then there must be a slow phenomenal 
re-inversion. 
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2.3.2 Phenomenal re-inversion and ‘semantic’ representationism 
The ’linguistic-conceptual’ or ‘semantic’ representationist might employ 
phenomenal re-inversion to correspond with the changes in the meanings of 
the Earthling’s concepts. This, however, looks somewhat implausible 
because it is not clear as to what the Earthling’s colour terms refer to, as the 
Earthling’s intentional content proceeds around the spectrum to get back to 
normal. If ’something’ is creeping back to normal, then what is tlus 
‘something’ that the colour terms of the Earthling are supposed to be 
referring to? To employ the semantic representationist’s refrain: ”this 
something is a nothing.”24 But if there is a nothmg, then nothing slowly 
creeps around the spectrum. If nothing slowly creeps around the spectrum, 
then there is no phenomenal re-inversion. Slow phenomenal re-invesion is 
just not consistent with tlus type of representationism. 
If there is no slow adapting ‘around’ the spectrum, then it looks like this 
lund of representationism requires an immediate and complete switch in 
intentional content as soon as the meaning of the Earthling’s colour terms 
changes. But is an immediate switch really plausible only because an 
individual slowly becomes embedded in a distinct linguistic community? 
Arguably not. 
However, it seems extremely implausible that Ned’s 
experience of these colours would undergo a 
corresponding shift: his qualitative experience doesn’t 
flicker, or become indeterminate, or finally reverse, as the 
semantics of his words and thoughts might well do, 
simply as a result of conversing with Inverted Earthlings 
(Rey, 1998, p.443). 
To put further strain on the representationist who appeals to anti-private 
language considerations, imagine if Ed was to return to Earth with an 
Invertling, Ted. Ted would disagree with the native Earthlings, describing 
a bananaas ‘blue’; Ed would agreewith Ted that the banana is ‘blue’. This 
would be so if Ed’s perceptual processing mechanisms have somehow 
counteractedthe effect of the lenses; thus he would see it as yellow. He has 
fully adaptedto the Invertling’s language, so he calls yellow things ‘blue’. 
They might claim that it is a ‘something’, but accordmg to the semantic 24 
representationist it is certainly not an inner object of awareness. 
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If he has not ’adapted’ to hs lenses and phenomenally re-inverted, he would 
also describe the banana as ‘blue’. He would see the banana as blue and 
describe it as ‘blue’. Now imagine that a native Earthling, Fred, puts on 
colour inverting lenses. If Fred talks to Ted his colour terms means one 
thing, if‘ he talks to a native Earthling his colour terms mean another thing, 
but it is simply not clear how being part of one linguistic community as 
opposed to another linguistic community has any effect on the phenomenal 
content or character of the mental states of Fred; it is the lenses that 
matter. 
This representationist might attempt to appeal to fine-grained functional 
differencesbetween the Earthling and the Invertlings to argue that they never 
really mean the same things despite the apparent agreement in their use of 
colour terms. But it is not clear as to how fine-grained functional 
differencesin the use of colour terms is salient to the meanings of colour 
terms. Therefoz, I am going to agree with Georges Rey and also argue that 
h s  type of representationismdoes not have the resourcesto handle Inverted 
Earth because: “phenomenal similarities and differences don’t track wide 
semantic similarities and Merences” (Rey, 1998, p.442). However, other 
types of representationism might also appeal to phenomenal re-inversion. 
2.3.3.1 Phenomenal re-inversion and current long-arm functional 
rep resent ationism 
The current long-am functional representationist might also appeal to 
phenomenal re-inversion, just as they appealed to phenomenal re-inversion 
in the intra-personal spectrum inversion scenario discussed in the last 
chapter. First Michael Tye (1998): 
Reflecting further, am I going to insist that there is no 
phenomenal difference between my present visual 
experienceand my earlierone? . . . Indeed, if the ‘I’ of the 
thought experiment is myself, then the answer is 
‘Certainly not.’ Since, in my view, the phenomenal 
characterof any phenomenal state . . . is a matter of 
representationalcontent, it immediately follows that there 
is a difference between the phenomenal characterthat is 
presently accessible to me, as it were, and the original 
phenomenal characterof my visual experienceat t (given 
the representationalchange) (pp.470-1). 
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- then Brendon Lalor (1999): 
The interactivist response to the Inverted Earth argument, 
then, is clear: deny Block’s intuition that ripe tomatoes 
would look red to his twin; they would come to look 
green, since that’s the color of tomatoes on Inverted Earth. 
Their looking green to him is just a matter of the 
information-bearing states in him being linked to the 
world so as to signal green under what have become 
normal conditions (p.269). 
It is possible to delineate Merent types of phenomenal re-inversion. The 
first type of phenomenal re-inversion is either an immediate total 
phenomenal re-inversion as soon as the Earthling opens his eyes, for the 
first time, on InvertedEarth, or an immediate and total switch that occurs at 
some later time after the Earthling’s arrival on Inverted Earth. Either he 
really sees the colours of objects for what they really are, as soon as he 
arrives on Inverted Earth, or a total instantaneous phenomenal re-inversion 
occurs at some point later on in his stay on Inverted Earth; one moment he 
sees things as they looked as on Earth, then the next minute he sees the 
colours as they really are. The second type of re-inversionis a slow shifting 
aroundthe spectrum as the look of objects creeps back, to reflect the actual 
colours of objects. 
2.3.3.2 Immediate and total phenomenal re-inversion 
The problem with the immehate and total phenomenal re-inversion reply, 
when applied to Inverted Earth, is that as soon the Earthling arrives on 
Inverted Earth and opens his eyes, he has had lenses inserted into hs eyes! 
The whole point of the lenses is to change the look of the objects so that 
objects appearthe way tlungs once used to look to the Earthling back on 
Earth. According to this representationist reply, the very existence of the 
lenses begs the question against the Represenationist, but what is so 
troubling about these lenses? It is worth recalling the relativistic account 
of colour discussed in the last chapter. 
If colours are only determined by their relations of similarity and differences 
to other colours, then this has some curious implications for Block’s 
attempted construction of the InvertedEarth scenario. First, it would not be 
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possible to even paint objects diflerent colours and keep their relations to 
one another intact. Second, it would not be possible to createlenses that 
would change the look of colours and keep the colours' relations to one 
another intact. This is the case not only because our colour spaces are 
asymmetrical, although this does present a problem of keeping fine-grained 
functional differences intact, but also because, according to the relational 
theory, being a colour just is its relations of similarity and Werences to all 
other colours. Block's scenario is, therefore, doubly impossible according 
to a relational theory of colour for the following reasons: first, because of 
the impossibility of painting objects different colours and keeping their 
relations intact; and second, because of the impossibility of creating lenses 
that invert the looks of colours whilst maintaining their relative relations of 
differencesand similarities. Not only do the colours of objects on Inverted 
Earth not change relative to the colours of objects on Earth, the lenses do 
nothing. If the relativistic account of colour is accurate, then the inverted 
Earth scenario is equivalent to a complete and total phenomenal re-inversion 
as soon as the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth. Seeing as there is no 
phenomenal inversion in the first place, the colours of thmgs on Inverted 
Earthlook no Werent from the colours of h n g s  on Earth but not because 
of the lenses. 
However, one obvious reply to this reply is to doubt the plausibility of a 
relational theory of colour. If the relational theory is assumed, it should be 
possible to start with a colour wheel and change one colour segment of the 
wheel so that it looks different, then every other segment could be changed, 
one at a time, so that all the original relations are kept intact. But by the 
time the painting of the colour wheel is finished, the changein colour of the 
origrnal segment would no longer look any different from the way it looked 
before it was painted. This does not look intuitively plausible. 
Another alternative for the proponent of the Inverted Earth argument is to 
bow to the pressures of a relational theory of colour and allow that painting 
objects Merent colours will not maintain relations of similarity and 
differences. The Earthling does not undergo a spectrum inversion, but a 
spectrum shifting. The lenses will somehow restore these relations so that 
objects will continue to look, to the Earthling, just the way they looked on 
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Earth. If the Earthling were to remove his lenses, the colours of objects 
would look very different albeit not symmetrically inverted. We must 
remember that all that is required is that the phenomenal content or character 
of the individual’s mental states stays the same while the differencein the 
colours of objects is sufficient to establish a differencein intentional content 
of this individual’s mental states. There will, however, remain fine-grained 
functional differencesbetween the Earthling’s and the Invertlings. 
Finally, it is perhaps not clear that the representationist under consideration 
can consistently maintain that colours are not objective monadic properties 
of objects. If it is acceptedthat colours are objective monadic properties of 
objects that are not determined relationally, with regards to one another, 
then the lenses are a realistic possibility; thus the plausibility of immediate 
and total phenomenal re-inversion is lughly suspect. 
2.3.3.3 
inversion some time aper the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth 
Total and complete phenomenal re-inversion or a slow re- 
Ifthe representationst maintains that it takes a while for the mental states 
of the Earthling to functionally establish themselves in their new 
environment, the total and instantaneous phenomenal re-inversion or the 
completion of the slow phenomenal re-inversion might occur some time 
&er the arrival of the Earthling on Inverted Earth. It is only when the 
phenomenal re-inversion occurs that the intentional contents of the 
Earthling ’ s mental states change. 
[Tlhey would come to look green, since that’s the color of 
tomatoes on Inverted Earth (Lalor, 1999, p.268, italics 
mine). 
Brendon Lalor appeals to the slow variety of phenomenal re-inversion. 
However, the question remainsas to what exactly is the specific cause of the 
phenomenal re-inversion? He supports his claim partly with an appeal to 
the plasticity of our visual systems and more specifically a gesture towards 
experiments involving spatially inverting goggles: 
[I]n the muchdiscussed studies on visual field inverting 
goggles, the world comes to seem n o d  to many 
visually inverted subjects to the point that they can go 
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about their lives as usual. Subjects who adjusted most 
thoroughly did not think of their visual fields as upside 
down. In all of these cases, after recalibration, 
informational properties are restored or preserved, and 
with them, experiential properties (p.269). 
According to Lalor’s interpretation of the data, concerning spatial goggle 
inversion, the wearers of these goggles, over time, phenomenally re-invert 
the spatial inver~ion .~~ If spatial reinversions can occur, why could not the 
Earthling’s mental states compensate for the colour inverting lenses, thus 
phenomenally re-inverting in a way that corresponds to the change in 
intentional content of the mental states? According to this reply, given the 
plasticity of our visual system, all of which is supported by impressive 
empirical research(Gwendo1en would be pleased), it is perfectly possible to 
endorse some kind of slow phenomenal re-inversion in the Earthling. 
Indeed we might be compelled to accept some kind of phenomenal re- 
inversion in the Earthling. 
However, the Inverted Earth scenario is set up in such a way that the 
plasticity of the visual system of the Earthling is simply not relevant. In 
the Inverted Earth scenario, there is no opportunity for the plasticity of the 
Earthling’s visual system to assert itself. If we consider the spatially 
inverting goggles, the individual wearing the goggles has to substantially 
alter his basic motor actions in order to perform even simple tasks; for 
example, catching a ball or making a cup of tea. Furthermore, it is arguably 
the agent’s self motivated behavioural gross re-adjustment, in order to 
perform simple tasks, that is requiredfor there to be any re-inversion. (Held 
& Blossom, 1961).26 But the Earthling who wears the colour inverting 
However, this is by no means clearly established by the existing 25 
experimental data on inverting lenses (see Dolezal, 1982, pp.227-8). But 
for the sake of  argument let us assume that Lalor’s interpretation is accurate. 
Previous experiments have shown that errors in hand-eye coordination 
induced by this prism rearrangement were partially compensated only after S 
had moved his hand under the rearranged condition. A more interesting 
result . . . was the finding that after S’s passive hand and arm had been 
moved in a comparable manner by E, no compensation occurred. . . 
According to these results, not simply movement but self-produced 
movement with its contingent reafferent stimulation is the critical factor in 
compensation for rearrangement. , . Experimental procedures showed that 
full and exact compensation for these errors requires gross bodily movement 
and more specifically, self-produced movement for prolonged periods of 
exposure ” (Held & Blossom, 1961, pp. 34, 37). 
26cc 
I .  
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lenses requires no self-motivated behavioural re-adjustment in order to 
cope with his new environment on InvertedEarth. 
For the Earthling, everything looks just the same way as it did on Earth. 
Making a cup of tea on Inverted Earth is just as simple as malung one on 
Earth. Even if the Earthling were to become an art historian, he would have 
no problems describing the colours of paintings in a way that would not 
raisean eyebrow with any of his colleagues. Notice that in the case of the 
intra-personal spectrum inversion, the individual, after the lenses were 
inserted, might have to behaviourally re-adjust to fit into his lingustic 
community; therefore,Lalor’s reply based on the plasticity of our visual 
systems might be applicable to inverted spectrum scenarios,27 but it is 
certainly not applicable to Inverted Earth. 
So a deeper question remains about the Earthling on Inverted Earth: What 
possible change in his mental states motivates a possible change in the 
phenomenal content or characterof this individual’s mental states? He does 
not have to change his language. No self-motivated behavioural re- 
adjustment is requiredto perform even the simplest of tasks. Presumably, 
from the retina inwards there is absolutely no change in the internal 
processing of  the Earthling’s brain states. Plausibility suggests that the 
phenomenal content or character of this individual stays the same. 
However, the wide representationist consistently claims that the only change 
is in the relations of the individual to his environment and none of the 
internal states need change, yet according to the wide representationist the 
relations matter. 
Curiously, however, a further implication of the wide represenlationist 
reply, which relies on phenomenal re-inversion, is that because the 
intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states is constituted by only 
the long-arm functional roles or the Earthling’s mental states, the internal 
functional roles of the Earthling’s mental states necessarily do not change. 
I f  phenomenal re-inversion occurs, the Earthling must not notice. 
~~ ~ 
Although it is not clear what gross behavioural re-adjustments are required 27 
to phenomenally re-invert if ones colours are inverted; perhaps if one 
worked in a paint factory moving pots of paint around and matching them 
to labels. 
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Assuming that the wide representationist still maintains that there is a 
phenomenal re-inversion without any appeal to empirical evidence, but only 
because phenomenal re-inversion is an empirical possibility, they still have 
to account for the phenomenal characterof the Earthling changing without 
the Earthling noticing. 
2.3.3.4 Unnoticed phenomenal shifts 
Given the supposition that the Earthling fails to notice the phenomenal 
shift, and indeed this is required if the representationist maintains that is 
only the wide functions of the mental states that count when it comes to 
intentional contents, there is arguably a substantial prima facie burden on 
the represatationist to explain how this phenomenal re-inversion could 
occur without the Earthling noticing. This requirement most likely will 
rule out a complete spontaneous re-inversion at some point in the 
Earthling’s stay on InvertedEarth. Slow re-inversionsthat creep around the 
spectrum look like the most plausible option for the representationist. A 
failure in short term memories of colours would also be helpful to the 
representationist . 
The subject never notices a change in qualia because of 
slow compensatory adjustments to the mechanism which 
recall memories of how things used to look (Lalor, 1999 
p.271). 
Arguably, the reason why the shifting has to be slow is that this might 
allow for the introduction of an argument based on the well-established fact 
that we often have trouble distinguishing between distinct but close shades 
of colour (Lycan, 1996). 
2.3.3.5 Transitivity failure 
If the proponent o f  the Inverted Earth argument argues that the phenomenal 
content or characterof the Earthling’s experience of, for example, the sky 
does not change after the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth and stays on 
Inverted Earth for a considerable period of time only because the sky’s shade 
of blue looks just like the shade of blue it looked like a moment/week/year 
ago, then William Lycan (1996) argues that the supporter of the Inverted 
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Earth argument relies on a false transitivity principle to establish this 
phenomenal constancy. Transitivity failure is sometimes shown to fail 
across the distinguishability of close colours on a patch, in thls case, the 
colours are not presented adjacent to each other on a patch, but temporarily, 
one after the other. 
Block needs a longsh interval during which all the 
relevant representational content change but colour 
sensations remain introspectively indistinguishable. 
Perhaps the representationalcontents do gradually change, 
but what shows that the colour sensations’ Strange Qualia 
. . . do not change with the representational contents? I 
suspect that a transitivity principle is at work here: if e1 is 
introspectively indistinguishable from e2 and e2 is 
introspectively indistinguishable from e3, then e 1 is 
introspectively indistinguishable from e3, and 
introspective indistinguishability is maintained over a 
long interval by way of very short experience-pair 
intervals (Lycan, 1996, p. 128). 
Lycan claims that the proponent of the Inverted Earth argument is 
committed to argcung that the phenomenal characterof the Earthling stays 
the same after hs arrival on Inverted Earth only because of the following 
argument: The sky looks blue on the first day the Earthling arrives on 
Inverted Earth. On the second day, the sky looks just as blue to the 
Earthling as it did on the first day. On the third day, the sky looks just as 
blue on the second day. Therefore, by the phenomenist applying a false 
principle of transitivity, the phenomenist infers that the sky on the third day 
looks exactly the same shade of blue to the Earthling as it did on the first 
day. According to Lycan the phenomenist assumes transitivity and re- 
iterates it for as long as they care; thus establishing that the phenomenal 
characterof the Earthling’s mental states do not phenomenally re-invert. 
After Lycan commits the anti-representationist to this transitivity principle, 
he rejects the transitivity principle; thus, according to Lycan, re-opening up 
the plausibility of phenomenal re-inversion without the Earthling noticing: 
I do not grant such a transitivity principle . . . notoriously 
there can be a just noticeable difference between a and c 
even though there is no just noticeable difference between 
a and b or between b and c (p. 128). 
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According to Lycan the only motivation for maintaining a constancy in 
phenomenal characteris undermined; therefore, there are no grounds for the 
anti-representationistto maintain that the phenomenal content or character of 
the Earthling’smental states stay the same while the intentional contents of  
the Earthling’s mental states differ. 
However, it is not clear that the phenomenist needs to deny Lycan’s 
transitivity principle in order to jus* why there cannot be unnoticed 
phenomenal shifts in the case of InvertedEarth. Lycan mistakenly assumes 
that the phenomenist relies on a false transitivity principle for 
discrimination of close shades to establish that there is no change in the 
phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling. Lycan, however, ignores 
that failure of transitivity is applicable only to close shades. It is surely 
plausible that transitivity holds for widely distinct shades of colour. 
Yellowish orange is clearly distinguishable from reddish orange; reddish 
orange is clearly distinguishable from red; thus it is also fairly plausible 
that yellowish orange is clearly distinguishable from red. Furthermore, 
anyone who argues for an unnoticed phenomenal re-inversion is not just 
committed to a failure of transitivity of close shades but a re-iteration of 
this failure to get from one shade to a very different shade; and this is 
arguably absurd as David Chalmers ( 1  996) points out: 
It is true that there can be unnoticeable differences between 
different experiences. If one changes a shade of red little 
enough, I will not be able to tell the difference. . . but if 
this were all that was going on one could re-iterate such a 
changea thousand times, eventually showing that red and 
blue produce the same experiences, which is ridiculous. 
So there can be some difference in experience that is not 
noticeable. One can observe this phenomenon by looking 
at a wide expanse of paint of  subtly varying shade; 
sometimes it is extremely cfifficult to tell whether one’s 
experienceof differentparts is the same or different. But 
importantly unnoticeable differences are very small 
Q.267). 
It is precisely the large kinds of colour shifts that Lycan thinks can un- 
problematically occur without the agent noticing through a series of re- 
iterated failures of transitivity. Lycan simply assumes that a denial of 
transitivity of  close shades is sufficient for claiming that an individual when 
perceiving a shift from orange to red will not at some point notice that there 
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has been a change in his phenomenal content or character; surely this is 
mistaken. 
Furthermore, transitivity is irrelevantas a justification for a constancy in the 
phenomenal character of the Earthling's mental states because transitivity 
does not need to be invoked in order to argue that there is no shift in the 
phenomenal content or character of the Earthling's mental states. The 
phenomenist has independent grounds for maintaining that there is no un- 
noticed phenomenal re-inversion. These will be discussed in due course. 
The representationist needs to offer a far more convincing argument to 
just@ a slow unnoticed phenomenal re-inversion. 
2.3.3.6 Memory failure 
The representahnist might argue that the only ground for the proponent of 
the Inverted Earth argument to hold is that the phenomenal characterof the 
Earthling stays constant because of the reliability of the Earthling's 
memory. The Earthling remembers that the sky looks just as blue as it 
once did, therefore the phenomenal character of the Earthling does not 
change. But why should we take the memories of the Earthling at face 
value? Indeed even according to the proponent of the Inverted Earth 
argument there must be something going wrong with the Earthling's 
memories, if the intentional contents of the Earthling's memories do 
change. First Lycan (1996): 
On Block's own view, memory contents will undergo the 
representational shift. So when you say or think to 
yourself, "Yes, the sky is as blue as it was thirty years 
ago," you arenot expressing the same memory content as 
you would have when you had just arrived on Inverted 
Earth. You are now remembering or "remembering" that 
the sky looked yellow, since for you "blue" now means 
yellow. And that memory is fuZse, since on the long-ago 
occasion the sky looked blue to you not yellow @. 130). 
- then Tye (1998bf 
My report of no change in phenomenal character.. . is 
necessarily in error. . . When I now say after a long stay 
on Inverted Earth, "grass looks just as green to me now, 
28 This is hinted at in Tye (1995b). 
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just as it did five, ten, and twenty years ago,” I am 
wrong. ‘Green’(in InvertedEnglish) means red; and grass 
did not look red to me twenty years ago. My memory 
has led me astray @. 466). 
- then Lalor (1999): 
What about the memory of your Earth sky and the look of 
the sky you enjoy as an assimilated Inverted Earther? 
Block thinks these will be qualitatively the same; but 
there is no reason to suppose this if intentional 
adjustment is complete. It is true that you cannot tell the 
difference between the phenomenal content of your 
memory of Earth’s blue sky and your current perception of 
InvertedEarth’syellow sky. In one sense, your memory 
representsa blue sky; that’s what was encoded. But in 
another sense it does not represent the sky as blue since, 
as you now decode the ‘blue’ memory, you can’t help but 
unzip it as yellow, and thus misremember. Given the 
connection between color perception and memory, the 
adaption of your perceptual system has limited your 
ability to correctly recall and elaborate the remembered 
color of objects. Yours is a memory of a blue sky whch 
representsthat sky as being yellow W.280). 
Lycan, Tye and Lalor attribute to the Earthling a major breakdown in the 
Earthling’s phenomenal memories. This is because when the Earthling 
claims that the sky looks just as ‘blue’ as it once did, the Earthling means 
that the sky once looked yellow. But, the sky never looked yellow. 
Therefore, there is a major breakdown in the Earthling’s phenomenal 
memory. If there is such a substantial breakdown in the memories of the 
Earthling, there are no real grounds for appealing to the reliability of the 
Earthling’s phenomenal memories in order to establish that there is no 
phenomenal change in the Earthling’s mental states after a long stay on 
Inverted Earth. Phenomenal re-inversion remains a viable reply to Inverted 
Earth. 
However, it looks as if the proponent of the Inverted Earth scenario has 
some plausible replies to the above claims of memory failure. First, it 
appearsgratuitously ad hoc to just claim that there is a break down in one 
aspect of an individual’s memory; therefore, one cannot rely on any of the 
Earthling’smemories of how objects used to look to him. Second, if the 
Earthling is aware of the fact that lenses has been inserted into his eyes, and 
it is assumed that the individual does not undergo any phenomenal re- 
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inversions, then it is perfectly possible to make sense of his memories.29 
Allowing for this modification, the Earthling accurately remembers that the 
colour of the sky looks the same way as it looked when he first arrived on 
InvertedEarth and the same way as a Merent sky looked to him when he 
was on Earth. The Earthling can consistently maintain that the sky on 
Earth never looked ‘blue,’ meaning yellow. It once looked ‘yellow’ 
meaning blue, but it did look the same colour. We can therefore 
disambiguate the following distinct memories that the above 
representationist claims fail to disambiguate. 
a) The colour of the Inverted Earth sky looks to me just the same way as 
the colour of the Inverted Earth sky looked to me a long time ago. 
b) The blueness of the Inverted Earth sky looks just the same then, as it 
does now. 
Assuming that it is the same sky that it is being looked at, is there any 
grounds for doubting claim A? There might be good grounds for doubting 
claim B, but not because the way the colour of the sky looks to the 
Earthling has changed, but only because the meaning of ‘blue’ has changed. 
It is just not clearthat the falsity of A follows from the falsity of B. It is, 
however, A that is maintained to be true by the proponent of the Inverted 
Earthargument, and it is not clear that the representationisthas given any 
reason for doubting why A might be true. Now there might be good 
grounds for offering a general scepticism about the human ability to 
rememberthe colours of things, (this happens to be notoriously bad), but it 
is not clear that poor colour memories are going to account for a 
phenomenal re-inversion in an individual without that individual noticing. 
Furthermore, just as the phenomenist need not appeal to transitivity of close 
shades to establish that there is no phenomenal re-inversion, it is not clear 
that the phenomenist needs to appeal to the memories of the individual to 
just@ the unlikelihood of a phenomenal re-inversion. The phenomenist 
has independent grounds for arguing that there is no unnoticed phenomenal 
Block (1996) does indeed mod@ his scenario by making the Earthling 
aware of his lens insertion, but Block’s motivation is to make it easier for 
the Earthling to become embedded in his new linguistic. 
29 
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re-inversion. An appeal to empirical experiments do not support a 
phenomenal re-inversion because there are not any empirically discovered 
relevant changes in actual experiments that could be inferred to occur when 
the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth and after he stays on Inverted Earth 
that could possibly warrantthe claim that he somehow compensates for his 
inverting lenses and starts to see the actual colours of  objects on Inverted 
Earth. But there are other independent grounds for doubting slow unnoticed 
phenomenal re-inversion. The representationist who appeals to unnoticed 
slow phenomenal re-inversion needs to account for the fact that the 
phenomenal re-inversion has to follow an extremely specific path to remain 
unnoticed because of considerations concerning coextensive discriminations. 
2.3.3.7 Coextensive discriminability again 
There are arguably extremely good grounds for thinking that the Earthling 
will notice a phenomenal re-inversion because of a failure of coextensive 
discriminability as the slow inversion takes place. The representationist 
assumes that the slow phenomenal re-inversion will occur in a manner that 
maintains coextensive dwriminability with all colours as the slow 
inversion occurs. But what possible grounds are there for this assumption? 
I will illustrate with an example. Imagine that the Earthling is looking at a 
flag with a purple patch on top and a yellow patch on the bottom. The 
Earthlingputs lenses on so that the top patch looks yellow to the Earthling 
and the bottom patch looks purple to the Earthling. Let us also assume that 
as the Earthling compensates for the lenses and undergoes a phenomenal re- 
inversion, the re-inversion is a slow creeping through the spectrum that 
follows a certain path. The purple slowly creeps through an indeterminate 
grayhrown and then to yellow. The yellow slowly creeps through an 
indeterminategrayhrown and then to purple. The problem should now be 
apparent. Halfway through the process the top of the flag will look the 
same as the bottom of the flag. Surely the perceiverwill notice this. At 
some point violets will look to the Earthling, the same colour as bananas. 
There need not be a complete identity between the two colours for the 
change to be noticed, merely a converging of the two colours; the top of the 
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flag starts to look more like the bottom of the flag and the perceiver notices 
this. 
The representationistmight reply to the above point by claiming that the re- 
inversion of purple to yellow follows a path distinct from that of yellow to 
purple; thus coextensive discriminations between the two colours remains 
the same; i.e., the top of the flag looks just as different from the bottom of 
the flag throughout the whole process of re-inversion. But can the 
representationist really plausibly maintain that all the colours, as they 
pursue paths to their inverted opposites, follow paths that never intersect? 
The only possible colour model that the representationist requires is that of 
a colour circle. Furthermore, during the re-inversioneach colour follows the 
other, like obedient ducks, either always clockwise or always counter- 
clockwise, around the circumferenceof the circle; for example, the bottom 
of the flag follows purple to blue to green to yellow; the top, 
contemporaneously follows yellow to orange to red to purple. Does the 
representationist have any plausible grounds for ju-ng this? 
If purple goes to yellow, clockwise, and yellow goes to purple, counter- 
clockwise, then the representationist meets with a difficulty; the colours 
will meet at blue/green. If the re-mversion path goes through the center of 
the circle, across the indeterminate mixed shades of grayhrown, the 
representationist is also in trouble; the colours will meet at grayhrown. 
Furthermore, if the model we adopt is a colour sphere or a solid, then it is 
very unclear how it is supposed to be possible that every colour slowly 
changes, during phenomenal re-inversion, in a manner that allows each 
colour to end up on the location that corresponds to its inverted opposite on 
the colour solid without some of the re-inversion paths intersecting; or at 
the very least either converging or divergng. Phenomenal re-inversion in 
such a manner might be possible, but I would argue that such a re-inversion 
is extremely unlikely. 
The representationist requires a phenomenal re-inversion without really 
offering any good grounds for why there should be a phenomenal re- 
inversion. One putative reason might be substantial self-motivated 
behavioural re-adjustment, but this does not apply to Inverted Earth. The 
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representationist also requires an unnoticed phenomenal re-inversion that 
maintains the coextensive discriminations of the Earthling as all the colours 
slowly phenomenally re-invert past one another. A total spontaneous re- 
inversion would arguably resolve problems of co-extensive discriminations, 
but a total and spontaneous re-inversionis hardly going to remain unnoticed 
by the perceiver. If the representationist has a reply to Inverted Earth, I 
suggest that they reject both slow creeping phenomenal re-inversions and 
total spontaneous phenomenal re-inversions. 
2.4.1 Narrow contents 
Earlier I suggested that there were two general strategies for the 
representationist to reply to Inverted Earth; the second is to argue that the 
Earthling actually compensates for his lenses and undergoes a phenomenal 
re-inversionand this corresponds with a change in intentional content. This 
reply is argued above to be substantially implausible, although it still 
currently has its adherents (Lycan, 1996, Tye, 1998a, 1998b, Lalor, 1999). 
The first strategy is to argue that the intentional content of the Earthling’s 
mental states does in fact stay the same after the arrival of the Earthling on 
InvertedEarth. One way of maintaining intentional content constancy is to 
appeal to the narrow intentional contents of the Earthling’s mental states. 
The narrow contents stay the same; the wide contents change (Rey, 1998, 
pp. 439-40).30 Sydney Shoemaker (1998) presents the narrow content view 
as a possible reply to InvertedEarth, thus: 
Another way of dealing with the possibility of inversion . 
. . is to hold onto the claim that phenomenal characteris 
representational content, but to abandon the view that 
content is externalist (p.674). 
Thereis some confusion as to what constitutes a m o w  content. It is easy 
to overemphasise the importance of physiological identity and local 
supervenience relations between mental states and their underlying 
physiology. Tye ( 1  994) arguably fell to this temptation when he presented 
his defense of a namw content account of phenomenal content or character. 
I will adopt a Fodorian type of  conception of narrow content. I will assume 
Rey (1 998) explicitly uses Inverted Earth as a successful refbtation of wide 30 
representationism to just@ narrow-content representationism. 
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that this is the best account of narrow content, i.e. if this account fails, no 
narrow content account of phenomenal charauer is adequate. It will 
eventually be arguedthat this account of narrow content does in fact fail 
when applied to phenomenal content or character. However, before the 
eventual demise of phenomenal narrow contents is demonstrated, the narrow 
content acoount will be developed independently of Inverted Earth and then 
it will be applied to Inverted Earth, thus explicating Shoemaker’s quote. 
Finally, the flaws with a narrow content account when applied to 
phenomenal content will be demonstrated. 
But what does it mean to claim that narrow contents are functions that map 
contexts onto contents? The context, w i h n  which the mental state’s narrow 
content functions, determines the mental state’s wide intentional content. 
The content of the mental state that is shared across distinct contexts is the 
narrow content. This conception of narrow content is best illustrated in 
terms of Fodor’s response to Twin Earth. 
2.4.2 Twin Earth, narrow contents and Inverted Earth 
Twin Earth is a place very much like Earth except on Twin Earth water is 
not composed of H20, but XYZ,  henceforthto be referredto as twater. We 
are also asked to imagine that we are at a time where no one knows the 
chemical composition of water. On Twin Earth there is a community of 
molecularly identical humans, henceforth to be described as Twinlings. 
Twinlings also describe the stuff that flows in rivers and falls from the sky 
as ‘water’. How do we evaluate the Merencesbetween the Earthling and 
Twinlings’ beliefs about the substance that flows in the rivers and falls from 
the sky? At first blush, one might be inclined to argue that because the 
Earthlings and Twinlings are physically identical, they must have the same 
beliefs about the stuff that falls from the skies and flows in the rives. On 
second blush, we might be troubled by the fact that the Earthhngs’ beliefs 
are about H20 while the Twinlings’ beliefs are about X Y Z .  If beliefs are 
individuated by what they are about, then it appears that we have to infer 
that the Earthlings have drfferent beliefs from Twinlings, concerning the 
substance that falls from the sky and flows in the rivers. How are these two 
claims to be resolved? 
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Fodor (1 990) proposes an appeal to narrow contents as functions that map 
contexts onto truth conditions to resolve these two apparently incompatible 
claims. Imagine a scenario where the Earthlings and the Twinlings share a 
context, transport the Earthling to Twin Earth. If an Earthling and a 
Twinling sharea context, for example Twin Earth, then the two individuals 
share a function which maps the same substance, in this case twater, onto 
the individuals’ mental states. However, if the two individuals do not share 
a context, then their mental states will be mapped onto by Merent objects; 
and thus, the contents of their beliefs will have different truth conditions. 
They will have dstinct wide contents, but shared narrow contents. 
Therefore, Fodor (1990) proposes narrow contents as functions that map 
contexts onto truth con&tions: 
Well there is presumhly somethmg about the relation 
between Twin-Earth and Twin-Me in virtue of which his 
‘water’ thoughts are about XYZ even though mine are not. 
Call this condition that is satisfied by me {Twin-Me, 
Twin Earth} condtion C (because it determines a 
context). Similarly, theremust be sometlung about the 
relation between me and Earth in virtue of which my 
water thoughts are about H20 even though my Twin’s 
‘water’ thoughts aren’t. Call this condition that is 
satisfied by {me, Earth} condition C1 . . . [I]t must be 
possible to satisfy C without satisfjlng C1 and vice versa 
. . . because. . . if an organism shares the nemo-physical 
constitution of my twin and safisjies C it follows that its 
thoughts and my thoughts share their truth conditions . . . 
in a world where I am in my Twin’s context, given the 
neuro-physical identity between us, my ‘water’ thoughts 
are about XYZ if his are. . . . [Tlwo intentions are 
identical only if they effect the same mapping of contexts 
onto truth conditions . . . lMJy Twin’s ‘wber’ thoughts 
are intentionally identical to my ‘water’ thoughts; they 
have the same intentional content even though their 
contexts are de facto Merent, they differ in truth 
conditions. In effect what we have here is an extensional 
criterion for what is sometimes called “narrow” content 
(pp.424-5). 
The narrow content representationist, by applying this notion of MITOW 
content to phenomenal character, offers a reply to Inverted Earth. They 
argue that the narrow intentional content of the Earthling stays constant 
after the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth, has lenses inserted, and looks 
at the sky. Consider Tye (1 994) once again: 
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If perceptual experiences have narrow intentional contents 
. . . then there will be intentional aspects of your 
experiences which do not change through time, just as 
there are unchanging phenomenal aspects. The sky will 
continue to look blue to you, even if through time it 
comes to look to you the way yellow things normally 
look and you come to think of it as being yellow 
@. 172).31 
WhenTye hereclaims that through time the sky will look to you the way 
yellow things normally look, he is not claiming the sky will start looking 
yellow to the Earthling. He is claiming that the wide content of your 
mental states will change as your mental states start to CO-vary with the 
environment of Inverted Earth. However, because, according to the narrow 
representationist account, your experiences have narrow intentional contents, 
you can get around Inverted Earth, by claiming that these narrow intentional 
contents do not change in the Earthling after the move to Inverted Earth and 
however long the Earthling stays on Inverted Earth. The Earthling’s mental 
states arethe same mental states, only in a Merent context. The different 
context maps onto the same mental state, thus providing a distinct wide 
content, but it is the same mental state with the same narrow intentional 
content. 
We might look at the specific neurophysical constitution of the brain of the 
Earthlingbefore and after the move to Inverted Earth. The brain goes into 
the same states when presented with the same types of objects on Inverted 
Earth. Thls is equivalent to the ‘water’beliefs of an individual who travels 
to Twin Earth. However, the wide contents o f  the Earthling’s mental states 
change when he goes to Inverted Earth, just as the indwidual’s ‘water’ belief 
is about X Y Z  on Twin Earth. 
This representationist reply takes on board the intuition that the phenomenal 
content or characterof the Earthling who travels to Inverted Earth stays the 
same. This constancy of phenomenal content or characteris explained by 
identiaing narrow contents with phenomenal content or character and 
maintainingthat the narrowcontents of the Earthling stay the same after the 
move to InvertedEarth. This representationistreply also takes on board the 
intuition that there is a change in the intentional content of the Earthling’s 
~~ ~ 
Tye (1995b) rejects narrow contents. 31 
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mental states. There is a change in the wide intentional content of the 
Earthling’s mental states. Therefore, according to this reply, the Inverted 
Earth argument fails to establish that phenomenal content or characteris not 
entirely constituted by intentional content. However, this reply does fail to 
establish that phenomenal character is entirely constituted by wide 
intentional content. 
There are, however, independent grounds for rejecting a narrow content 
account of phenomenal character. 
2.4.3 Undermining the narrow content account of phenomenal content 
or character 
The argument that undermines the narrow content account of phenomenal 
characterfollows a similar strategy as the Inverted Earth argument. I will 
attempt to demonstrate the possibility of two mental states having hstinct 
narrow intentional content whilst they have the same phenomenal contents 
or character. If this is possible, we have to conclude that narrow intentional 
content does not entirely constitute phenomenal content or character. 
Narrow contents are not phenomenal contents. 
When considering close shades of colour it is possible that narrow contents 
might be considered to be the same in certain contexts due to phenomenal 
indistinguishability, but the phenomenal content of one of these shades 
might also vary dependmg on the context under which this shade is viewed 
thus suggesting that narrow contents should not be identified with 
phenomenal content. 
Consider four very close, but distinct, shades of blue: b l ,  b2, b3 and b4. 
An individual is capable of discriminating between shades that are more 
than one shade apart. This individual can distinguish between b l  and b3, 
and between b2 and b4. However, this individual is not capable of 
distinguishing between b l  and b2, b2 and b3 and b3 and b4. Given the fact 
that this individual is not capable of distinguishing between b2 and b3, it 
will be assumed that when the individual is looking at a patch of paint 
constituted by b2 and a patch constituted by b3, the phenomenal content or 
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charactemf his mental states is shared. The two patches ‘look the same’ to 
the perceiver. The m o w  content theorist is committed to explaining this 
phenomenal similarity by an identity between the mental state’s narrow 
content ‘b2’ and the mental state’s same narrowcontent ‘b3’. 
At first, this argument appears to support a narrow content account of 
phenomenal content or character. Consider the wide contents of this 
indwidual’s mental states when he is confrontedwith first a patch of b2, 
then a patch of b3. Remember narrow contents are functions that map 
contexts onto contents. When th~s  individual is confronted with a patch of 
b2, this is a distinct context, from when he is presented with a patch of b3. 
His mental state clearly has the wide content b2 and not b3. When this 
inhvidual is presented with a patch of b3, this is a distinct context from 
when he is presented with a patch of b2. His mental state clearly has the 
wide content b3 and not b2. But, are the narrow contents ‘b2’ and ‘b3’ 
shared? Crucially, arethe narrowcontents ’b2’ and ’b3’ shared across other 
distinct contexts? The answer appears to be, no. 
Now consider when the individual is presented with a patch of b2 and a 
patch of b4. The narrow content of his mental state ‘b2’ is a function that 
maps a context that enables the individual to Merentiatethe mental state 
with the narrowcontent ‘b2’ from ’b4’. Now consider when the individual 
is presented with a different context, a patch of b3 and b4. The narrow 
content ‘b3 ’ is a function that fails to Merentiate the narrow content state 
’b3’ from ‘b4’. This suggests that the narrow content state ‘b2’ that maps 
b2 is distinct from the narrow content state ‘b3 ’ that maps b3. The function 
is not shared because the narrow contents function differently, across the 
two contexts when the two distinct narrow contents are placed in these 
distinct contexts. Therefore, the narrow contents ‘b2’ and ’b3’ must be 
distinct. 
Consider when this individual is presented with a patch of b l  and b3. 
Likewise, this individual has a mental state that maps a context whereby 
narrow content ‘b3 ’ can be differentiatedfrom ‘b 1 ’ . Now consider when the 
individual is presented with a distinct context: a patch of b l  and b2. The 
narrowcontent of the mental state ‘b2’ that maps b2 cannot Merentiate 
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between ‘bl’  and ’b2’. This also suggests that the narrow content ‘b2’ that 
maps b2 is distinct from the narrow content ‘b3’ that is maps b3. Not only 
does the narrow content of the mental states that are map b2 and b3 M e r  in 
wide contents, there is nothing shared by these two narrow contents when 
they are placed in distinct contexts. 
Narrow content ‘b2’ is distinct from narrow content ‘b3,’ when they are 
placed in different contexts, yet the phenomenal characterof the mental state 
of an individual when presented with b2 is identical to the Phenomenal 
characterof a mental state when presented with b3. Therefore, narrow 
content does not entirely constitute phenomenal content or character. 
2.4.4 What are the possible narrow content replies to this argument? 
The narrow content representationit might reply to the above argument by 
claiming that the phenomenal content or character also changes across 
Merent contexts. But this does little to explain why the phenomenal 
content or characterof mental states when exposed to patch b2 and b3 is the 
same when presented togerher. It is not because the narrow content ‘b2’ and 
‘b3’ is shared, as the narrow content theorist would like to suggest. 
The narrowcontent representationistmight try to deny that the phenomenal 
content or characterof the mental states when presented with patch b2 and 
b3 is shared. The phenomenal content or characterof the mental states 
when presented with patch b2 and b3 are distinct; and hence, the narrow 
contents are distinct. This entails that the person does not have 
introspective access to the Werencebetween these distinct narrow contents. 
The narrow content theorist is required to deny the introspective 
accessibility of distinct narrow contents, and hence argue that the 
phenomenal content or charactersof the individual’s mental states are 
distinct. The person does undergo distinct phenomenal content or characters 
when presented with b2 and b3, the person just does not realize it. 
However, this would be a most curious, arguably inconsistent, line of 
defense for a narrow content theorist to take. 
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If the narrow content theorist argues for distinct phenomenal content or 
character,it seems that the narrow content theorist is forced into denying 
comparative self-knowledge of content. But this appears to be one of  the 
major motivations for narrow contents over wide contents in the first place. 
If this is denied, then there is nothing to stop the wide content theorist from 
denying the plausibility of Inverted Earth in the first place on the grounds 
that the Earthling does undergo distinct phenomenal content or characterson 
InvertedEarth, he just does not realize it. It is precisely comparative self- 
knowledge of content that motivates the claim that the Earthling’s 
phenomenalcontent or characterof his mental states stays constant after the 
move to inverted earth, which in turn motivates the narrow content reply to 
Inverted Earth. If the narrow content theorist rejects comparative self- 
knowledge, the main motivation for positing narrow content in the first 
place is undermined. 
The phenomenal content or characterof an individual’s mental states when 
presentedwith two close shades of colour is the same. If the narrow content 
theorist attempts to deny this, he essentially underminines Inverted Earth, 
the motivation for narrow contents in the first place. However, the narrow 
contents of the mental states that correspond to ‘b2’ and ‘b3’ are distinct 
because these contents are not shared functions that map distinct contexts 
onto the contents. When placed in distinct contexts these narrow contents 
behave in very different ways. Therefore, narrow content does not entirely 
constitute phenomenal character. 
Notice that this argumentdoes not rule out wide content representationism, 
it merely serves to remove one representationist contender from the field. It 
is perfectly possible for the wide representationistto deny self-knowledge of 
mental states, indeed it might even be required, but this is not an option for 
the narrow representationist. Ruling out narrow representationism becomes 
increasingly important when considerations of causation are developed in 
part 2 because it is arguably the narrow content view that attempts to 
reconcile problems of causation with intentional content. Without an appeal 
to narrow content, considerations of causation and explanation become 
especially sharp against the representationist. 
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2.5 Are the fine-grained functional differences relevant? 
It might be argued that the Earthlings are never completely functionally 
isomorphic with the Invertlings because of fine-grained functional 
differencesbetween them. 
A parallel problem arises in connection with the earlier 
example of blackish blue versus blackish yellow. Clearly 
some modifications are needed in the Inverted Earth 
hypothesis for it not to encounter immediate difficulties 
(Tye, 1995b, p.206). 
Arguably the failure of coextensive discriminability is perhaps the more 
serious of the fine-grained functional differences; the problem of blackish- 
yellow is a variant on this same point, i.e. black is closer to blue than to 
yellow. Indeed these fine-grained functional differences are relevant. I have 
employed them to cast doubt on the possibility of unnoticed slow 
phenomenal re-inversions. But the question remains as to whether they 
scupper the Inverted Earth argument. As pointed out earlier, it is not clear 
as to how fine-grained firnctional differences are relevant to a ’semantic’ 
style of representationism. However, it is arguably the ’semantic’ 
representationist who has the most to gain by pointing out functional 
differences between the Earthling and the Invertlings, but only if this 
differencehas an impact on the meaning of their colour terms. It is simply 
not clear how these fine-grained differences are relevant to the meanings of 
colour terms.32 Are the fine-grained functional differences relevant to the 
current long-arm functional representationist? Arguably not. 
The reason that the fine-grained functional differences appear to be of no 
relevanceto the current long-arm functional representationist is because the 
proponent of the argument does not require the presence of Invertlings to 
establish a long-arm functional difference between the Earthling’s mental 
states before he arrives on Inverted Earth and after he arrives on Inverted 
Earth. The Invertlings might be useful to illustrate heuristically the change 
in long-arm functional roles of the Earthling’s mental states, and hence the 
~ 
See Block (1999) for elaboration of how fine-grained functional differences 32 
are not relevant to this semantic style of representationism. 
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intentional content of the Earthling’smental states, but the Invertlings are 
not required. 
It is precisely the long-arm functional differences between the Earthling 
before he arrives on InvertedEarth and after he arrives on inverted Earth that 
need to be exaggeratedand not diminished by the proponent of the Inverted 
Earth argument. With these functional differences comes a difference in 
intentional content. But as long as the phenomenal content or characterof 
the Earthling’s mental states stay the same, then this type of 
Rerpesentationism apparently faces a problem. An appeal to fine grained 
functional differencesis not going to help this type of representationism. 
2.6 Summing up Inverted Earth thus far 
A semantic style of representationism that emerges out of ‘anti-private 
language’ considerations against inverted spectrums is one motivation for 
InvertedEarth. Ths style of representationism is rejected because it is not 
clearas to how the semantics of colour terms has anythng to do with the 
phenomenal character of mental states. Phenomenal re-inversion, as one 
attempt to save both the semantic representationism and the current long- 
arm functional representationism is rejected for the following reasons: first, 
because one motivation for arguing for phenomenal re-inversion is 
inapplicable to Inverted Earth; and second, because of the presence of 
insurmountable problems concerning unnoticed phenomenal re-inversions. 
An appeal to narrow intentional contents is a good attempt to maintain 
intuitions behind the plausibility of both premises of the Inverted Earth 
scenario and that phenomend content or characteris still entirely constituted 
by intentional content, but phenomenal narrow contents ultimately fail 
because of the ‘four shades of blue’ objection. Fine-grained functional 
differencesare simply not relevant in a manner that the representationist can 
use to just$ a response to Inverted Earth. However, the representationist 
still has replies to Inverted Earth available, one more plausible than the 
other. 
The next chapter considers the plausibility of a representationism that 
appeals to the historical wide functional role of mental states, sometimes 
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described as teleological accounts of intentional content. These will 
eventually also be deemed problematic as a plausible account of phenomenal 
content or character. The teleological representationist response to inverted 
Earth is rejected partly because of the availability of a far simpler but 
overlooked reply to Inverted Earth on behalf of the wide representationist. 
Finally a wide representationist reply to Inverted Earth will be considered 
that is superior to all the other replies; thus Inverted Earth will also be 
committed to the dust heap of mere metaphysical speculation, despite being 
a fascinating exercise in philosophical imagination. 
72 
Chapter 3: Inverted Earth (11) 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the proponent of the Inverted Earth argument, Inverted Earth 
demonstrates that the intentional content of an Earthling’s mental states 
changes when the Earthling travels to Inverted Earth, yet the phenomenal 
content or character of the Earthling’s mental states does not change; 
therefore, representationismis false. 
An appeal to a slow or immediate phenomenal re-inversion in the 
Earthling’smental states after he arrives on Inverted Earth is an attempt to 
show that the phenomenal content or character of the Earthling’s mental 
states do not stay the same; therefore, the above argument is unsound. 
However, in chapter two, it was demonstrated that an appeal to a 
phenomenal re-inversion of the Earthlings mental states is not a good 
strategy for the current long-arm functional representationist to adopt as a 
response to Inverted Earth; however, no independent grounds were offered 
for rejecting a current long-arm representationist account of phenomenal 
character. If, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, Inverted Earth fails on 
lstinct grounds, then the phenomenist fails to demonstrate the falsity of 
this variant of wide representationism. Although narrow content 
representationism offers a creative solution to Inverted Earth, independent 
grounds were offered in the last chapter to demonstrate that narrow contents 
as functions that map contexts onto contents do not entirely constitute 
phenomenal content or character. 
In this chapter, two more representationist replies to Inverted Ea~th are 
considered, the second more successful than the first. The first 
representationist reply applies to mental states a historical long-arm 
functional role account of intentional content. This representationist 
account appeals to the histories of mental states to determine the intentional 
content of those mental states. The current long-arm functional account of 
intentional content appeals to the current inputs and outputs of mental states 
and the way they function in a current environment to determine the 
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intentional content of the mental states. The historical account looks to the 
way the mental states fimctioned in the past to determine the intentional 
content of those mental states. The appeal to historical functional roles sub- 
divides into two furthertypes of representationism as follows: phylogenetic 
representationism and ontogenetic representationism. But although 
historical accounts of intentional content are plausibly applicable to non- 
phenomenal mental states, problems concerning their applicability to 
phenomenal states will be hscussed. 
The second representationistreply to Inverted earth that is considered in this 
chapter makes no appeal to historical long-ann functional roles, nor does it 
appeal to narrow contents. This reply makes no appeal to a semantic style 
of representationism motivated out of anti-private language considerations 
and it certainly does not appeal to phenomenal re-inversion in the mental 
states of the Earthling after he arrives on Inverted Earth. The successful 
reply, however, brings out some essential ambiguities in the presentation of 
the Inverted Earth argument that can be successfully exploited by the 
representationist. 
3.2 History, teleology and content 
The histories of mental states of the Earthling before he arrives on Inverted 
Earth and even before he was born are appealed to in an attempt to argue 
that there is something about this history of the mental states of the 
Earthling thatfixes the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states. 
If the intentional contents of the Earthling’s mental states are fixed in the 
past of the Earthling, then there is no reason to maintain that the intentional 
content of the Earthling’smental states changes, after he arrives on Inverted 
Earth; therefore, the Invelted Earth argument is unsound. If one considers 
the Invertlings, there might be something in the history of the Invertlings 
that fixes the intentional content of their mental states and if their history is 
sigmficantly different from the history of the Earthlings, then according to a 
historical account of intentional content, there is no reason to maintain that 
the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states ever comes to 
resemble the intentional content of the Invertling’s mental states; h s  
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undermines any purported support for a change in the Earthling’s intentional 
argument; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument is unsound. 
Therelevanceof the histories of our mental states to intentional content is 
arguably motivated by certain intuitions concerning how representational 
states acquired their contents in their past. For example, photographs are 
about what they are about because of events that occurred in the history of 
the photograph. Arguably what determines the content of the photograph is 
the process that occurredin the past whereby light bounced of an object, 
travelled through a lens and exposed a negative. It is this event that 
occurredin the past that determines the intentional content of a photograph 
and nothing to do with the ‘current’ functioning of that photograph. 
Although the photograph may well be used to ident.@ the object originally 
photographed, this is not relevant to the intentional content of the 
photograph. Accordmg to a historical account of content, the intentional 
content of a mental state is determinedby events that occurredin the history 
of that mental state. 
However, accordingto teleological accounts of intentional content it is not 
only the history of the mental state that matters, but what the mental state 
was ‘designed’ to represent that determines the intentional content of the 
mental state; hence these accounts are often described as ‘teleological’. 
Stephen Stich (1990) offers a good summary of Fred Dretske’s use of the 
notion of a ‘designed’ state: 
A simple exampleis the bi-metallic strip in a thermostat, 
whose function is to indicate the temperature. When 
embedded in the thermostat, the bi-metallic strip not only 
indicates the temperature, it is also a representation of the 
temperature, since, for Dretske, ‘‘a representational 
system” is “any system whose function it is to indicate 
how things stand with respect to some other object or 
magnitude.” “Whata system represents. . . is what these 
elements have thefunction of indicating. . . In the case of 
the thermostat, it is the person, the designer of the 
thermostat, who determines what the function of the 
indicator will be. But Dretske maintains there are also 
natural biological systems in which internal indicators 
have acquired the function of indicating something, 
typically something about the organism’s external 
environment (p.802). 
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Two distinct theories of teleological content pull apart depending on whxh 
causal histories are deemed to be relevant for attributing the ’design’ of the 
mental state. Dretske (1  98 1) maintains an ontogenetic teleological account 
whereby learning and conditioning in the specific history of that mental 
state determines its function and hence its intentional content. phylogenetic 
teleological accounts maintain that the evolutionary history of the 
individual and the environmental pressures that selected for the mental state 
determines the design and historical function of that mental state; and 
hence, its intentional content. This distinction is important because 
differing variants on the teleological accounts are sufficient for differing 
responses to Inverted Earth. 
Accorlng to ontogenetic accounts of intentional content, the design history 
of mental states that is relevantto the function of those mental states is the 
development of individual mental states as a result of conditioning and 
learning (Dretske, 198 1). Stich (1990), although ultimately disagreeing 
with Dretske, offers an excellent sumfnary of Dretske’s version of an 
ontogentic teleological account of content with the example of conditioning 
in a rat: 
In conditioning, accorlng to Dretske. an internal 
indicator, C, comes to be causally connected to another 
internal state which, in turn, causes the organism to 
produce a certain sort of behavioural output, M. 
Moreover, C gets hooked up to M - it gets to be a cause 
of this sort of behavioural output - because M is an 
appropriateway to behave when the state of affairs that C 
indicates obtains. Thus when C gets linked to M, it 
comes to be C‘s function to inlcate that state of affairs. 
An example will make this a bit clearer. Consider the rat 
in the Skinner box. When the light is on, pressing the 
bar will produce a bit of food. Let F be the state of affairs 
in which the light is on. Presumably there is some 
internalperceptual state of the rat that indicates when the 
light is on. Now prior to being 
placed in the Skinner box, C was not causally linked up 
to the bar pressing behaviour (=M). But as a result of 
conditioning, a causal link between the two was forged. 
C comes to cause M because it indicates F. It is now C’s 
function to indicate F, and as we’ve seen, for Dretske an 
indicator of F whose function is to indicate F is a 
representation of F (p.802). 
Let this state be C. 
So for Dretske (1981), a natural system’s way of utilising indicators in 
order to acquire the function of indicating something is through learning 
76 
and conditioning. For a phylogenetic representationist, the natural selection 
of individuals within a species determines the biological function of the 
mental states. 
According to phylogenetic accounts of intentional content, the design 
history of mental states is also relevant, but not a history that involves the 
learningprocesses as an individual mental state develops in an individual as 
a result of conditioning and learning, but a history that involves the 
selection pressures on the mental states of an individual as its ancestor’s 
evolved. The phylogenetic account of the intentional relation between our 
mental states and objective properties in our environment emphasises the 
selection pressures on the survival of the ancestors of the owner of those 
mental states; the selection pressures determine the biological functions of 
those mental states. Accordmg to the phylogenetic representationist, the 
history of the ancestors of the owner of the mental states, more specifically, 
the selectional history of the individual’s mental states determines the 
hstorical function of the mental state; and hence, the intentional content of 
mental states. Therefore, the evolutionary history of the species of the 
organism that possesses the mental states is salient to determining the 
intentional content of those mental states. Papineau (1998) explains the 
teleological theory thus: 
The centralthesis of the teleological theory . . . is that the 
representationalcontents of mental states can be explained 
in terms of the biological functions of those mental states. 
More specifically, this theory equates the contents of 
informational states . . . with the conditions in which 
those states are biologically supposed to be present. . . . 
Defenders of the teleological theory standardly cash out 
their references to biological purposes etiologically, in 
terms of processes of natural selection. According to the 
etiological account of biological function, as item X has a 
biological purpose Y if and only if X is now present 
because previous versions of X were selected in virtue of 
doing Y. The paradigm case of such selection is inter- 
generationalDarwin selection of genetic traits @. 1). 
This account is best illustrated with examples. Most humans have mental 
states that enable them to discriminatebetween different objects by virtue of 
their colours, for example, ripe from raw tomatoes. This might be 
explained in terms of the survival advantage conferred on a certain 
proportion of  a previous population who are able to discriminate between 
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objects on the basis of differencesin colour. The ability to lscriminate 
between objects of different colours may have come about by genetic 
mutation or a recombination of genes, genes that are responsible for the 
development of cones in our eyes. Natural selection will then select for the 
proportion of organisms that inherit genes responsible for discriminable 
capacities in organisms based on colour. Therefore, natural selection 
explains why we have certainmental states that enable us to discriminate 
between objects on the basis of colour. The phylogenetic representationist 
then applies this account of natural selection to explain the biologcal 
function of colour detecting mental states. 
According to the phylogenetic representationist, selection pressures in the 
past of our mental states determine the function of our colour indicating 
mental states. Evolutionary processes design our mental states and lock our 
mental states onto the features of the natural environment that we once 
occupied in our past. Certain mental states have colour as their intentional 
content because colour detecting is the biological purpose of those mental 
states. Mental states that detect colour are only present in us now because 
previous versions of colour detecting states were selected in the past in order 
to detect colour. 33 
Another application of the account is the ability of frogs to detect flies. 
Arguably selection pressures favour frogs that can catch flies; therefore, the 
frogs that possess mental states that recognise flies will be more likely to 
pass on the genetic trait that enables the frog to catch flies. Crucially, 
however, what is important to the phylogenetic representationist is not how 
frogs come to be able to catch flies, but why the mental states of the frogs 
represent flies. The frog’s mental states are about flies because of the 
history of the fly detecting mental states of the frog; more specifically, 
evolutionary pressures favoured a fitness advantage for the frog’s ancestors 
whom possessed the genetic trait responsible for these mental states; thus 
designing the frog’s mental states to detect flies. Certain mental states in 
An immediate problem arises with this account because of  an ambiguity 
between trait-types and trait-tokens. If natural selection only offers an 
explanation of trait-types or trait frequencies within a population, then it is 
not clear that a phylogenetic account will able to offer natural selection as 
part of  a causal history as to the development of a token mental state in one 
individual (Walsh, 1998). 
33 
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frogs have flies as their intentional content because fly detecting is the 
biological purpose of those mental states; fly detecting mental states are 
only present in frogs now because previous versions of fly detecting states 
were selected in the past in order to detect flies. 
Having offered a brief summary of two teleologcal accounts of intentional 
content, it will be demonstratedas to how this is relevant to Inverted Earth 
and problems with these accounts will be demonstrated. 
3.3.1 Teleology and Inverted Earth 
When the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth, his mental states act in a 
manner for which they were not originally designed. Mental states 
previously used to ident@ red tomatoes as red now i d e n w  green tomatoes 
as red. But accordmg to the teleologist, it is not the current long-arm 
fimctional roles of these mental states that determines the intentional 
content of these mental states; it is what these mental states were originally 
designed to do that fixes the content of these mental states. Tye (1998a, 
pp.679-8 1) gives a parallel example of an axle speedometer being shifted to 
a planet where in one sense the speedometer ‘works’ but it fails to fulfil the 
function it was originally designed to fulfil. 
Imagine on a new Twin Earth, an axle speedometer from a car on Earth is 
installed on a car on Twin Earth. On Twin Earth distances are measured 
differently and all the wheels of cars are systematically of a different size: 
these differences are such, however, that they cancel out. From a Twin 
Earthling’s perspective the speedometer functions perfectly adequately. If 
the speedometer were to read ‘50’ on Twin Earth, this would misrepresent 
the speed in terms of Earth miles per hour because the wheels are the wrong 
size; this malfunctioning is compensatedby the fact that Twin Earth ‘miles’ 
area different length, so the speedometer appears to function adequately to 
the Twin Earthling’s on Twin Earth. The Dretskeanand Tyean intuitions 
are that the speedometer misrepresents the speed of the car on Twin Earth 
because it was designed to measure Earth velocitieq despite the fact that it 
fimctions adequately from a Twin Earthling’s perspectwe. Notice that a 
molecularly identical Twin Earth axle speedometer, designed for cars on 
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Twin Earth, represents Twin Earth velocities accurately because that is what 
the Twin Earth axle speedometer was designed for. Applying the 
Teleological account of content, design determines content; therefore, the 
Earth speedometer misrepresents whilst the Twin Earth speedometer 
represents speeds accurately. 
According to the teleologist, the axle speedometer is analogous to the 
colour detecting mental states of the Earthling. The mental states of the 
Earthling were designed to detect colour on Earth. But by a quirk of ‘fate’, 
strange colours and inverting lenses, the mental states of the Earthling 
appear to function adequately on Inverted Earth. When compared to the 
mental states of the Invertling, the mental states of the Earthling appear to 
both the Invertling and the Earthling to function adequately just as the Earth 
speedometer appears to function adequately on Twin Earth. However, just 
as speedometers are not designed for use on Twin Earth, the mental states of 
the Earthling are not ‘designed’ for use on Inverted Earth; therefore, the 
mental states of the Earthling malfunction on Inverted Earth. The 
intentional content of the Earthlings mental states cannot be compared to 
the mental states of the Invertlings because their mental states have different 
design functions. According to teleological accounts of content, design 
function determines intentional content. Furthermore, after the Earthling 
travels to InvertedEarth, his mental states fulfil the same design function 
that they were designed to fulfil, albeit maifunctioning on Inverted Earth; 
therefore, the Earthling’s history permanently fixes the intentional content 
of the Earthling’s mental states. 
The Earthling’s mental states were designed to idenw,  for example, red 
objects as red. When he arrives on Inverted Earth, this is not his natural 
habitat. His mental states are performing an artificial function that only 
appearsto work from both the Earthling and the Invertlings’ perspective, 
just as the axle speedometer appearedto work when it was installed on a 
Twin Earth car. However, because the mental states of the Earthling are 
fulfilling a role for which they were not designed there is no reason to 
suppose that the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states are 
either identical to the Invertlings mental states or that they change. 
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If what an experience normally tracks is what nature 
designedit to track, what it has as its biological purpose 
to track, then shifting environments from Earth to 
Inverted Earth will make no difference to normal trackmg 
and hence no difference to the representational contents of 
your experiences(Tye, 1998b, p.461). 
According to the teleological accounts of content, the history of the 
Earthling’s mental states fixes the intentional content of the Earthling’s 
mental states; thus no new environment changes the relevance of the design 
function of the Earthling’s mental states. The intentional contents of the 
Earthling’s mental states do not change; therefore, the Inverted Earth 
argument is unsound. 
Thus far, the representationistreply only appeals to design functions, but 
remains ambiguous as to whether a phylogenetic accounts or an ontogenetic 
account establishes the relevant design history that determines the 
intentional content of mental states; and hence, the phenomenal content or 
charactemf the Earthling’s mental states. 
3.3.2 Phylogenetic teleology applied to Inverted Earth 
According to the phylogenetic representationist, the Earthlings have an 
evolutionary history that determines the intentional content of their mental 
states. T h s  locks the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states 
onto the properties of the Earth environment in the past of the Earthling. 
The Earthling can never overcome his evolutionary hstory; therefore, his 
intentional contents will always represent what they were designed to 
represent. Moving the Earthling to InvertedEarth is like moving a fish out 
of water except the Earthling can still breath and function ‘normally’. His 
mental states will never come to represent the colour of objects on Inverted 
Earthbecause this scenario was not a scenario for which his mental states 
were originally, in an evolutionary sense, designed. 
I am a living creaturewith an evolutionary history; the 
environment in which I find myself on Inverted Earth is 
not my naturalhabitat and I am wearing inverting lenses. 
So, on InvertedEarth, optimal conditions do not obtain. 
The brain state that tracks blueness in optimal conditions 
(and thereby represents blueness) now tracks yellowness. 
But it does not now represent yellowness (Tye, 1995b’ 
p.205). 
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The sensory state that nature designed in your species to 
track blue in the setting in which your species evolved 
will continue to do just that even if through time, on 
Inverted Earth, in that alien environment, it is usually 
caused in you by looking at yellow things (Tye, 1998a, 
p.46 1). 
I understand teleology in terms of selection history . . . 
thus for me, the intentional states of the victim 
transported to Twin Earth would not chmge their 
intentional contents even if that person stayed on Inverted 
Earth for a very long time and the states ceased having 
their evolutionary normal causes altogether (Lycan, 1996, 
p. 114). 
According to the phylogenetic teleologist, the intentional content of the 
Earthling’s mental states never changes, so the phenomenal content or 
characterof the Earthlings mental states never changes. The Inverted Earth 
argument is thus no threat to the historical long-arm functional 
representationistwho appeals to the phylogenetic history of mental states. 
3.3.3 Applying ontogenetic teleological representationism to Inverted 
Earth 
Ontogenetic teleological representationism might also be appealed to, in 
order to respond to Inverted Earth on behalf of the represertationist. It is, 
however, worth distinguishing another subdivision, between two types of 
ontogenetic teleological representationism as follows: The first, assumes 
that all developmental learning and conditioning ends at the end of child 
development; thus all intentional content of mental states is fixed at the end 
of child development. This position might be described somewhat 
clumsily as developmentally fixed ontogenetic teleological 
representationism. If this is so, then all the intentional contents of the 
Earthling’smental states are fixed by the time he has reaches a certain age. 
These intentional contents are fixed by the Earthling’s Earth environment. 
When the Earthling goes to InvertedEarth, the intentional content of all h ~ s  
mental states have been ‘designed’ by ontogenetic development -- 
conditioning and learning throughout the Earthling’s youthful, formative 
years on Earth. The Earthling’s mental states permanently stay the same 
&er he arrives on Inverted Earth; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument 
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presents no challenge to the developmentally fixed ontogenetic teleological 
representationist 34 
The second type of ontogenetic representationism allows for continuous 
development, learning and conditioning throughout an individual’s life. 
This position might be described as developmentally continuous 
ontogenetic teleological representationism. However, on this account, the 
above teleological strategy of maintaining that the intentional contents of 
the Earthling’s mental states remain constant after the Earthling arrives on 
Inverted Earth cannot be employed. Ths position arguably most closely 
resembles the current ‘long-arm’ functional account of mental states. The 
short-term history of learning and conditioning fixes the intentional 
contents of these mental states, these may take some time to establish 
whilst a creature adapts to its new environment. Given continuous 
development and adaptation to a new environment between the mental states 
and the properties of the new environment, the intentional content of the 
Earthling’s mental states changes on Inverted Earth. This therefore commits 
the developmentally continuous ontogenetic teleologml representationist to 
the Earthling undergoing a phenomenal re-inversion. Phenomenal re- 
inversion is not, however, a plausible option for the representationist, given 
the Inverted Earth scenario (see last chapter); therefore, representationism of 
this type is not going to offer a coherent reply to Inverted Earth. 
But, how about the phylogenetic and the developmentally fixed ontogenetic 
representationist replies to inverted Earth? Are they successful? These 
representationist theories, however, also have problems associated with 
them independent of Inverted Earth. 
3.4.1 Problems with phylogenetic and developmentally fixed 
ontogenetic teleological accounts of intentional content as entirely 
constituting phenomenal content or character 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that Inverted Earth might present a 
challenge to this type of representationism if the Earthling is taken to 
Inverted Earth as a young child that is still undergoing the required 
development that fixes the child’s intentional contents. 
34 
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Problems with teleological accounts arise because they have problems 
accounting for the specific occurrent contents of  our mental states. The 
specific occurrent contents of mental states are the specific contents of the 
mental states of a perceiving organism contemporaneous with the organism 
being presentedwith an object in its environment at a determinate point in 
time. According to the phylogenetic account, the explanation for the 
specific occurrent content of our mental states is not properties of our 
immediate environment, but a long history of selective pressures on our 
mental states in prior ancestors. But is this really plausible? Certainly it 
does seem plausible to claim that our perceptual systems have evolved in a 
certain manner; human eyes have evolved in very Merent manner from 
insect eyes. However, it is not clearthat selection pressures should apply to 
the specific contents of those mental states. 
One possible teleologcal claim that does perhaps have some plausibility is 
that selection pressures might select for the kinds of properties that enter 
into the content of our mental states. So, for example, properties of depth 
perception might be more important concerning selection pressures to 
certain creatures while detecting movement might be more important to 
other organisms. But the relevanceof selection pressures on the kinds of 
propertiesdetected by our visual systems does not entail that the selection 
history of our perceptual system determines the specific occurrent contents 
of our mental states. It is a particularproblem to teleological accounts of 
colour that the survival functions for specific colour experiences come out 
the same providing discriminatory capabilities come out the same. Surely 
the most obvious explanation for specific phenomenal contents is the 
properties of the immediate environment of a perceiving organism. Two 
additional metaphysical speculations might be proposed to demonstrate that 
the current functions of mental states are better suited to determining the 
intentional content of the mental states that putatively entirely constitute 
phenomenal content or charactem follows: the first is swamp-creaturesand 
the second is the silicon replacementof brain parts. 
A further problem with historically based accounts of intentional content is 
that they rarely take into account the possibility that mental states have 
evolved to function in new environments. Arguably our perceptual systems 
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havenot just evolved to function in one specific environment. They have 
evolved to function in any new environment that we happen to occupy. 
This is a somewhat useM feature of percephml systems. We can enter 
environmentsthat we have never occupied before and survive and thrive in 
these new environments. Consider an organism leaving its natural habitat 
for the first time. According to the evolutionary account given above, this 
creature will not be representing correctly because it is entering an 
environment for which the specific contents of its mental states have not 
been selected for, but surely this is not true. When we enter new 
environments, new properties enter into the contents of our perceptual 
systems. Our perceptual systems are designed so that occurrent 
environments can fix the phenomenal content or characterof our mental 
states. 
One further problem specific to the phylogenetic account is that it is not 
clearas to how belonging to a species is specified. Imagine if the Earthling 
marriesan Invertling and has a child on Inverted Earth. Let us assume that 
it was a genetic alteration that inverted the colour experiences of the 
Earthling and not inverting lenses.35 This genetic alteration is then passed 
on to the child and all the future offspring of that child. Arguably being 
born on a planet is not sufficient for belonging to a species. So the child is 
not yet an Invertling. Although having half the genes of an Invertling 
might suggest it is on the way to becoming an Invertling. In the future 
perhaps we will say that the descendents of the Earthling are Invertlings, but 
how will we then describe the contents of those descendents’ mental states? 
It is certainly not obvious to me that the answer should be any different 
from the description of the intentional content of the mental states of the 
earthling with the genetic alteration when he first arrived on Inverted Earth. 
Before a superior reply to Inverted Earth is offered, these objections to 
teleological accounts will be developed Eurther in the next few sections, not 
as a knock down refutation of these theories, but as a serious questioning as 
to whether teleological accounts of intentional content are really applicable 
to phenomenal content or character. Inverted Earth is eventually going to be 
Perhaps the genetic alteration affects the cones of the Earthling in an 35 
identical mannerto colour inverting lenses. 
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shown to fail as a refutation of representationismon grounds independent of 
teleological considerations. These independent grounds demonstrate that an 
appeal to a teleological account of phenomenal characteris not required as a 
response to inverted Earth, and if Inverted Earth is an important motivation 
for adopting a teleological account of phenomenal content, then the 
existence of a better response to Inverted Earth is troubling to the 
teleologist. However, it is still worth developing some of these 
independent objections to a teleologcal account of phenomenal content or 
characterin the next few sections. 
3.4.2 Swamp creatures 
Swamp creatures are just one example of  a thought experiment that 
demonstrates that teleological accounts ignore the relevance of specific 
properties of an environment that immediately constitute the phenomenal 
content or characterof the mental states of a perceiver. Swampman is a 
molecular duplicate of an individual that accidentally pops into existence. 
This qualifies as metaphysical speculation of the sort of which Gwendolen 
is so scornful. However, it appearsthat the existence of such creaturesoffer 
counter-intuitive implications If phylogenetic representationism or 
developmentally fixed ontogenetic teleological representationismis assumed 
First, if an evolutionary history involving all the nitty-gritty of natural 
selection within a natural environment is a necessaq condtion for a mental 
state having any intentional content, then swamp creatures, despite having 
all the right ‘bits’, have mental states with no intentional content. The 
swamp creaturehas mental states that are of nothing and thus these mental 
states have no phenomed content of character? 
A teleological account might be modified thus: if there is no evolutionary 36 
‘design,’ there might still be the possibility of the mental states having 
content, but a content of a different type. Tye (1998a,b) presents a dual 
account whereby swamp-people have phenomenal contents, but when a 
swampman has lenses inserted and is transported to Inverted Earth he 
phenomenally re-inverts; developmentally continuous ontogenetic 
teleological representationism applies to swampmen. For humans, design 
trumps current functioning, so the Earthling’s do not phenomenally re- 
invert when they go to Inverted Earth; phylogenetic Rerpesentationism 
applies to humans. Arguably, however, Tye doubles his problems rather 
than solves them. Phenomenal re-inversion is problematic (see chapter 
two), even for swamp-people, and phylogenetic representationism faces 
problems independent of swamp-people (see rest of chapter). 
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[Assuming phylogenetic representationism] accidental 
replicas of actual sentient creatureslack all experiences. . . 
On a cladistic conception of species, swampman is not 
human. Indeed lacking any evolutionary history, he 
belongs to no species at all. His inner states play no 
teleological role. Naturedid no design any of them to do 
anythng. So, if phenomenal characteris a certain sort of 
teleo-representational content, then swampman has no 
experiences(Tye, 1998b, p.461). 
Second, swamp creatures also present a problem to developmentally fixed 
ontogenetic Teleological representationism because a spontaneously created 
adult swampman does not have mental states that have gone through the 
appropriatedevelopment in order to mate any intentional contents of these 
mental states. 37 
However, it is extremely counter-intuitive to suppose that such duplicates 
undergo no phenomenal experiences. For all anyone knows, anyone could 
turn out to be a swampman; yet arguably all of us undergo a rich and full 
experientiallife. Surely kicking a swampman is not equivalent to lucking a 
football with regards to the pain felt. Therefore, according to the 
swampman objection, both phylogenetic representationism and 
developmentally fixed ontogenetic teleological representationism are false.38 
The Teleological representationist might allow that the swampman 
undergoes some phenomenal character, but even then, the intentional 
contents of the swamp-man must be substantially indeterminate. 
A creahre without any history or evolutionary ancestry 
would have indeterminate qualitative states, no matter 
how much it might physically resemble a n o d  person 
possessed of determinatesuch states . . . when swampNed 
looks at either a red tree or a green one - well, there is 
presumably no fact of the matter about what he is 
experiencingin either case (Rey, 1998, pp.443-4). 
Notice that the phylogenetic teleological representationist seemingly 
entails the possibility of non-feeling swamp babies growing into non- 
feeZing swamp adults. Whilst the developmentally fixed ontogenetic 
teleological representationism can accept that the swamp-baby will develop 
mental states with intentional contents and phenomenal charactersjust like 
any other normal adult. These two teleological accounts are therefore 
inconsistent. 
has a response to swamp-people because as soon as they start to interact 
with their environments a new causal history begins. 
37 
A developmentally continuous ontogenetic teleological representationist 38 
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Rey’s version of swampman allows that general properties might constitute 
some content for the swampman, but without the specific design history, 
the specific contents are not fixed; therefore, swamp-people have mental 
states with indeterminate contents. 
Dretske and David Papineau caution against the use of such metaphysical 
speculation because these are arguably thought experiments that have little 
relevanceto ’facts of life’. The success of the metaphysical speculation also 
depends on the supposed relation that the representationist argues for 
between the intentional contents and phenomenal content or character. Is 
the representatioxist trylng to offer a conceptual analysis of phenomenal 
content or characterin terms of intentional content? If so, mere logical 
possibilities look problematic. Is the representationist merely offering a 
’scientific’ identification between phenomenal character and intentional 
content or a theoretical reductionfg 
But as Rey points out, surely these intuitions should count for something 
especially concerning qualitative states (Rey, 1998, p.444). If the 
teleologist rejects such experiments, then preswzbly they reject the 
possibility of the two behavioural inhstinguishable individuals - Earthlings 
and Invertlings - whom possess mental states with dstinct intentional 
contents. But the possibility of such individuals motivates the teleological 
account of intentional contents as entirely constituting phenomenal content 
or characterjn the first place, as a response to Inverted Earth. Therefore, it 
is inconsistent of the teleologist to allow for distinct intentional contents in 
behaviourally indistinguishable individuals, but to then reject swamp- 
people because they are not metaphysically plausible. 
It is always open to the proponent of the teleological theory to ‘bite the 
bullet’ and accept the counter-intuitive implication that swamp-people 
undergo no, or indeterminate phenomenal content or character. But this 
surely ignores the role of occurrent contents. Accepting the possibility of 
unfeeling swamp-people does not meet the underlying intuition that 
See Braddon-Mtchell and Jackson (1997) for attempts to show that such 39 
metaphysical speculation is relevant. 
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grounds the swampman scenario. The evolutionary account cannot take into 
account the fact that that the swampman has mental states whch have very 
effective current functions that arguably possess their phenomenal content or 
characterbecause he is in an environment and that environment can enter 
into the occurrentcontent of that swampman’s perceptual states. It is the 
here and now, specific contents of our mental states that evolutionary 
accounts just cannot account for. The swampman scenario is just a 
somewhat vivid scenario that exemplifies this point. 
3.4.3 Silicon replacements 
David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (1997, pp.487-8) reapply a 
traditional thought experiment whereby a scientist slowly replaces parts of 
your brain with functionally isomorpluc artificial implants against the 
teleologsts. Silicon replacement is arguably not a pleasant prospect, but 
assuming that the replaced parts fulfil the same current functions, this 
should be one possible desirable option. Yet according to the phylogenetic 
or developmentally fixed ontogenetic teleological representationism, this is 
not a legitimate option, since the artificial parts do not have the right 
evolutionary history, nor have they been part of the appropriate 
developmental learning process. The rational response to the artdicial 
replacement is to be concerned only as to whether the arkEicial parts fulfil 
the same currentfunctional role as the neurological states before they started 
to degrade. The irrational response would be to worry that the artificial 
component did not evolve out of natural selection processes, nor was it part 
of an integrated system that developed and conditioned certain responses to 
an environment. 
A common thought experiment is to imagine that, as 
parts of someone’s brain degenerate,they are progressively 
replacedby silicon implants, and to note that, provided 
the implants fill the pre-degenerationfunctional roles of 
the parts they replace, the surgery counts as successful. 
The key point for us is that what a patient facing such an 
operation will care about is essentially that what is about 
to be inserted in her brain will do the job done by the 
relevant brain states before things started to go wrong 
(Braddon-Mitchelldk Jackson, 1997, p.487). 
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It might be responded that the silicon parts of the thought experiment are 
designed, albeit in a way distinct fiom slow processes of biological natural 
selection. However, it is not clearas to whetherthe process of designing of  
the artificial parts is of any relevanceto the concerns of the patient. The 
only relevant concern to the patient is whether the artificial part has identical 
current functions to the pre-damaged part it replaces (Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson, 1997, pp.586-7). 
Ultimately, however, the above thought experiment only re-enforces the 
claim that the authors of the metaphysical speculation think that only 
current functional roles matter. The above argument merely begs the 
question against the teleoloast. It is always an option open to the 
teleologist to claim that they would not want the replaced parts. Why 
merely assume that the person who does not care about the causal history of 
the brain parts is both rational and correct? teleologists might have many 
independent grounds for maintaining their account so one additional bitter 
pill to swallow is not so problematic. If one had the option of having a 
healthy functioning brain part that has the right causal history, perhaps a 
part grown from your own genetic tissue, or a silicon brain part, it is not 
immedately obvious that one would choose the silicon implant. But 
whether thzs choice is just a doubt as to the functional isomorphism of the 
silicon implant or whether the choice involves a genuine appeal to the 
relevanceof the design hstory of the part, is not clear? 
However, just as inverted spectrums do not demonstrate the falsity of 
current long-arm fiunctional Rerpesentationism, the above thought 
experiments do not demonstrate teleological representationist to be 
mistaken, but these metaphysical speculations arise out of a deeper 
underlymg assumption that the current functional role of  mental states 
determinesthe intentional contents of those mental states4' In the case of 
swampman, the current functional roles of his mental states can work 
~ 
Notice that the possibility of inverted spectrums demonstrates the 40 
inconsistency of these two types of representationism. Current long-arm 
functional representationism cannot allow for the possibility of inverted 
spectrums across two currently functional isomorphic individuals when they 
share an environment, but the teleological representationist can allow for 
differences in two functionally isomorphic, even physiologically identical, 
individuals, if they have either Merent ontogenetic or phylogenetic 
histories. 
90 
perfectly adequately; and hence, occurent Contents serve to constitute his 
phenomenal content or character. In the case of silicon replacement, it is 
assumed that as long as a functioning part does its job adequately, the 
history is not relevant. It is when the teleologist tries to account for 
phenomenal content or characterin terms of teleological content that these 
counter-intuitions become especially strong. 
However, the teleologist faces objections greater than the presence of 
underlying counter-intuitions concerning the relevance of current functional 
roles. Teleological accounts face substantial problems concerning the 
vagueness of the intentional contents that these theories are supposed to 
generate because the teleologist cannot account for specific differences in 
content if the survival functions come out the same. 
3.4.4.1 Indeterminacy of content 
Teleological accounts of content are notoriously bad at speclfllng the 
determinate contents of mental states. The objections that develop t h s  
theme come in a variety of forms. The first identifies an indeterminacy 
concerningthe referenceclass of that the teleologist claims that the mental 
states indicate. It is not clear on a teleological account whether frogs detect 
flies, or small dark moving dots. When applied to Inverted Earth, the 
survival functions of the Earthling come out the same for the Earthling and 
the Invertlings. But our phenomenal contents are both specific and highly 
determinate; therefore, suggesting that a teleological account is not suitable 
for an account of phenomenal content or character. 
The second type of objection identifies a problem with indeterminacy when 
a perceiving organism moves to a novel environment. This might be 
applied to InvertedEarth. Why not argue that the Earthling is just moving 
to a new environment? If the Earthling moves to a new environment, why 
assume that the mental states of the Earthling are malfunctioning? The 
lenses appearto be affecting the current functions of the Earthling’s mental 
states, but the teleologist does not care about the lenses, given the 
irrelevanceof current functions. 
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I do not suggest that there are no adequate replies to some of these 
objections, but when taken together, they constitute a general problem with 
adopting a teleologcal approach to phenomenal content. If there is an 
alternative solution to Inverted Earth that does not appeal to such 
teleological ‘baggage’, I would suggest that this constitutes a superior reply 
to Inverted Earth. 
3.4.4.2 Flies or dots? 
The account of content gven by the phylogenetic teleologist depends only 
on the survival functions of the mental states. According to the teleologist 
the functions of mental states that arise from the mathematics of survival, 
when spelt out, determines the intentional contents of mental states. 
Frog’s mental states detect flies because ‘fly’ detecting mental states have a 
positive fitness value and were selected for in the past to detect flies; 
therefore, frogs’ mental states have the content ‘flies’. 
This is where an appeal to teleological considerations 
seems to yield a natural and satisfjmg answer. . . we can 
pick out the truth conditions of a belief as that which it is 
the biological purpose of the belief to be co-presented 
with (Papineau, 1990, p. 125). 
But this answer is not quite so satisfying because the survival functions are 
the same however the specific contents of the mental states are determined. 
Distinct contents come out with exactly the same survival value, so it is not 
clear as to how the teleologist is supposed to determine which specific 
content constitutes the mental state. Fodor (1994) argues against the 
phylogenetic teleologist thus: 
M o u  can say why snapping is a good thing for frogs to 
do given their situation, whichever way you describe 
what they snap ut. All that’s requiredfor frog snaps to be 
functional is that they normally succeed in getting the 
flies into the stomach of the frogs, so long as the little 
black dots in the frog’s normal environment are flies, the 
snaps do this equally well on either account of their 
intentional objects. The mathematics of sumival come 
out precisely the same either way @. 195). 
Applying Fodor’s point to Inverted Earth, according to the evolutionary 
theorist, the Earthling’sperceptual system, on Inverted Earth, is working 
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perfectly well. The perceptual system of the inverted earthling is fulfilling 
the function it was selected for in the first place, to i d e n w  features of an 
environment and utilise these features, in a manner that will aid his 
survival. It is absolutely not clear, accordingto an evolutionary account, as 
to why representingthe sky in some manner is any more relevant to the 
survival of the Earthling as representing the sky in a different manner as 
long as all the discriminatory capacities of the perceiving organism are 
maintained. If inverted spectrums across two individuals fulfil all the 
required discriminatory functions, then the survival functions all come out 
the same; therefore, it is not clear as to how an evolutionary account can 
even begin to offer an account of why mental states were selected to detect, 
for example, greenas opposed to say red. 
Papineau (1 998) later argues that fly detecting is a mere metaphysical puzzle 
and should not be considered to invalidate biological investigation. 
Maybe there are underlyng metaphysical puzzles about 
the fact that ‘fly’ and ‘small dark moving thing’ are 
causally relevant descriptions. . . But since nobody would 
say that these metaphysical puzzles invalidate biological 
analysis in general, it would be unreasonable to argue that 
they are an obstacle to a biological analysis of 
representationin general (p.2). 
This is perhaps ironic since in 1990 it was precisely the same metaphysical 
puzzle that motivated his teleologcal account. According to Papineau 
(1990), when a metaphysical puzzle serves to give an opportunity for 
supporting a theory’s plausibility, as a response to the puzzle, the 
metaphysical puzzle should be embraced. According to Papineau (1998), if a 
metaphysical puzzle poses a problem to your theory, it should be rejected as 
a mere metaphysical puzzle that has no bearing on ‘real’ science. 
Irrespectiveof Papineau’ s galling dodge of the argument, the reference class 
of the frog’s mental states might be broader than ‘flies’ but smaller than 
‘dots.’ Perhaps the mental states of  the frog track ‘food’ (M~lllkan, 1993). 
The teleologist at no point commits themselves to such a narrow reference 
class of ‘flies’ as the content of frogs’ mental states. Alternatively the 
referenceclass could be even broader than food. Perhaps frogs’ mental 
states really are selected to detect ‘small dark moving objects. ’ After all it 
is any member of  this class of objects that causes a response in the frog and 
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it is this mental state that has been selected for to cause a direct response 
meander, 1995). But however the teleologist fixes the referenceclass for 
what the mental states of frogs represent, it is not clear as to how the 
phylogenetic teleologist can explain specific colour contents given the 
identity of survival functions across spectrally inverted individuals. 
3.4.4.3 Novel environments 
The final objection offered to both phylogenetic and ontogenetic teleological 
accounts is that they cannot really account for the intentional contents of an 
organism’s mental states changmg when it moves into a new environment. 
Accordingto the teleological accounts the contents of the mental states have 
been selected for within a specific environment. If a perceiving organism 
moves into a genuinely new environment then according to the teleological 
account, none of the new properties of the novel environment will have been 
selected for in the hstory of the ancestors of that organism. None of the 
new properties of the novel environment will have played any role in the 
development and conhtioning of that organism when it was young. 
Indeed, it seems essential to the teleologcal reply to Inverted Earth that the 
Earthling’s new environment has no effect on the intentional contents of the 
Earthling’s mental states in any way. If an evolutionarily selective or 
developmental history is sufficient for permanently fixing the intentional 
contents of an individual’s mental states, then when this individual moves 
to a new environment, this individual will not undergo any new intentional 
contents. If phenomenal content or character is entirely constituted by 
intentional content, then this individual will never see any new objective 
properties of a new environment. But surely the overwhelming intuition is 
that when an organism enters a new environment it undergoes a host of new 
phenomenal contents. Imagine seeing a new shade of purple for the first 
time, that none of your ancestors have ever been exposed to, or that you, as 
a child, have never been exposed to. 
The best that the teleologist can offer is that if an organism moves to an 
environment where objective properties change, the intentional contents of 
that organism is indeterminate. This indeterminacy of content is expressed 
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by Stich when he considers a bird that flies into a new environment, 
progressively crossing environments where the proportion of monarchs, an 
edible butterfly, to viceroys, a poisonous butterfly that very closely 
resembles monarchs, slowly grows until there are no viceroys at all. The 
bird presumably develops mental states that indicate both monarchs and 
viceroys, with the function of avoiding them, as either its ancestors evolved 
in thls environment or it developed this avoidance in its own lifetime. The 
bird then flies into a new environment where there exist only monarchs. 
The question is at what point does the bird’s mental states cease to represent 
monarchs and viceroys, and just represent monarchs. At what point does 
the birds mental states ‘malfunction?’ 
There is it seems no principled way to answer this 
question. . . Cases like this arebound to make trouble for 
Dretske’s account of Representation, since If there is no 
principled way of  determining whether C indicates 
monarch, or monarch and vicerox then there is no 
principled way of determining what it represents (Stich, 
1990, p.805). 
Dretske (1990) replies to this argument by pointing out that as soon as a 
mental state has a non-zero chance of error, it misrepresents. This might 
have some plausibility when dealing with the contents of beliefs, but is 
arguably more questionable regarding phenomenal content or character. 
This is because, arguably, the better explanation of explaining the 
determinate contents of mental states is the actual properties of objects in 
the immediate environment of that perceiver and these properties direct and 
current relation to those mental states of that perceiving individual. 
Whether the bird perceives a monarch or a butterfly depends on whether it is 
a monarch or a butterfly that is currently in a &rat causal relation to that 
bird’s mental states. If it is this direct relation between the mental state of a 
perceiver and objective properties of that perceiver’s environment that 
explains the specific intentional content of that perceiver’smental state, then 
there is no problem in explaining the intentional content of a perceiver’s 
mental states when it moves into a novel environment. Selection histories 
based on the past evolution of ancestors of a creature and that creature’s 
mental states might tell a worthwhile story about the types of properties a 
perceptual system detects across a percentageof a population, but when it 
comes to the specific intentional content of one specific mental state of a 
95 
perceptualsystem, only the actual properties of the immediate environment 
of that perceiver best accounts for the specific content of that individual’s 
mental states. 
On Inverted Earth it appears that our Earthling has moved to a new 
environment, thus thereappearsto be no real grounds for claiming that his 
mental states start to malfunction. It might be arguedthat the Earthlings 
mental states were selected for in a manner that takes into account the 
possibility of the Earthling moving to a new environment. The Earthling 
moves to, not an abnormal environment, but a new environment, thus the 
Earthling’s mental states function perfectly adequately on Inverted Earth. 
The teleologist just assumes that mental states are selected for in only one 
‘natural’environment but why assume this? Does an individual’s mental 
states, who was born in Britain, suddenly start to malfunction when this 
individual travels to America? Surely not. So why assume that the 
Earthling’s mental states start to malfunction when he goes to Inverted 
Earth. The lenses offer some grounds for maintaining that the Earthling’s 
current mental states malfunction, but it is hardto see why the evolutionary 
history of the Earthling offers any grounds for a malfunction of the 
Earthling’s mental states. 
3.4.4 Summing up some objections to teleological accounts of 
phenomenal content or character 
First, intuition suggests that occurrent contents are to be more closely 
identified with phenomenal content. It is the current functioning of mental 
states that establishes a direct causal relation between an object in the 
environment and a mental state. Metaphysical speculations about 
swampmen and silicon replacements are only manifestations of this 
intuition, but arguably do not serve to conclusively demonstrate this 
intuition. It is not obvious that the teleologist can just reject the scenarios 
as absurd because it was the metaphysical speculation of Inverted Earth that 
partly motivates a teleological account of phenomenal content as a response 
to the argument. 
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Second, phylogenetic teleological accamts appear to be notoriously bad at 
speclfllng determinate contents if two contents result in the same survival 
value for a creature. This might be illustrated with frogs and flies, but is 
arguably equally applicable to specific colours given the fact that these 
might change whilst the survival functions remain constant; thus making it 
hard for a teleologist to give an explanation of why the mental state that 
indicates, for example, green was selected. The teleologist cannot deny the 
possibility of invexted spectnuns because it is consistent with their own 
theory that functionally, even molecularly, identical duplicates can have 
mental states with distinct intentional contents. 
Third, it appears that teleological accounts have problems accounting for 
how an organism can move into new environments, yet still undergo mental 
states with determinatecontents. This was illustrated with Stich’s example 
of a bird flying into a new environment with Merent types of butterflies. 
When considering Inverted Ear@ it is hard for the teleologist to ident@ 
where the malfunctioning is occurring. It is not just because the 
environment is new, it is arguably because of the lenses, but the teleologist 
cannot appeal to the lenses, because the lenses have nothmg to do with the 
historical function of the Earthling’smental states. 
Fourth, a problem specific to the phylogenetic account is that one can 
imagine offspring of the Earthling and Invertlings that inherit the spectrally 
inverting genetic alteration that was inserted into the Earthling. How many 
generations have to pass before the teleologst accepts that the descendents 
have mental states that have an appropriate design function? Any possible 
answer is surely entirely ad hoc; thus suggesting that there is a faulty 
assumption that the phylogenetic teleologist is making. A further related 
point is that surely the first creaturethat undergoes a genetic mutation that 
offers some major survival advantage, perhaps it enables the creature to 
perceive colours in the infra-red range, is in its own way a swampcreature. 
Yet because this was a spontaneous accident, does this rule out this creature 
as having any content to its infrareddetecting mental states? 
Because of the above problems with teleological accounts of intentional 
content as an account of phenomenal content or character, it is suggested 
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that an alternative representationist reply is preferable as a response to 
Inverted Earth. There is such an alternative representationist reply to 
Inverted Earth that makes no appeal to phylogenetic or non-phylogenetic 
teleological accounts of content. 
3.5.1 The real reason Inverted Earth fails to demonstrate the falsity of 
represent ationism 
To recap, the representationist has two broad options to reply to Inverted 
Earth; to either: first argue that the phenomenal content or characterof the 
Earthling’s mental states change when he arrives on Inverted Earth and t h s  
corresponds to the change in the intentional content of the Earthlings mental 
states; thus the Earthling’s perceptual system overcomes the inverting lenses 
phenomenally re-inverting (slowly or instantaneously) without the Earthling 
noticing; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument is unsound. However, an 
appeal to phenomenal re-inversion was argued to fail in chaptertwo. 
Or second, to argue that the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental 
states stays the same after the move to Inverted Earth, and the intentional 
content remains different from the Invertlings’ intentional contents; thus the 
phenomenal content and characterof the Earthling’s mental states stays the 
same; therefore, the inverted Earth argument is unsound. We have seen two 
representationistattempts to argue this line as follows: 
First, the narrow content account attempted to show how the narrow 
intentional contents as functions that map contexts onto contents stay the 
same after the Earthling arrives on Inverted Earth; narrow contents entirely 
constitute phenomenal content or character; thus the phenomenal contents 
and character stay the same; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument is 
unsound. However, an appeal to narrow contents was demonstrated to fail 
in chaptertwo. 
Second, the teleological approach argued that the design functions of the 
Earthling’s mental states were fixed either in the phylogenetic or the 
ontogenetic history of the Earthling; thus the intentional content of the 
Earthlings mental states were never the same as the Invertlings despite 
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behaviouralidentity; thus the intentional contents of the Earthlings mental 
states did not change because the current long-arm functional roles are 
irrelevant; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument is unsound. However, 
there are problems with th~s  account when applied to phenomenal content or 
character(see ear1ier)and there is a better reply to InvertedEarth available. 
3.5.2.1 The dilemma 
The best reply to Inverted Earth exploits an ambiguity in the original 
formulation of the argument thus allowing the possibility of presenting a 
dilemma to the proponent of the argument, neither of which options pose a 
problem to the representationist. The dilemma goes thus: are the inverting 
lenses that are inserted into the Earthling part of the environment of the 
Earthling, or are they part of the brain of the Earthling? 
3.5.2.2 The lenses are part of the environment of the Earthling 
Imagine a different scenario as follows: on Inverted Earth someone paints all 
the objects the same colours of things as they are on Earth (the sky and the 
sun are problematic, granted), red grass is painted green, blue bananas are 
painted yellow, and then an Earthling without lenses inserted arrives on 
Inverted Earth. In this scenario there is absolutely nothing surprising about 
the intentional contents of the Earthling’s mental states staying the same, 
when the Earthling looks at the same types of coloured objects on Inverted 
Earth. The phenomenal characterof the Earthling’s mental states would 
stay the same when looking at the same types of coloured objects on 
InvertedEarth. The grass would look just as green and the bananas would 
look just as yellow. This example is clearly no threat to the 
representationist . 
Now imagine a scenario where objects on Inverted Earth are not painted to 
resemble the colours of object on Earth; however, in this scenario when Ed 
arrives on Inverted Earth a bubble surrounds Ed. On the inside of this 
bubble are projected images of Inverted Earth. The images change as the 
Earthling moves around and looks at the world creating the illusion that 
there is no bubble there. These images are, however, altered such that the 
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colours of the object images are changed so that the same types of coloured 
object images projected onto the inside of the bubble look just the same as 
the colour of the same types of coloured objects on Earth. Once again, so 
far as they concern colours, the contents of Ed’s mental states, when 
looking at the images projected onto the inside of the bubble, are the same 
as the contents of the corresponding mental states obtained on Earth when 
loolung at the objects correspondmgto those images. The bubble is clearly 
part of the environment of the Earthling and the Earthling clearly and 
correctly perceives the colour of the images projected onto the inside of the 
bubble. This example is clearly no threat to the representationist. 
Now imagine a scenario where the Earthling wears very light goggles, 
unbeknownst to him. These goggles have an image of the world projected 
onto them. Like the bubble, the colours of the images of the same types of 
objects correspondto the colours of the same types of objects on Earth. 
Once again, the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states stays the 
same when looking at the same type of coloured surfaces on Inverted Earth. 
The goggles are part of the environment of the Earthling and the Earthling 
correctly representsthe colours of images on the screen of the goggles. This 
example is no threat to representationism. Clearly the contents on Inverted 
Earth differ from the corresponding contents on Earth since the former are 
about images on either the bubble or the goggles and the latter are about 
objects beyond the screens, but regarding colour, the differences in content 
are irrelevant to phenomenal character. So if the lenses of the Earthling are 
part of the environment of the Earthling, why are the lenses a threat to 
representationism? 
Assuming that the lenses are part of the environment of the Earthling is 
comparable to the above scenarios. In the case of the colour inverting 
lenses, there are no painted objects or painted images; however, if the lenses 
are part of the environment, the Earthling correctly represents colours. The 
mental states of the Earthling still detect the right wavelengths of light 
enteringthe Earthling’seye. Thereis clearly a sense in which the Earthling 
is fooled concerningthe actual colours of, for example, ripe tomatoes, but 
this fooling is no more mysterious than when someone paints the Inverted 
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Earthobjects to look like Earthobjects, or alteredimages are projected onto 
the inside of a bubble. 
In the case of the bubble, the goggles or the lenses, the Earthling and the 
Invertlings do not share an environment. In the environment of only the 
Earthling there is interposed between the Earthling and his environment 
some mechanism, which is part of the environment, specific to the 
Earthling. In one sense the Earthling and the Invertlings share an 
environment; i.e. they are on the same planet, but in a crucial sense they do 
not share an environment because the Earthling has as part of his 
environment a further mechanism that the Invertlings do not. The Earthling 
with lenses inserted is, to all extents and purposes, part of a goggled or 
bubbled world while the Invertlings are not. 
Because the Invertlings and the Earthling do not share an environment, t h ~ s  
immediately undermines any attempt to appeal to Invertlings to just@ a 
sameness of intentional content between the Invertlings and the Earthling. 
This thus underminesan attempt to appeal to the intentional content of the 
Invertling’s mental states to just@ a change in intentional content in the 
mental states of the Earthling, when the Earthling moves to Inverted Earth. 
Furthermore, if the Invertlings are not appealed to, seeing as the Earthling is 
representing colours perfectly correctly when presented with same types of 
coloured objects, there is no reason to suppose that there is a change in the 
intentional content of the Earthlings mental states when he arrives on 
Inverted Earth. There is, therefore, no change in the Earthling’s phemmenal 
content or characteqwhen presentedwith the same patterns of light. If the 
lenses are part of the environment of the earthling then there is no need to 
maintain that the intentional content of the Earthling’s mental states 
changes; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument is no threat to the wide 
representationist 
352.3 The lenses are part of the brain of the Earthling 
If it is assumed that not the lenses, but a tampering of the brain of the 
Earthling brings about the colour inversion, it is no longer clear that there is 
any sense in which the Earthling correctly represents colour. If the 
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tampering is part of the brain, there is no reason to suppose that the 
phenomenal content or character of the Earthling’s mental state stays the 
same when the Earthling simultaneously looks at the same types of objects 
on Earth and Inverted Earth. There is a sense in which the Earthling notices 
no differencewhen he wakes up on Inverted Earth, but athough he does not 
notice that anythlng phenomenal has changed a phenomenal change can 
easily be demonstrated to him by presenting the Earthling simultaneously 
with an Earth object and the same type of Inverted Earth object. 
If he was to simultaneously look at a ripe Earth tomato and a ripe Inverted 
Earth tomato on InvertedEarthto comparethe look of the same types of 
object, the ripe Earth tomato would look green to the Earthling because of 
the brain tampering. The ripe Inverted Earth tomato would look red to the 
Earthling. Therefore,the same types of objects if presented simultaneously, 
do not look the same to the Earthling. If the brain of the Earthling is 
altered, then the look of the same types of objects on Earth and Inverted 
Earth do not stay the same if the Earthling was to be simultaneously 
presented with the same Earth and Inverted Earth objects after the Earthling 
moves to Inverted Earth It therefore cannot be inferred from the Inverted 
Earth argument that the phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling’s 
mental states stays the same if the Earthling is presented simultaneously 
with an Earth object and the same type of Inverted Earth object. 
There is an essential sense in which the phenomenal content or characterof 
the Earthling’s mental states changes if the Earthling were to look at the 
same types of Earth objects on Inverted Earth. It is this ambiguity that 
partly motivates the Inverted Earth argument. If the lenses are part of the 
Earthling such that he really does fail to detect wavelengths correctly, there 
is no sensible sense that can be made of the idea that the Earthling 
representscolours correctly on InvertedEarth or that there is a constancy in 
phenomenalcontent or characterwhen the Earthling looks at objects of the 
same type on InvertedEarthwhen compared to objects of the Same type on 
Earth. Furthermore, his mental states will newer come to represent colours 
correctly either on Earth or Inverted Earth. Given this change in the 
phenomenal content or charactercomesponding with the intentional contents 
of the Earthling’s mental states mis-representing, there is no reason to 
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maintain that phenomenal content or character is dlstinct from intentional 
content. The proponent of the Inverted Earth argument requires a constancy 
of phenomenal content or character across the simultaneous inspection of 
Earth and Inverted Earth objects, and thls is not established by the Inverted 
Earth argument. 
If the lenses are built into the brain of the Earthling, there is no reason to 
suppose that there is any phenomenal constancy, r f  the Earthling were to 
look at the same types of objects, before and afrer the move to Inverted 
Earth; therefore, the Inverted Earth argument fails to establish that 
phenomenal content or character is entirely constituted by intentional 
content. 
3.5.3 But what about functional isomorphism, causal co-variation 
and linguistic embedding? 
Imagine that our Earthling returns to Earth with an Invertling. The 
Earthling is most surprised and notices how odd everythtng looks. He 
describes tomatoes as green, etc. The Inverthng is in complete agreement 
with Ed. He also points out how odd everythtng looks. However, from the 
fact that both the Earthling and the Invertling are in complete linguistic 
agreement, functionally isomorphic, and even causally co-variant with the 
same types of objects, and the same types of coloured objects, on Inverted 
Earth, it absolutely does not follow that the Earthling correctly represents 
the colour of objects. The Invertling represents colours correctly. The 
Earthling misrepresents because of the tampering with his visual system. 
The Earthling misrepresents not because of teleology. The intentional 
contents of the Earthlings mental states are clearly distinct when compared 
with the Invertling. The phenomenal content or characterof the Earthlings 
mental states change after the tampering with his visual system because it is 
now clearthat the same types of objects do not look the same way as they 
used to look before he had his perceptual system tampered with. He can 
now compare the looks of the same types of objects, for example, ripe Earth 
tomatoes and ripe Inverted Earth tomatoes. The only sense in which the 
phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling’s mental states stays the 
same, assuming that the tampering is part of the Earthlings processing, is 
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when the perceptual experiences of the Earthling looking at Inverted Earth 
objects is comparedto the Earthling looking at the same coloured types of 
objects. 
If the lenses are part of the Earthling, his mental states fail to ever represefl 
colours correctly on Earth or Inverted Earth, and hence there is good reason 
to maintain that both the intentional content and the phenomenal content or 
character of the Earthling’s mental states change if he were to 
simultaneously look at the same types of objects on Inverted Earth and on 
Earth. The Earthling’s mental states permanently mis-represent the colours 
of objects. If this horn of the dilemma is accepted, the phenomenal content 
or characterof the Earthling is permanently tampered with and the Inverted 
Earth argument is unsound. 
3.5.4 The successful representationist reply concluded 
If either the lenses are part of the environment of the Earthling, or built into 
the neurological structure of the Earthling, then the Inverted Earth argument 
does not succeed in establishing that representationism is false. If the 
lenses are part of the environment of the Earthling, this is analogous to 
placing the Earthling in a painted, bubbled or goggled world. This presents 
no problem to the representationst. The Earthling has no problem correctly 
representing the same types of coloured objects. There is no reason to 
maintain that the intentional contents of the Earthlings mental states or the 
phenomenal content or character of the Earthling’s mental states changes, 
but not on grounds of phylogenetic teleology or developmentally $fixed 
ontogenetic teleology. If the lenses are integral to the Earthling, then the 
Earthling mis-represents intentionally and phenomenally the same types of 
objects on Earth, Inverted Earth and everywhere. The Earthling permanently 
mis-representsthe colours of objects. Thereare no grounds for maintaining 
a phenomenal re-inversion if the E W n g  is placed on Inverted Earth; 
therefore, if the lenses are part of the Earthling, then there are no grounds for 
maintainingthat the phenomenal content or characterof the Earthling stays 
the same when the Earthling simultaneously looks at the same types of 
Earth and InvertedEarth objects on InvertedEarth. Either way there are no 
good grounds offered by Inverted Earth for driving a wedge between 
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intentional content and phenomenal character. The Inverted Earth argument 
fails to establish the falsity of representationism!' 
3.6 Inverted spectrums again 
This reply to Inverted Earth also suggests a plausible representationist reply 
to intra-personal spectrum inversions. Phenomenal re-inversions cannot be 
ruled out in the four stage intra-personalinversions because there is no 
requirement for an unnoticed phenomenal re-inversion, and there is possibly 
a presence of behavioural readjustment in the four stage intrapersonal 
inversion scenario that is lacking in the Inverted Earth scenario. However, 
the above &lemma also applies to the intra personal inversion scenario; are 
the lenses part of the environment or part o f  the Earthling? 
If the lenses are part of the environment, then there is a sense in which the 
individual who has the lenses inserted does not phenomenally or 
intentionally change at stage two, when the lenses are initially inserted. 
Therefore, the individual never comes to intentionally revert back to the way 
he once was. Just think of the lenses as analogous to painting every object 
a Merent colour. The individual may change his behaviour, but the 
colours of objects axe permanently changed and he sees these changed 
colours correctly There is a sense in which the same objects look a 
different colour but this is no more a threat to the representationist than 
painting ripe tomatoes green. This individual cannot be compared to other 
individuals in his community to jus* a possible change in the intentional 
content of the mental states of the individual; therefore, an essential 
motivation for thinking that the intentional contents of the individual 
changes is undermined. 
If the lenses are part of the individual, then there is a clearer sense in whch 
the phenomenal content and characterof his mental states changes. His 
perceptual systems have been tampered with in a way far more fundamental 
Notice also that this reply makes no appeal to narrow content accounts to 
establish that the intentional contents of the Earthling stay the same. The 
reason that the intentional contents might be argued to stay the same stay 
the same is because the lenses might be assumed to be part of the 
environment of the Earthling. 
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than painting objects a different colour. He no longer perceives colours 
correctly, nor will he ever perceive colours correctly. However long he 
remains phenomenally re-inverted, he will always remain phenomenally re- 
inverted. His intentional contents will permanently change corresponding 
to the phenomenalchange. Notice that this is despite linguistic agreement 
and coarse functional isomorphism with all his companions. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The first part of this thesis considered two metaphysical speculations as an 
attempt to motivate phenomenism out of presenting objections to 
representationism. Both metaphysical speculations failed to demonstrate 
the falsity of representationism. However, both arguments served an 
invaluable role in motivating both different types of representaticnism as 
responses to these metaphysical speculations and apparent inconsistencies 
with certain existing representationist responses to these thought 
experiments. It is perhaps revealing that the teleological responses only 
relied on the historical design functions of mental states in an attempt to 
maintain intentional constancy in the Earthling while if they looked more 
closely at the failure of the current functioning of the Earthling’s mental 
states, they would have realised that the Earthling’s mental states badly 
misrepresent the same types of coloured objects. This was simply shown 
by returning the Earthling to Earth. Narrow content replies are motivated 
out of making the InvertedEarth experiment work, but given its failure, this 
offers a further undermining of narrow content accounts. The serious 
misrepresentingof the Earthling’s mental states might be hard to reconcile 
with the supposed success of the narrow contents. Furthermore, as 
established in the last chapter, narrow content accounts of intentional 
content face an insurmountable problem. Teleological accounts of 
intentional content are too clumsy to speclfy the determinate contents of 
individual phenomenal states. This leaves the current long-arm functional 
representationists or one version of wide representationism. 
The wide representationist, however, faces problems entirely independent of 
the considerations outlined in the first part of this thesis. Wide 
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representationists face deep problems concerning the casual efficacy of 
relationalproperties. These considerations have been argued, to and fro, 
with regards to mental states such as beliefs, but these considerations are 
equally applicable to the representationist who claims that phenomenal 
characteris entirely exhausted by wide intentional content. If the wide 
representationist wants to give phenomenal character some causal or deep 
explanatory role, then these same concerns apply also to them. Part two of 




Explanation and Causation 
Chapter 4: Explanation, Causation and Wide 
Content 
4.1.1 Explanatory constraints and wide content 
In the first part of the thesis, two types of metaphysical speculation were 
considered as an attempt to address possible motivations for phenomenism 
by presenting arguments against representationism. These arguments 
against the representationist were concluded to fail. Interpersonal spectrum 
inversions beg the question against the represen~onist, intra-personal 
spectum inversions allow for the possibility of phenomenal re-inversion, 
and there is an ambiguty being exploited by the phenomenist concerning 
the status of the lenses as either being part of the environment or integral to 
the peIceptual processing of the individual wearing the lenses, this latter 
point is also exploited by the phenomenist in the Inverted Earth argument. 
Once t h ~ s  ambiguity is clarified, both intra-personal and Inverted Earth 
arguments can be demonstrated to be unsound. However, a narrow content 
account of phenomenal character, inspired by a Fodorian account of narrow 
content, was found wanting as possible intentional identification of 
intentional content with phenomenal content or character. Suspicion was 
also cast upon historical or teleologcal accounts of intentional content when 
applied to phenomenal content or character. This leaves only a version of 
wide representationism as an adequate representationist account of 
phenomenal content or character. 
Part two of the thesis develops some more considerations that might be 
thought to count for or against wide representationism and phenomenism; 
these considerations, although sometimes assumed to rely only on 
metaphysical speculation are perhaps grounded instead by matters of fact. 
The considerations that concern part two are considerations that have 
traditionally challengedboth phenomenism and wide intentionalist theories 
of mind, although lately wide intentional theories of mind have received the 
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brunt of these objections mainly due to Fodor (1987). These considerations 
concernthe causal or explanatory role of mental states. 
Constraints on causation and explanation present a troubling challenge to 
the wide representationist. Furthermore, phenomenism as a theory of 
phenomenal character appears better suited to handle what might be 
described as ‘causal or explanatory principles’, although whether 
phenomenism is better able to handle these causal or explanatory 
considerations will be considered in chapter six. This chapter elucidates 
some of these causal or explanatoryprinciples, examines how they might be 
taken to be inconsistent with wide representationism, and analyses the 
success of two representationist replies to these inconsistencies: Wilson 
(1997) and Yablo (1997). The onus is placed on the wide representationist 
to first meet these principles of causation or explanation, and second, 
present an adequate theory of causation or explanation that accommodates 
wide representationist intuitions. If the causal-explanatory challenge is 
presented adequately, it appears that there remains a large lacuna in this 
representationisttheory, when it comes to their attempt to explain how wide 
contents can be causal or explanatorily efficacious. If the wide 
representationist wishes phenomenal content or character to have some 
causal or explanatory role, then the general objections that apply to wide 
intentionalist theories of mind also apply to the wide representationist who 
maintains that wide intentional content entirely constitutes phenomenal 
content or character. 
Through the development of this argument, some curious dynamics arise 
between types of reasoning within the phdosophy of mind concerning the 
metaphysical and logical analyses of relational properties and constraints 
within scientdic explanation. The reason for concluding that considerations 
about causation and explanation count against the wide intentionalist is 
summarised by Crane (199 1); he applies the argument to wide intentionalist 
theories of beliefs and desires: 
The problem . . . arises from [the] conflict with two 
fundamental principles about causation and the nature of 
intentional states. The first principle is that intentional 
states have causes and effects. I take it as uncontroversial 
that beliefs, for example, are caused by perceptions and 
other beliefs, and combinations of beliefs and desires 
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cause actions. . . . The second principle is about which 
properties of things are involved in causal interactions 
between them. . . . We should lstinguish between those 
properties whose acquisition or loss by a particular is a 
real change in that particular and those whose acquisition 
or loss is not one. . . Properties of the first kind are, 
uncontroversially, intrinsic [non-relationallproperties; and 
properties of the second kind are non-intrinsic [relational]. 
[when we look for causes, we look for intrinsic [non- 
relational] properties. . , . [Blroad intentional states are 
not, and do not systematically depend on, intrinsic 
properties of thinkers . . . [Tlherefore wide 
representationists] must deny either that intentional states 
as such have causes and effects, or that relational 
properties. . . cannot have immediate effects (pp.5-9). 
I will also take it as uncontroversialthat intentional mental states, including 
phenomenal mental states, both cause and explain behaviour. Fodor appeals 
to scientific practise as part of hs formulation of hs argument (Fodor, 
1987). Fodor appeals to scientrfic practise to just@ why relational 
properties are not causally efficacious. However, Crane (1991), when 
formulating t h s  argument, claims that an appeal to scientific practise as part 
of the argument would be a mistake. 
Fodor weakens his case by making the dependence on 
intrinsic properties a hgh-level generalization of scienbfic 
practice. [However, these two principles] are not just 
generalizations about the current practice of  science, but 
assumptions about causation and the causal status of mind 
(P.8). 
I disagree with Crane. The anti-wide repesentationist owes the wide- 
representationist some explanation as to why relations cannot cause. It is 
precisely the causal efficacy of relations that seems, in the current literature, 
to be sometimes defended (Wilson, 1997, Yablo, 1997). Crane’s 
assumption about relational properties and causation cannot be assumed; 
this assumption requires justdication. This justification for the causal or 
explanatory problems that confront relational properties arises from causal 
and explanatory principles. Thereforq the anti-wide representationist can 
considerably clm his argument by a development of why relational 
properties are not suitable for playng a deep explanatory role by an appeal 
to causal or explanatoryprinciples. There are a host of possible confusions 
that arise from an analysis of relational properties and their causal efficacy, 
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so before an investigation of relations in terms of scientific principles is 
developed, some preliminary points have to be addressed. 
First, there is a variety of possible explananda that the wide 
representationistmight be taken to be attempting by an appeal to relational 
properties. The wide representationist might be attempting to explain 
variables associated with one of the terms of the relation by variables 
associated with the other term of the relation. The wide representationist 
might be attempting to explain variables associated with a third event, 
entirely distinct from the terms that constitute the relation, by the relation. 
The wide representationist might be attempting to explain this third event 
by an appeal to variables associated with only one of the terms of the 
relation. 
Second, there has to be some clarification of the wide representationist’s 
commitment to relations as explanatory. Sadly, the nature of the relations 
to which the wide representationist is committed is rarely spelt out. This 
chapter will present two conceptions of relations: a strict conception, 
whereby X stands in a strict relation to Y if it is possible that this relation 
should cease to hold solely on account of a changein Y (this corresponds to 
Crane’s distinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties)!’ and a 
looser conception, whereby there are no constraints on the changes in 
variables associated with the two terms that constitute the relation. Wilson 
( 1  997) offers an explicit rejection of strict relations as causally efficacious in 
an attempt to just@ wide causation: 
Many relational properties, however, are causally 
efficacious in a way that the paradigmatic cases of mere- 
Cambridge properties are not. For example, being a 
mother, being unemployed, being a member of a 
particular species, being a planet, being located in a 
magnetic field and occupying a relatively specific 
ecological niche are all relational properties that different 
entities can have in particular instantiating circumstances, 
each of which, when coinstantiated with the appropriate 
properties, enables an entity to bring about particular 
effects (p. 124). 
Otherwise known as mere-Cambridge properties (more on these later). 42 
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Therefore,it might be thought that explanatory constraints only present a 
challenge to the strict conception of relations. However, the next chapter 
argues that these explanatory constraints not only present a challenge to the 
strict conception of relations, but also to the looser conception of relations. 
Attempts to jus@ the explanatory relevance of the looser relations are 
problematic since the wide representationist still has to go beyond the loose 
relation to demonstrate how the variables associated with the terms that 
constitute the loose reldon meet explanatory constraints. The wide 
representationist’s attempt to jm the explanatory relevance of the loose 
relations inevitably entails that the relation fails to deeply explain in a 
mannerthat provides an understandingof the event or process. 
Finally, the challenge to the causal efficacy of strict relations arises not from 
one, generalized, hgh-level, a priori causal constraint, but a myriad of 
methodological constraints placed on explanations in a variety of different 
explanatory contexts. These constraints push the wide representationist to 
the edge of legitimate explanation, and arguably over the edge. 
Before, the argument against the wide representationist is developed it is 
worth clarrfyrng further as to whether the argument is about whether mental 
states should be taxonomised by their wide intentional contents. Does the 
argument apply only to strict relations or loose relations? Does the 
argument rely on one explanatory constraint or many? Are these explanatory 
constraints a priori or a posteriori? 
4.1.2 Taxonomies, superficial explanations or deep explanations 
Before explanatory constraints are considered and applied to relational 
properties it should first be clarified that the concern of this chapter is not 
the traditional debate between Tyler Burge (1986) and Jerry Fodor (1987) 
concerninghow mental states should be taxonomised or individuated. It 
might be argued that the explanatory relevance of the relational properties 
that determine wide contents does have a direct bearing on how mental 
states should be individuated (Fodor, 1987, pp33-34). It might even be 
arguedthat the way mental states aretaxonomised has a direct bearing on 
the deep explanatoryrole of such states (Wilson, 1997, pp.124-125). 
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I want to attempt to avoid this debate and focus on whether relational 
properties, which determinethe wide contents of mental states, have a deep 
explanatory role to play and one of the terms of the relation is either the 
neurological or intrinsic states of an individual when the third term, 
independent of the relation and to be explained by the relation, is the 
ensuing behaviour of that individual. As stated earlier, I assume that the 
representationist who claims that wide contents entirely constitute 
phenomenal content or character assumes a deep explanatory role for 
phenomenal content or character concerning behaviour. In the next chapter 
it will also be considered as to whether a looser conception of relations is 
suitable for an explanatory role for the intentional contents that the wide 
representationist maintains entirely constitutes phenomenal character or 
content. 
4.1.3 Relational properties 
As these various constraints on explanation are offered, they are going to be 
presented as a challenge to a specific set of  properties, relational properties. 
It is a feature of wide representationist accounts that they are often 
somewhat under-specficabout which terms constitute the relevant relations; 
however, when they maintain that wide contents explain, it is arguably 
certainthat at least one of the terms of the relation resides at some ’distance’ 
from the other term. Sometimes critics of the anti-wide representationist 
argument assume that the anti-wide representationist holds all relational 
properties to be entirely redundantwith regards to all causal efficacy and 
explanation. This is not necessarilythe case. 
Various confusions might arise concerning how relations should be 
analysed. Let us start with a simple relation aRb, where a and b are terms 
or events with various variables associated with these events and R is a 
relation. For example, Bob is taller than Joe. Bob is ‘a’ and Joe is ‘b’ and 
the relation is ’taller than’. The specific variable associated with Bob might 
be him possessing the property of being 6 feet tall; the specific variable 
associated with Joe might be him possessing the property of being 5 feet 
tall. One confusion arises concerning what explains what; whether the 
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terms that constitute the relation themselves are explanatory with respect to 
eachother, or whether the relation itself is causally explanatory either in 
explaining the variables associated with the terms of the relation, or whether 
the relation itself is explanatory with regards to an additional third event 
‘C’ , 
Dependmg on how the explanatory role of relations is construed, the anti- 
wide representationist need not maintain that all terms that constitute any 
relations are explanatorily redundant with regards to one another. For 
example, the atomic explosion occurred ‘before’ everyone within a certain 
radius of the explosion died. These two events are clearly causally related. 
Just because a relation, for example ‘earlierthan’, links two terms does not 
necessarily entail that there need be no causal relation between variables 
associated with these two terms, although relations might be defined in such 
a mannerthat rules out an intrinsic change in at least one of the terms that 
constitutes the relation. Therefore, the anti-wide representationist further 
needs to argue that the type of relation that the wide representationist 
appeals to are only explanatorily redundant with regards to the events or 
variables that the wide representationist hopes these relations explain. One 
term of the relation to whch the wide representaionist appeals is the 
intrinsic state of the agent. The third independent term that the wide 
representationist argues is explained by the relation will be designated as the 
ensuing behaviour of the agent. 
If the explanatory emphasis is the relation, and not on the terms, then the 
anti-wide representationist might, however, plausibly maintain that 
relations, themselves, never causally explain, perhaps because strict 
relations are not bona $de events. Strict relations are not events because 
strict relations alone cannot change. 
Now all change consists in some object’s having some 
property and then lacking some property; but a relational 
change consists in an object’s having and then lacking a 
property solely in virtue of the fact that object bears some 
relation to an object which ‘really’ changed or altered. 
Xanthippe’s becoming a widow consisted entirely of her 
being the last wife of Socrates when he died (Lombard, 
1999, p.364). 
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Brim Lombard has a strict conception as to what constitutes a legitimate 
relational change. He illustrates this with an example of  temperature 
applied to distinct objects and the relation ‘cooler than’ applied to the two 
objects. He considers two distinct scenarios as follows: The first is 
whereby one object is 40 degrees and the other is 50, and then at a later 
time the first object is heated to 60 and the second is cooled to 45 degrees. 
The second object stands in the changing relation ‘being cooled relative to 
the first object’. Lombard describes this apparent change in the relational 
properties of the second object as non-relational because there is a genuine 
changein the temperaturesof the second object; it really does become cooler 
as the first object becomes hotter; therefore, what appears to be a relational 
change is really a non-canonicaldescription of an event. 
In the second scenario, the first object is heated from 40 to 60 degrees, but 
the second is maintainedat 50 degrees. The second object still remains in 
the ‘being cooled relative to the first object’ relation. However, there is no 
change in the properties of the second object other than the relational 
property; therefore, this constitutes a genuine relation (Lombard, 1999, 
p.365). 
Even if one allows a dual role for the relation of being cooled r e l ~ v e  to 
another object, which allows for a change in variables associated with both 
terms of a relation, relations are dependent only on changes in variables 
associated with the terms that constitute the relation. Lombard draws a 
rather stark contrast between relational and non-relational properties whereby 
it is the non-changing status of variables associated with one term relative 
to changes in variables associated with the other term that defines a 
relationalproperty. I would be inclined to claim that both examples of 
relational properties are legitimate examples of the type of relation the wide 
representationist might appeal; however, even assuming the looser 
conception of relations, the changes in the relational property is apparent 
and only occurs because of changes in the variables associated with the 
terms that constitute the relation. 
Relational properties might be employed by the representationist to try to 
explain variables associated with a distinct event. For example, the 
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relational propelty of one person being taller than another appears to explain 
why one person and not the other reachesthe cookie jar without standing on 
a chair. The problem confronting the wide representationist arises 
concerning either whether relations themselves are explanatorily relevant, or 
whether it is the variables associated with the terms that constitute the 
relation and the underlying causal mechanisms, that are explanatorily 
relevant relative to a thud event, bearing in mind that one of the terms, 
according to the wide representationist is a state of an agent and the third 
event to be explainedby the relation, is the behaviour of that agent. If one 
person is taller than another, this is of no relevance to explaining the 
specific heights of the two people. If the taller person grows a couple of 
inches and the other person stays the same height, then the relation itself 
appearsto change; i.e., one person gets even taller than the other; however, 
this does not in any way affect the height of the person who remains the 
Same height. If the taller person grows 2 inches and the shorter person 
shrinks by 1 inch, then the taller person grows even taller, relative to the 
shorter person. Furthermore, there is a change in the variables associated 
with both of the terms that constitute the relation, but does the apparently 
changing relation explain the change in the variables associated with the two 
terms? Does the apparently changing relation itself explain any third event 
such as the abilities of individuals to reach objects at a certain distance? 
Answers to these questions will be developed in this and the next chapter. 
The anti-wide representationist, in order to demonstrate a problem with 
wide representationism, has to establish the following: first, if the reldon 
is strict, then the terms that constitute the relation that the wide 
representationist hopes to be explanatory, have no explanatory relevance to 
one another, or to a third distinct event, one of these terms being the 
intrinsic state of a person, and the third event being the behaviour of the 
person; or second, if the relation is loose, then relations themselves are of 
no causal relevance to changes in the terms that constitute the relation; or 
the relation between two terms is of no deep explanatory relevance to the 
distinct event that is hoped by the representationistto be explained by the 
relation. 
4.1.4 A priori or a posteriori? 
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The anti-wide representationist demonstrates that the variables associated 
with the terms that constitute relations are not of  explanatory relevance to 
one another, or a third event, by an appeal to scientific practice; therefore, 
the anti-wide representationist has good grounds for attempting to place 
constraints on explanation. However, the wide representationist often finds 
it easy to reply to these constraints because the anti-wide representationist 
often fails to present these constraints as methodological, thus allowing the 
wide representationists to rebut by scoffing at over-generalised, individual, 
illegitimate, a priori attempts to place limitations on scientific endeavour. 
Sciences, particularly the special sciences, develop their 
own taxonomies, theories and explanations in response to 
very different researchinterests and problems, and with 
very different methodologies. Because of the often 
unappreciated, rich diversity within the sciences, any 
argument that relies on a premise about scientific 
taxonomies and explanations having some essential 
featureis unlikely to be sound; more so any argument that 
relies on a general premise about the notions of causation, 
property or explanation, notions at least some of whose 
principal instances are found by turning to the sciences. 
The pragmatics of scientific explanation cannot be 
separated from its metaphysics; at least not if the 
metaphysics one proposes for science is to be taken 
seriously as an account of the metaphysics science actually 
traffics in. Scientific practice is not simply the ultimate 
arbiter for claims about the nature of science; its 
examination is the way to do philosophy of science. 
Although this conclusion may well strike one as trite, we 
do well here to remember that philosophers, including 
philosophers of science, tend to crave the general. Insofar 
as this is a craving satisfied only by a priori 
argumentation, it should be resisted (Wilson, 1997, 
p. 138). 
Wilson is perhaps correct in expressing a concern that any one individual 
constraint on explanation offers a constraint on all scientific endeavour, but 
he is perhaps wrong in assuming that many constraints on a variety of 
scientific endeavours present no challenge to the wide representationist. 
What if all constraints within many explanatory contexts, including the 
special sciences, prove troubling to the wide representationist? Wilson is 
perhaps correct in expressing a concern about a priori constraints on 
scientific explanation. However, it is not always clear that such constraints 
are entirely motivated by a priori reasoning, but instead are motivated by 
an examination of scientific practice and the underlying assumptions that 
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investigators make to rule out certain lines of inquiry before the 
investigators begin to investigate. Perhaps Wilson is once again wrong in 
assuming that the pragmatic constraints on scientific endeavour, within a 
variety of specific explanatory contexts, present no challenge to the wide 
representationist. 
Therefore, to increasethe plausibility of the causal or explanatory challenge 
against the wide representationist’s appeal to relations, various pragmatic 
constraints on causation and explanation will be presented. Some care is 
going to be taken to show how multiple causal or explanatory constraints 
present a challenge to the wide representationist who maintains that wide 
content, whch is constituted by relations, and only wide content entirely 
constitutes phenomenal character. Thus four constraints will be considered 
that emerge out of various theories of causation and explanation as follows: 
a non-causal nomological account of explanation, a probabilistic causal 
theory, a counterfactualtheory of causation, and a causal process theory. 
The first explanatory constraint might be motivated by Russell’s comments, 
largely inspired by Hume, regarding the role of explanation in science. 
Accordingto this account, the concern of science is not causal efficacy, but 
a posteriori investigation and the identification of functional relations 
between variables. Science, through the process of empirical observation, 
identifies correlations and regularities rather than necessay causes. Thus 
methodological constraints on explanation need not appeal to a priori 
causal constraints; for example, a non-causal nomological law account of 
explanation also suggests a possible constraint that might rule out certain 
types of events as explanatorily useful. Such an explanatory constraint, 
based on functional correlations between variables, poses the cfirst challenge 
for the wide content theorists appeal to relations. 
4.2.1.1 Nomological laws and content 
The general purpose of physics as a scientific enterprise is not often to 
explain the occurrenceof individual events, although individual events may 
end up being explained. The emphasis is usually on the effects on the 
variations of variables and establishing functional relations between 
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variables. Some common questions in physics are: What happens if we 
keep this variable constant whilst we change another variable? If we 
increaseone variable, does the other increase? If we decrease one variable, 
does the other decrease? By how much? Once correlations are discovered 
and mathematical functions between variables made explicit, individual 
phenomenon may be predicted and explained in terms of general 
nomological laws of nature. ” [Tlhe question ‘why does the phenomenon 
happen?’ is construed as meaning ‘according to what general laws, and by 
virtue of what antecedentconditions does the phenomenon occur?”’ (Hempel 
& Oppenheim, 1965, p.58). 
The first suggested pragmatic constraint on explanation is that for one 
variable to be of any explanatory relevanceto anothervariable, there must be 
some specific functional correlation relating the variables. This functional 
correlationusually adopts the form of an equation relating the variables and 
is sometimes described as a nomologcal law of nature; for example, 
Boyle’s gas law relates pressure, volume and temperature: PV = nRT.43 
From this law, looser generalisations can be presented in a conditional 
form, such as, if the temperature of a certain fixed volume of gas is 
increased, then the pressure within that volume also increases. Specific 
instances may then be explained in terms of this looser, conditional 
generalisationor in terms of the specific law; however, accordmg to this 
Hempelian deductive nomological model, there must be some specific 
functional correlations, between the relevant variables from which the looser 
generalisation is derived, for these variables to be of any explanatory 
relevanceto one another. 
Consider billiard balls: Billiard ball ‘a’, with a certain mass, on a very 
smooth billiard table, moves at a certainvelocity towards stationary billiard 
ball ‘b’. Billiard ball ‘a’ hits billiard ball ‘b’. Billiard ball ‘b’ starts rolling 
towards a pocket at a certain velocity, eventually falling into the pocket. 
Billiard ball ‘a’ carries on moving with a certain velocity. Why does 
billiard ball ‘b’ fall in the pocket? A simple law, incorporating a principle 
of the conservation of energy, relating masses and velocities, combined with 
~ ~ ~~ 
The fact this law is only approximate and is thus strictly false is 43 
irrelevant; it is merely cited for illustrative purposes. 
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a set of initial antecedentconditions, explains why billiard ball ‘b’ falls into 
the pocket. An anti-wide representationist argument, drawing on this 
explanatory model, can be run against the wide representationist. 
The Hempelian deductive nomological model suggests the first premise. 
According to the Hempelian model of explanation, a functional correlation 
between variables is necessary in order for one variable to be explained in 
terms of the other. The second premise of this version of the anti-wide 
representationist argument is that the variables associated with the term in 
one part of the relation that determines the wide contents never functionally 
correlates with variables associated with the second term, the intrinsic 
mental states of a person. Furthermore, the relation itself could never 
functionally correlate with variables associated with a third event, the 
ensuing behaviour of that person. Thus, no laws of nature exist among the 
variables associated with the events the wide representationist hopes are 
explanatory with regards to each 
It is thereforethe relational nature of wide contents that presents a problem 
in iden-ng functional correlations between wide contents and certain 
events. Fodor (1 987) gives an account of a relational property that he takes 
to be analogous to the kind of relational property to which the wide 
representationist putatively appeals. He presents an example whereby the 
state of every particle in the universe depends on whether one turns a coin 
heads or tails up. The two terms of the type of relation to which a wide 
representationistputatively appeals are as follows: the first is the orientation 
of a dime that is either heads or tails up; the second term of the relation is 
the state of every particle in the universe. If the dime is heads up, then 
every particle stands in a ‘heads up’ relation to the dime and might be 
described as ‘H’ particles. If the dime is tails up, then every particle stands 
in a ‘tails up’ relation to the &me and might be described as ‘T’ particles. 
More formally, aRb, whereby ‘a’ is the dime and ‘b’ is any particle in the 
universe. R is a relation dependent on the state of ‘a’. If ‘a’ is H (heads up) 
then R is a ‘heads up’ relation and ‘b’ is described as a ‘H’ particle. If ‘a’ is 
T (tails up), then R is a ‘tails up’ relation and ‘b’ is described as a ‘T’ 
Davidson also argues for the anomalism of the mental, but on distinct 44 
grounds. 
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particle. Notice that this relation is consistent with Lombard’s strict 
criteria for a relational property because al l  variables, apart from the 
relational property, associated with the second term remain entirely 
unchanged when only variables associated with the first term change. The 
relational property associated with the second term changes when there is 
only a change in variables associated with the first term. 
The problem is that there are no functional correlations required between 
variables associated with the two terms that form the relation, in this case 
the orientation of the dime and variables associated with, for example, an 
electron on Alpha Centuri. Turning the dime over in Fodor’s pocket will 
not make this electron spin faster or jump an energy level. Strict relational 
properties fix the variables associated with one of the terms of the relation. 
This necessarily entails no functional correlation between variables 
associated with the terms of the relation. 
How on Earth could the causal powers of particles on 
Alpha Centun depend on the orientation of my dime? 
Either there would have to be a causal mechanism to 
mediate this dependency, or it would have to be mediated 
by a fundamental law of nature; and .there aren’t any such 
laws. Of course therearen’t (Fodor, 1987, p.39). 
If the wide representationist relies on relational properties analogous to, for 
example, the orientation of a dime and the electron on Alpha Centuri, then 
there need be no functional correlations between the terms that constitute the 
relation, nor is it clear how there possibly could be any functional 
correlationbetween these variables. For a strict conception of relations, it is 
necessarythat the variables associated with the second term do not change, 
other than with respects to the relational property, and this change is only 
because of a change in variables associated with the first term. I f  the 
variables associated with the second term necessarily do not change, how 
can there be any functional correlations between variables associated with 
the first term and variables associated with the second term? How can there 
be any functional correlationsbetween un-changingvariables associated with 
121 
the second term and a third event that the wide representationist hopes to 
explain? 
Consider, once again, the relationalproperty: ‘being taller’. x is 5 feet tall 
and y is 6 feet tall. y is taller than x. Is this kind of relational property 
subsumable under some functional correlations between distinct events? 
Certainly this relational property seems to have explanatory relevance with 
regards to a distinct event, for example, explaining why y can reach the 
cookie jar without stanlng on something or jumping, and x cannot. 
However, it is arguably not the relation that explains why y, and not x, can 
reach the cookie jar without standing on a chair or jumping. It is the 
specific height of y, combined with his reach, which explains why he can 
reachthe jar. It is the specific height of x, combined with his reach, which 
explains why he cannot reach the jar. The relation explains nothing, 
although it does serve to quant@ one variable, i.e., height, as greater, 
between the two individuals. 
One might construct a generalisation thus: in order for p to reach q (an 
object above p)’ without p standing on something or jumping, the distance 
of q from the ground must be no greaterthan the distance between the toe 
and finger tip o f  p, with p’s arms stretched to the maximum in a straight 
line. The distance from Bob’s toe to his fingertip with arm outstretched in 
a straight line is 7 feet. The distance of the cookie jar from the floor is 6 
feet. Therefore, this explains why Bob can reach the cookie jar, without 
standing on something or jumping. The distance from Joe’s toe to his 
fingertip with arm outstretched in a straight line is 5.5 feet. This explains 
why Joe cannot reach the coolue jar without standing on somethmg or 
jumping. 
If the wide representationist maintains that the relational properties that 
determine wide contents are of a type analogous to the orientation of a dime 
relative to the causal powers of an electron on Alpha Centuri, then it appears 
that Fodor has a point. Wide representationism maintains that relational 
properties of a certain type determine the content, and hence, relational 
properties determine the phenomenal characterof mental states. According 
to wide representationism, if the relational properties of two mental states 
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aredistinct, it then follows that those mental states are distinct. If the 
relevant relational properties of a phenomenal state are distinct, then, 
accordmg to the wide representationist, the phenomenal charactersof these 
two mental states are distinct. However, variables associated with relational 
properties require no functional correlation to variables associated with 
relevant mental states and ensuing behaviour, just like the orientation of a 
coin relative to the state of particles on Alpha Centuri. There are no 
nomological laws of nature that correlate the variables that determine 
contents with mental states and ensuing behaviour. According to the above 
constraint on explanation, if there is no law of nature, i.e., no functional 
correlations between variables, then these variables have no explanatory 
value. Therefore, wide content, and hence phenomenal character has no 
explanatoryvalue with regardsto the ensuing behaviour of an individual. 
4.2.1.2 Laws again, loose relations and problems with a deductive- 
nomological model 
The wide representationisthas two obvious replies to the above argument as 
follows: either there are functional correlations, and hence nomological 
laws, relating the variables associated with terms that constitutes the 
relation that determines the wide content of the mental state and a third 
event; or perhapsthe deductive nomological law requirement is too strict a 
constraint on explanation. 
Given a reliance on strict relational properties by the wide 
representationism, the first option of arguing for a nomological law between 
mental states and behaviour does not look plausible. But before the wide 
representationist rejects the deductive nomological model outright they 
might attempt to salvage the deductive nomological explanatory model by 
adopting a looser conception of the relation between the variables that are 
associated with the terms that constitute the law. The argument in the 
previous section is not so much that all relations can never be explanantia. 
The argument is instead that the relations that are appealed to by the wide 
representationist are not of a type that will provide for functional 
correlationsbetween the terms of  the putative law. But even rf the variables 
associated with terms in a relation can change, is the relation itself 
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explanatory in the sense of furthering our understanding, or are functional 
correlations that might include relational variables merely descriptions of 
universal regularities?Must an explanation that increases our understanding 
go beyond the relational terms that constitute variables in a functional 
corrleation and the functional correlation in order to offer an adequate or 
deeper explanation? 
The wide representationist might adopt a more liberal conception of 
relations, whereby variables associated with all the terms in a relation can 
change, and there still exists a legitimate functional correlation between the 
terms that constitute the law. But if any type of relation can never be a 
term in a functional correlationthat offers an explanation in the deeper sense 
of understanding, then the deductive nomological account might be rejected 
on the grounds that it fails to offer a comprehensive account of scientific 
explanation perhaps if the laws are to be understood as equations that 
merely describe universal regularities. 
For example, in a situation whereby the temperatureof the first object gets 
hotter and the second object gets cooler, and the relation between the second 
and the first object is of ’becoming cooler’ relative to the first object. There 
clearly could be, although this is by no means necessary, a functional 
correlation whereby the second object getting hotter stands in some 
functional correlationto the second getting cooler, one has only to think of 
a fridge to imagine the possibilities of certzin correlations between 
temperaturechanges. As the hdge  motor works harder, it gets hotter by a 
certainamount; this pumps more coolant around the fridge, thus cooling the 
air in the fridge a little more. 
Another example that apparently demonstrates the explanatory role of 
relations is to consider a seesaw and the relative heights of the two people 
sitting on the seesaw. Arguably Fred’s height relative to Jane explains the 
height of Jane. If Fred is lower than Jane, Jane is higherthan Fred. If Jane 
is higher than Fred, Fred is lower than Jane. Fred being lower than Jane 
explains why Jane is higher than Fred. This appears tautologous, but there 
is a sense in which their relative heights are dependant on one another in a 
nonempty manner. Fred’s specific height relative to the pivot point, which 
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through a rigid plank that sits on the pivot, explains Jane’s specific height 
relative to the pivot point. It so happens that Fred’s height relative to Jane 
is also a function of Fred and Jane’s height relative to the pivot point. It 
does not really look like an appeal to the relation between Fred and Jane is 
that useful explanatorily, although this relation does serve to ident@ a 
variable associated with Fred and Jane that is statistically relevant - 
distance. 
The question, however, remains as to whether the relation between terms 
explains functional correlations or distinct events or processes, or whether a 
change in the variables associated with the terms of the relation and 
underlyng causal mecharisms deeply explain the functional correlations or 
distinct processes or events. It is not clear as to how the relation ‘getting 
cooler’ itself has any deep explanatory role in explaining how the fiidge 
motor getting hotter results in air in the fridge getting colder, thus cooling 
the beer. A lonely appeal to the relation in the seesaw example looks 
downright vacuous. The functional correlations between the variables might 
describe a regularity, but perhaps the relation alone does not offer an 
understandingof the event or process to be explained. 
But surely a relational property of distance constitutes one of the terms of 
the Newtonian Universal Law of Gravity; this relation is a crucial element 
of a fundamental or basic explanatory law; thus a relation can constitute a 
legitimate explanantia. 
(F is the force between two masses, G is the gravitational constant, ml is 
the first mass, m2 is the second mass, r is the distance between the two 
masses.) In this case the distance between two objects is a key element in 
explaining the force between two objects. An altered distance between two 
objects will result in a different force between two objects. However, this 
example is arguably somewhat misleading as an attempt to just@ that 
relational terms in a functional correlation can offer an explanantia with 
regardsto an understandingof the nature of the ‘force’ between two objects 
of mass. 
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As Salmon (1999) plausibly argues, when discussing whether gravity 
provides an example of action-ata-distance, there are two options for giving 
a deeper account of the nature of gravity as follows: either that what really 
provides an explanation for the force between two masses is yet to be 
discovered sub-atomic particles described as ‘gravitons’ ; or on Einsteinian 
grounds a different conception of space as non-planar leaves the 
phenomenon of gravity as an unsurprising implication of an altered 
geometry. The property of distance is not the simple relational property 
that offers an explanantiafor the ‘force’ between two objects with mass that 
Newton’s law suggests. On either of the above attempts to provide a deeper 
understanding of gravity the relational property of distance does not provide 
an adequate explanation of gravitational forces in the sense of giving us an 
understanding of what explains the ‘force’ between two objects, despite 
providing what appears to be relational variable in a law that offers a 
description of how objects with mass behave. 
According to the wide representationist, relational properties entirely 
determine the phenomenal characterof mental states. It is simply not clear 
that the strict relations to which the wide representationist might appeal 
could fit into functional correlations with the events that the wide 
representationisthopes to explain. If the relational properties to which the 
wide representationist appeals, resemble the relation between the orientation 
of coins and particles, an example of a strict relation, then it is simply not 
possible that variables associated with the first term of the relation bear any 
fhctional correlation, and hence explanatory relevance, to variables 
associatedwith the second term of the relation or to a third distinct event. 
If there is no functional correlation between the variables associated with 
one term of the relation that constitutes the content of the mental state of an 
individual and the variables associated with intrinsic states of an individual, 
and thus no laws of nature relating these variables to the intrinsic states of 
the individual, and crucially the ensuing behaviour of the individual, then 
an explanatory model, following the Hempelian deductive nomological 
schema, cannot be constructed. 
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The wide representationist might adopt an account of intentional content 
that is constituted not by strict relations but by loose relations. But if there 
are functional correlations between the terms of the looser relation, the 
relation alone does not explain the changes in the variables associated with 
these terms, nor does the relation explain, in a sense that provides a deeper 
understanding, changes in any independent third event or process.45 
Thereforeon either a strict or a loose conception of relations, assuming only 
a deductive nomological model of explanation, wide intentional contents 
plausibly have no deep explanatory value concerning mental states and the 
ensuing behaviour of an individual. 
But what about the prevalenceand success of generalisations that one might 
construct to explain the actions of agents in terms of beliefs and desires - 
sometimes known as 'Folk Psychology'? Perhaps the mere existence of 
these generalisations lends credence to the existence of nomological laws 
between wide contents and behaviour. These generalisations between 
beliefs, desires and actions might be constructed, but it is not clear either 
how such generalisations are derived from laws that identrfl speclfic 
functional relations between the relevantvariables, or how they are deeply 
explanatory. If these generalisations can be constructed, and they rely on 
terms determined by strict or loose relational properties, then these 
generalisations are certainly not of a type that resemble generalisations 
derived from specific functional correlations between variables in more 
traditional laws of nature. It is perhaps illustrative to consider an attempted 
generalisation that relates beliefs, desires and actions. 
If a believes that (b is the only (best, easiest or cheapest) means to achieving 
c) and a only (mostly) desires (c), then ceterisparibus a will do b. 
By adding some specific antecedent conditions, a deductive nomological 
explanationmight be provided. Bob believes that crossing the room to go 
to the fridge is the only (best, easiest or cheapest) means to getting a beer, 
and Bob only (mostly) desires a beer. The general law combined with the 
The next chapter considers specific representationist attempts to 45 
demonstrate how relations might be explanatory. 
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antecedentconditions; therefore, explains why Bob crossed the room to go 
to the fridge. 
However, to restatethe problem with the above appeal to folk-psychological 
laws, if these beliefs and desires are entirely constituted by strict relations, 
then beliefs and desires are not relations of a type that can plausibly 
constitute terms in a law because of the inability to construct a functional 
correlation between the variables (compare with Fodor’s discussion of ‘H’ 
and ‘T’ particles). If beliefs and desires are only determined by strict 
relational properties, the functional correlations from which to derive these 
generalisations cannot be constructed, thus casting into doubt the 
explanatory power of  the generalization. 
If beliefs and desires are determined by looser relations, then h s  is 
consistent with the possibility of changes in the intrinsic properties of 
mental states and desires as a result of changes in variables ’at a distance’ 
from those mental states. But then the question remains as to whether it is 
the relational property alone that is of deep explanatory relevance to the 
ensuing behaviour. 
If, on the other hand, the beliefs and desires are determined not only by 
relational properties, but non-relational properties, then they might be 
associated with variables that fit specific functional correlations with 
ensuing behaviours. The above generalisations can be saved, but only by 
rejectingthe claim that beliefs and desires deeply explain in virtue of only 
their relational properties. 
The mere construction of generalisations relating beliefs, desires and actions 
does little to establish that wide contents and the determining variables that 
fix these wide contents can enter into law-like relations with neurological 
states and ensuing behaviour. If the deductive nomological model of 
explanation is adopted, then the difficulty in relating variables associated 
with relational properties, which supposedly determine wide contents, with 
the variables associated with events that the wide representationist hopes 
will be explained suggests a reason to be suspicious that wide contents can 
be explanatory in the way hoped for by the wide representationist. 
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However, what if the deductive nomological account of explanation is 
rejected? 
Is the second option for the wide representationist, relying on an 
explanatory scheme that does not depend on laws of nature or functional 
correlations, plausible?6 The wide representationist is not entirely without 
the means to reject a nomological law account of explanation - perhaps by 
appealing to various special sciences that make no appeal to strict laws or 
functional correlations between variables. 
[Tlhe question of whether there are folk psychological 
laws reflects in my view a misplaced emphasis on the 
roles of laws in scientific explanation. . . Paradigmatic 
examples of such laws are drawn from physics and 
chemistry. . . But if being covered by such laws is the 
mark of a scientific explanation, what of the special 
sciences? . . . @]xplanations in the variety of special 
sciences, including natural sciences, such as geology and 
evolutionary biology, are perfectly all right whether or not 
there are laws that cover them (Wilson, 1997, pp. 170-1). 
This mere appeal to the legitimacy of the special sciences and specific 
examples within the natural sciences other than physics and chemistry, 
however, hardly offers an alternative set of explanatory standards by which 
explanation might be deemed legitimate or otherwise. Do these special 
sciences, or specific natural sciences, place any constraints on explanation? 
Is there a causal or explanatory ‘free for all’ within these sciences? Arguably 
any appeal to an explanatory schema entails some methodological 
commitments that provide some kind of constraints on explanatory 
relevance. Once the deductive nomological model of explanation is rejected 
there remains the somewhat pressing problem as to what replaces this model 
in different explanatory contexts. Whatever replaces the deductive 
nomological model might also present a problem to the wide 
Davidson, in attempting to maintain a consistent physicalist identity 
theory, takes the rather radical step of  ditching explanation in favour of 
causal efficacy. Events, under a mental description, cause. Such events can 
also be subsumed under a physically description, but physical descriptions 
of these events are not of a type that can form terms in strict deterministic 
laws. However, it is not clear that content theorists want to lose 
explanatory relevance for content states by adopting this Davidsonian 
approach, although this remains a somewhat intriguing option. 
46 
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representationist. Perhaps the special sciences, and incidentally some of  the 
natural sciences, appeal to statistical explanation. 
An alternativeaccount of explanation is to appeal to a high probabilistic 
account. One event explains another if there is a high probability that it 
causes another event. If the probability is formulated as a probabilistic law, 
then the probabilistic explanation corresponds roughly with Hempel’s 
( 1965) Inductive Statistical model of explanation. 
The earliergeneral psychological law might be stated in probabilistic terms: 
If a believes that (b is the only (best, easiest or cheapest) means to aclueving 
c) and a only (mostly) desires (c), then, aprobably will do b. 
By adding some specific antecedent conditions, an inductive statistical 
explanationmight be provided. Bob believes that crossing the room to go 
to the fridge is the only (best, easiest or cheapest) means to getting a beer, 
andBob only (mostly) desires a beer. ThereforeBob probably crossed the 
room to go to the fridge, and if he did, the high probability of the event 
occurring, explains why he crossed the room. 
However, it is not clear as to how the variables associated with one of  terms 
in the relation that determines the wide contents which putatively 
determines beliefs and desires has any statistical relevance to intrinsic states 
and ensuing behaviour, or whether strict rehtions have any statistical 
relevance; therefore, relations can not play a role even in a probabilistic law. 
Before this claim is developed further, it is worth considering how Salmon 
offers some substantial improvements on Hempel’s inductive statistical 
model of explanation based on statistical relevance. 
4.3 Statistical relevance and content 
Salmon (1999) originally proposed a substantial revision of Hempel’s 
Inductive-Statistical ( 1 4 )  model of  explanation, by replacing it with a 
statistical relevance account of explanation. Statistical relevance is best 
explained in terms of  an example. When considering lung cancer, one only 
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has to look for variables that have some (even small) statistical relevance to 
getting lung cancerin order to explain why an individual gets lung cancer. 
Smoking, for example, clearly has some statistical impact with regards to 
getting lung cancer. Notice that irrelevant variables that nonetheless have 
some statistical relevance have to be screenedoff such as the statistical 
relevanceof yellow fingers (stained by the smoke) with regards to the 
increasedlikelihood of getting lung cancer. 
Accordmgto Salmon, the structure of the universe is inherently statistical; 
therefore, explanations based on statistical relevance might be fundamental. 
He also argues that Hempel’s I-S model is really only an epistemically 
impoverished version of his deductive nomological (D-N) model. Salmon 
also rejects Hempelian accounts of explanation on more specific grounds 
than a general appeal to special sciences, or specific natural sciences. 
Salmon arguesthat the argumentative structure that inspires the above non- 
causal, Hempelian deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical models, 
has no temporal component. Causality requires a temporal component; 
therefore, both the Hempelian D-N and I-S models are flawed. 
Salmon has another convincing rejection of Hempel’s I-S model. He rejects 
Hempel’s I-S model because it violates explanatory symmetry: if high 
probabilities explain, then so must low probabilities. Scientific enquiry is 
often stimulated by the identification of variables that have some 
probabilistic, not necessarily high, but nonetheless statistical relevance to 
other variables. For example, the incidence of Leukaemia was higher 
amongst a population exposed to Nagasaki and H i r o s h .  There need not 
be a high probability for these people to contract the disease, especially if 
they were a considerable distance away from the explosion, but there was a 
slight but increasedprobability, relative to the general population, that these 
people would contract Leukaemia. If high probability is the only criteria for 
justlfirlng an event to be a cause, then the explosion, even when the 
probability is low, is not a cause of the Leukaemia. However, the 
explosion, even when the probability is low, clearly is causally relevant; 
therefore, high probability is not the only criteria for causal relevance 
(Salmon, 1999, p.130). All this suggests a constraint on an event being a 
cause that cannot be based on the level of  probability, but whether the 
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occurrenceof that event has any statistical relevance whatsoever to the 
occurrenceof the other event. Therefore, this statistical relevance account 
also suggests a necessary constraint on explanation. 
If one event, or variables associated with an event, has no statistical 
relevance regarding the occurrence of, or variables associated with, another 
event, then the first event is not a cause of the second event.47 To return to 
the billiard ball example, it is not so much the fact that there are no 
functional correlations between variables, such as say the colour of the table 
and the motion of the billiard balls, which rules the colour of the table out 
as explanatorily relevant, but because the colour of the table is a variable 
that has no statistical relevance whatsoever to variables associated with the 
motion of the billiard balls. To returnto Fodor’s example, it is not because 
there is no law of nature between the orientation of coins and variables 
associated with particles in distant star system, which rules out the 
orientation of the dime being causally relevant. It is because the orientation 
of the dime has absolutely no statistical relevance to variables associated 
with particlesin distant solar systems, that rules out the orientation of the 
dime as explanatorily relevant. 
It appearsthat just as it is not necessary for the distinct terms in a relation 
to stand in any sort of functional correlation with one another, there is no 
need for Qstinct terms in a relation to have variables associated with them 
to have any sort of statistical relevanceassociated with the other term or a 
third Qstinct event. An event might occur a certain distance from 
Cambridge, but all sorts of variables associated with Cambridge need have 
no statistical relevanceto varihles associated with this event. 
Not only do the terms in a relation need have no statistical relevance to one 
another, it is not clear how relations provide an explanatary understanding 
of ensuing events even when they appear to have statistical relevane to 
ensuing events. 
It might be possible to construct complex causal chains whereby 47 
statistical relevances cancel out, thus making it only appear that altered 
variables associated with one event have no statistical relevances to changes 
associated with variables associated with the other event. I will assume 
that such problems can be overcome. 
132 
To return to the relation ’taller’, the relation itself has no statistical 
relevance to events other than through the variables associated with the 
terms themselves. Now it may so happenthat variables associated with the 
two terms in a relation may have some sort of statistical relevance to each 
other (cf. the fi-idge), but this is not because of the relational property. For 
example, Bob might get the cookie more quickly that results in him 
growinga little bit taller, while Joe does not get the cookie, so he starves 
and shrinks. In this case it appears that Bob being taller enabled him to 
get to the food, which made him taller still, while Joe being shorter meant 
that he did not get the food and he shrunk slightly. However, an 
explanation that provides us with an understanding rather than a description 
of a regularitywould be that it was the height of Bob that enabled him to 
get a cookie, which caused a change in Bob. The height of Joe explained 
why he Qd not get the cookie, and his starving provides us with an 
understanding of why he shrunk slightly. 
But does the relational property of distance between two masses not have 
statistical relevance with regards to the force between those two objects? 
Distance has statistical relevance with regards to the motions of two masses. 
However, more basic laws involving yet to be discovered particles that do 
not rely alone on the relational property of distance might offer a deeper 
understanding of the gravitational ‘force’. Alternativdy, perhaps if the 
geometry of space is non-planar, distance loses its statistical relevance with 
regards to the ‘natural’ motions of objects. Gravitational force is 
‘geometrized’ out of the picture; thus rendering this proposed 
counterexample to the lack of statistical relevance of relational properties as 
somewhat moot. 
On Lombard’s narrow definition of relational properties, it is in fact 
necessary that variables associated with one term in the relation undergo no 
change, other than with respects to the relational property, whilst the 
variables associated with the other term change; therefore, there is hardly 
room for statistical relevance between the variables associated with the 
terms. On a looser conception of relations, if the variables associated with 
the terms that constitute the relation do happen to have some kind of 
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statistical relevance, it is arguably not going to be the relational property 
that deeply explains this statistical relevance. Therefore, wide contents 
arguably have no causal or explanatory relevance in the deeper sense of 
being able to provide an understanding of the neurological states of 
individuals and these individuals’ ensuing behaviour. 
The wide representationist might reply either that some relational properties 
have statistical relevance, or that just as the D-N model was inadequate, the 
statistical relevanceconstraint on explanation is mistaken. It is not clear, 
however, how the strict relational properties that determine content can be of 
statistical relevanceto mental states and ensuing behaviour. I suggest that 
the onus is on the wide representationist to demonstrate exactly how the 
variables associated with terms in a looser relation have statistical relevance 
to one another that offers a deeper understandmg of the events or processes 
to be explained. This raises some perplexing problems for the wide 
representationist in how they argue that relations do have statistical 
relevance. Twin Earth scenarios certainly suggest that the statistical impact 
of the variables that constitute one term in the relation that determine wide 
content on variables associated with mental states and ensuing behaviour, is 
non-existent, if the variables associated with the states of the agent are by 
definition, non-changzng, assuming the strict Lombardian conception of 
relations. 
It is often assumed that the Twin Earth scenario is about the supervenience 
of mental states on intrinsic properties, and this explains why mental states 
andbehaviours do not change. This is a mistaken conception of what the 
Twin Earthscenariois about; it is about relational properties. It is about 
how, on one conception of relations, variables associated with one term in a 
relation, other than the relational property, necessarily undergo no change. 
On t h ~ s  strict conception of relations, the relational change occurs only 
because of a change in the variables associated with the other term. The 
Twin Earth scenario is a somewhat stark illustration of this feature of strict 
relations. 
If there are non-relatiod changes in the mental states of  the behaviour of 
the earthling, then these changes are arguably what are going to do the 
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causing of any third event, and not the relation. If the variables associated 
with the terms that constitute the wide content relation change in a non- 
relational manner, and there is a mechanism that relates the variables 
associated with terms of the relation, then arguably this mechanism arises in 
a way that the wide representationistdoes not desire (more on this later). 
On both a strict and a loose conception of relations, assuming a statistical 
relevanceaccount of explanation it is not clear how wide contents are deeply 
explanatorily relevant. 
There are, however, alternative causal explanatory models to which the wide 
representationist might appeal that reject the need for law-like functional 
correlations or even statistical relevance. These causal accounts appeal to 
counterfactual relevance. 
4.4 Counterfactualism and content 
To return to the billiard balls: there are various explananda that might be 
constructed given the billiard ball scenario, perhaps the most obvious being 
the event of billiard ball 'b' enteringthe pocket. This immediately suggests 
a certain categorization of explananda into the occurrence or non-occurrerce 
of an event. The main focus of one type of explanation is the event of the 
ball falling into the pocket, in contrast with the event of  the ball not falling 
into the pocket. This perspective leads quite naturally to what might be 
described as a counterfactual theory of causation. A cause might be proposed 
as the occurrence of one event that results in another event occurring as 
opposed to not occurring. 
Imagine a slightly altered scenario and consider which changed events have 
absolutely no impact on the subsequent occurrenceof the event of the ball 
falling into the pocket. These are the events, in the actual scenario, which 
we can claim are not causal with respects to the ball falling into the pocket. 
Furthermore, imagine a slightly altered scenari, whereby one event not 
occurring, or being changed, results in the non-occurrenceof the ball falling 
into the pocket. We might plausibly consider the occurrenceof that event, 
in the actual scenario, to be a cause of  the ball falling into the pocket. The 
table being a different colour does not look like a cause of  the ball entering 
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the pocket. Why? Because, if we were to imagine an altered scenario where 
the table is a different colour, the ball still falls into the pocket. Ball ‘a’, 
moving in diffelent direction, thus entirely missing ball ‘b’ looks to be 
important. Why? Because if we were to imagine the altered scenario, 
whereby ball ‘a’ misses ball ‘b’, then ball ‘b’ fails to fall into the pocket. It 
is worth pointing out the importance of keeping all other factors constant, 
whilst one considers the changein the event, we suspect to be causal. As a 
result of such considerations, one might construct a counterfactual principle 
of causation based on event occurrence. If there is a close possible world 
whereby one changes the occurrenceof one event, and the non-occurrenceof 
that event has no subsequent impact on the occurrence,or non-occurrence, of 
another event, then, that first event has no causal efficacy concerning the 
other event. 
If this general counterfactual principle of causation can meet all objections, 
and the wide representationist account entails that the variables associated 
with the terms that constitute the wide content relation, violate this 
constraint with regards to each other or certain subsequent events, then it 
can be inferredthat bide contents are not causally efficacious with regards to 
the variables that constitute the relation or subsequent events. Assuming 
the counterfactualaccount, or a good enough modification, does the wide 
representationist position entail that contents are not causal? Consider once 
again the Twin Earth scenario. 
On Twin Earththe Twinling has a mental state with twater content. On 
Earth, the Earthling has mental states with water content. If we imagine the 
Earthling on Twin Earth, the Earthling has a mental state with a distinct 
content. His belief is now about twater, yet the change, i.e., the change in 
It would be foolhardy to suggest that this general principle is foolproof 
without further need of modification. One counter example to this 
principle, sometimes presented, is the example of the firing squad. In the 
firing squad example there are six shooters, all contributing to the death of 
the victim. However, one can consider a close possible world whereby one 
removes one shooter, yet the victim still dies. Indeed one can consider a 
possible world whereby one removes each of the shooters, yet it does not 
follow that the individual shooters did not cause the death of the victim. I 
do not intend to dwell on the possible modifications that might be made to 
salvage this example, but the important point here is that there is a general 
principle of causation that puts constraints on what might legitimately 
count as a cause. 
48 
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the chemical composition of water (and whatever other factors are deemed 
relevant), present to the Earthling, and hence the change in wide content of 
the Earthling’smental state, has no direct impact on the subsequent events 
that follow, regarding the Earthling’s mental states and his ensuing 
behaviour. By Lombard’s strict de$nition of a relational property, there 
necessarily is no change in the variables associated with events that form 
one term of the relation, in this case variables associated with states of the 
Earthling other than the relational property. There is a close possible world 
whereby the change in the chemical composition of water (and whatever 
other factors are deemed relevant), and hence the content of the Earthling’s 
mental states, has no subsequent direct impact on the occurrenceor non- 
occurrenceof the ensuing mental states and behaviour of the Earthling. A 
mere application of the counterfactual principle of causation entails, at least 
in this scenario, that wide contents are not explanatorily relevant to the 
Earthlings neurological states and his ensuing behaviour. 
The representationist has various possible replies to this scenario as follows: 
first, to deny that the content of the Earthling has changed; therefore, the 
representationist is not committed to a change in content; second, to deny 
that the changein content has no impact on the subsequent behaviour of the 
Earthling; or third, to reject the counterfactual constraint on causation. I 
take the most plausible representationistvariant of the first line to be an 
appeal to narrow content, perhaps as a function that maps contexts onto 
contents. However, I take it to be a lstinctive feature of the wide 
representationistaccount that it is their consistent and strong affirmation 
that the wide content of the Earthling changes, and that it is only the wide 
content that counts. This essentially blocks this line of reply for the 
representationist. Besides, narrow contents have been rejected as a plausible 
account of phenomenal characterin chapter two. 
Does the behaviour of the Earthling change? Perhaps the change in 
molecular structure of the water and hence a change in one variable that is 
one term in a relation that determines the wide content of the Earthling’s 
mental states is responsible for a change in some variable associated with 
some state of the Earthling, other than the relational change, that results in 
distinct behaviour. The ‘independence’of the two terms of the relation is 
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not analogous to a changein, for example, the colour of the billiard ball 
table and the event of the ball falling into the pocket. It is not, however, 
clear as to why changing contents is dis-analagous to the example of the 
change in colour of the billiard table and the ball falling into the pocket. It 
is precisely at this point that the burden of proof might be placed on the 
wide representationist to demonstrate how the change in molecular structure 
of water (and whatever other appropriate variables) does have some kind of 
non-relational impact on the subsequent behaviour of the Earthling. 
One explicit wide representationist reply is that the Earthling reaches out for 
a glass of twater rather than water; thus his intentionally described 
behaviour is different on Twin Earth. However, these examples fail Fodor’s 
(1994) cross context test. Additionally, a more substantial difference is 
required for the change in content to be really described as causal with 
respect to the relevant effects. Consider the billiard ball table again: by 
changngthe colour of the table, there is a changein the effect, with regards 
to the event of the ball falling into the pocket: the ball rolls into a pink 
pocket instead of a green pocket. Yet clearly we do not want to claim that 
the change in colour of the table is a change in an event that is worthy of 
explanatory consideration concerning the effect of the ball rolling into the 
pocket 
Another possible consideration that might motivate a (non-relational) 
changein the Earthling’s behaviour is to imagine the presence of a type of 
predator on Twin Earth and Earth. When these predators spot new arrivals to 
the planet that have drunk twater, they find these new arrivals particularly 
desirableto eat. These predators also live on Earth, but they never happen 
to chase Earthlings because they never find them tasty since there is no 
twater on Earth. After the Earthling takes a swig of twater on Twin Earth, 
that Earthling’s neurological states and behaviour changes because of the 
chasing predator. However, the putative change in one term in the relation 
that determines the wide contents of the earthling’s mental states is really of 
no direct explanatory relevance to the change in the mental states and the 
ensuing Earthling’s behaviour. The change in the Earthling’s behaviour 
only comes about incidentally because of the existence of the predatos. 
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However, presumably the wide representationist wants wide contents to be 
explanatory in a way that the relations of mental states explain 
The wide representationist might attempt to mod@ a counterfactual account 
that somehow rules out the Twin Earth example to be of any relevance to 
the real world. This is done by appealing to counterfactuals that have 
relevanceonly in nearby worlds and Twin Earth is a world a long, long way 
away. 
Generality is an explanatory virtue only insofar as it 
indicates counterfactual rigour, where we can express this 
in terms of an explanation’s holding in nearby possible 
worlds. For the preceding reasoning to be valid, the set 
of Twin Earth scenarios just mentioned must form a 
subset of nearby possible worlds. Yet they do not: Many 
of the worlds in which doppelgangersexist . . . are very 
differentphysically from the actual world. . . [we could 
choose to compareRex only to a physically very different 
individual who instantiates the Same folk psychological 
states but exists on a planet that is otherwise identical to 
earth. In such a case we might be tempted to consider 
that the wide explanation is causally deeper. . . An 
exclusive or primary focus on doppelgangers can lead one 
to forget that in the actual world in which our 
psychological explanations are developed, the subjects of 
psychology are individuals who are not physically 
identical (Wilson, 1997. pp.211-2). 
This is a popular line of reasoning. One might also point out that Twin 
Earth is a possible world that is more than far, far away; it does not even 
exist. 
A fact that tends to get lost in the excitement about our 
Twins is that we have no twins. Neither here nor on 
Earth nor anywhere in darkest space can molecule for 
molecule duplicates of flesh and blood human beings be 
Fodor considers a machine that tracks your past. This machine responds 49 
differently to you, depending on how your past went, so your past states 
combined with your present state are a causal power that can result in a 
Merence in causal powers between two intrinsically identical beings; thus 
individualism is false. His response to this argument goes: “Individualism 
does not say, however, that having water thoughts rather than twater 
thoughts is not a causal power. What it says is that having water thoughts 
is not a causal power in virtue of its being responsible for you producing 
water behaviours rather than twater behaviours.” (Fodor, 1995, p.2 13). 
Curiously Fodor tries a different tack in responding to the camouflaged 
moth-like examples (see h i s  appendix in 1995). All he needs to do is 
consider the predators, or in his example ‘the creatures you can sneak up 
on’, as analogous to past history detectors. 
139 
found. As an immediate consequence, the foregone 
generalisations [anyone intrinsically just like say you is in 
his circumstances going to do just as he does] are 
generalisationsover things all but one fail to exist. This 
may not make the generalisations any less true, but 
neither does it recommend them as crashingly important 
(Yablo, 1997, p.260). 
Yablo’s attempt to diffuse Twin-Earth relies on the point that in the actual 
world people are physically very different and only wide contents provide 
the best explanation for explaining common behaviours rather than an 
attempt to ident@ shared intrinsic properties. Most importantly, claiming 
that identical people behave the same way offers no explanation for the 
behaviour. Yablo’s specific argument will be considered in more depth in 
the next chapter. But for now, I am inclined to think that both Yablo and 
Wilson are missing the point of Twin Earth. Yes, we should not be 
looking for, nor should we necessarily care whether there are, molecular 
duplicates on earth, but there will be plenty of variables associated with 
psychological states that are determined only by a variation in a variable 
that occurs a long way away from the variables associated with that 
neurological state of  an individual. Twin Earth merely serves to remind the 
wide representatiomst, somewhat vividly, that their theory relies on the 
explanatoryrelevanceof relations. There is I think a clear sense in which 
thought experiments like Twin Earth do not really serve to establish the 
desired conclusion; i.e., Twin Earth does not demonstrate that variables 
associated with terms that constitute loose relations are never causally 
related, but Twin Earth does force a choice on the wide representationist 
who chooses not to avoid a decision as to which kind of relational 
propertiesthey wish to adopt. Are they adopting a relation along the lines 
of Lombard’s conception, or are they adopting a looser conception of 
relations that allows for non-relational changes in variables associated with 
the terms that constitute the relation? If strict relations are chosen, then the 
explanatory constraints are sharp. If the looser conception is chosen, it still 
has to be established how the loose relation does not violate any of the 
explanatory constraints without appealing to the variables associated with 
the terms that constitutes the loose relation or underlying causal 
mechanisms. 
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The wide representationist might entirely reject a counterfactual account and 
appeal to an account of causation that relies neither on nomological law-like 
relations, nor statistical relevance relations, but interactive causal processes. 
4.5 Interactionism and content 
Although ultimately disagreeing with the causal objection to 
representationism, Colin McGinn ( 1989) presents a conception of causation 
thus: “What happens at the causal nexus is local, proximate and intrinsic; 
the features of the cause that lead to the effect must be right there where the 
causal interaction takes place” @. 13 3). This causal limitation relies on what 
might be described as a principle of the locality of causation. Salmon’s 
(1999, pp.248-60) latest proposed account of causation relies on causal 
interactions in a manner that also signdicantly emphasises the locality of 
causal interactions. The details of this account are problematic to the 
content theorist gwen the lack of mdatory processes between the terms 
that constitute the strict relations that determine wide content, whereby one 
of the terms is a neurological state. Conservation of momentum between 
two billiard balls best illustrates Salmon’s principle. Salmon argues that 
the transmission of a ’mark’ is required for any causal interaction. So, in 
order for one billiard ball to transmit energy to another billiard ball there 
must be some kind of local interaction, whereby energy is e~changed.~’ 
The question for the wide representationist remains as to how relational 
properties transmit any energy. To return to Twin Earth, it is simply not 
clear how the altered chemical composition of water transmits any energy to 
the intrinsic states of the Earthling and the ensuing behaviour of the 
Earthling. If there is some casual interaction between the variables 
This involves a substantial defence of how certain effects at a quantum 
level do not really result in ‘action at a distance’ and various forces must be 
explained by exchanges of as yet undiscovered particles. I do not intend to 
embark on such a defence here, but it would be curious if the wide content 
theorist relied on a rejection of local interactions to support their position. 
Wilson (1997) explicitly employs the example of fields in an attempt to 
demonstrate how relational properties can be causal; i.e., distance relative to 
another object explains the behaviour of that object. Is he appealing to an 
endorsement of ‘action at a distance’? If so, perhaps the onus is on him to 
explain how this is possible. It is certainly not clear that he has conclusive 
example of the causal efficacy of relational properties given the alternative 
options of  altered spatio-temporal geometries or hidden particles. 
M 
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associated with the terms that constitute the relation, i.e., some 
transmission of energy to the mental states of the Earthling, then there 
might be some grounds for maintaining that the altered chemical 
composition of water (and whatever other variables are deemed relevant) and 
hence the variables associated with one of the terms of the relation, can enter 
into a causal relationship with the intrinsic states of the Earthling and the 
resulting behaviour. This of course assumes that the relations are not 
narrowly defined in such a way that variables associated with one of the 
terms in the relation cannot change other than the relational property. 
On a looser conception of relations, there could on Twin Earth be some 
causal mechanism via unusual predators (see earlier); however, these causal 
mechanisms arenot of  a type that is really relevant to the way in which the 
wide representationist arguably hopes the relations to be explanatory to an 
agent’s actions. In the Twin Earth scenario there is no direct causal 
mechanism that mediates between the variables that determine the wide 
content and the mental states of the Earthling; therefore, the variables whch 
determine wide content are not, in at least this one case, causally efficacious 
with regards to mental states and ensuing behaviour. 
Burge, for one, has made considerable mileage from denying that any 
conclusion concerning how science should individuate its key terms follow 
from such metaphysical constraints, in speclfic local c a ~ s a t i o n . ~ ~  As stated 
earlier, whether Fodor’s conclusion about the taxonomising of mental states 
follows from his explanatory principles is not a concern of this chapter. 
The concernof this chapter is whether an absence of fbnctional correlations, 
statistical relevance, counterfactual relevance and local interactions between 
wide contents and mental events is sufficient to refute the wide 
representationist who claims that wide contents are explanat~ry.~~ 
“Local causation does not make more plausible local individuation” 
There are complex issues concerning the individuation of mental states; 
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purge, 1986, p.16). 
how science ought to taxonomise terms; and the deep explanatory 
importance of such taxonomisation. Fodor argues that an appeal to 
intentional taxonomy in psychology results in laws that contain 
conceptually necessary truths, thus the laws cannot be causally interesting, 
such as ‘if something is a water thought, it tends under certain optimal 
conditions to cause water related or water caused behaviour’ (Fodor, 1995, 
op. cit.). Burge replies that the detail in such generalizations makes them 




A summary of the constraints applied to two conceptions of 
On the strict Lombardian conception of relations: Variables associated with 
the terms that constitute the relation that determines wide contents 
necessarily do not hctionally correlate with variables associated with 
intrinsic mental states and ensuing behaviour. Variables associated with the 
terms that constitute the relation that determines wide contents necessarily 
have no statistical relevance with variables associated with intrinsic mental 
states and ensuing behaviour. Variables associated with the terms that 
constitute the relation that determines wide contents necessarily have no 
counterfactual relevance to variables associated with intrinsic mental sates 
and ensuing behaviour. Variables associated with the terms that constitute 
the relation that determines wide contents necessarily have no melatoxy 
processes to allow for exchange of energy with intrinsic mental states and 
ensuing behaviour. Since the most plausible explanatoqkausal models all 
require at least: a nomological law, statistical relevance, counterfactual 
relevance or intermediary processeq and the wide representationist fails to 
offer any other causal explanatory model that can account for the causal 
explanatory relevance of the terms that constitute the strict relation that 
determines wide contents with regards either to the terms or a third event 
hoped to be explainedby the relation, strict relations do not, nor could they 
ever explain. 
On the looser conception of relations: Variables associated with the terms 
that constitute the relation that determines wide contents require no 
functional correlation with variables associated with intrinsic mental states 
and ensuing behaviour. Variables associated with the terms that constitute 
the relation that determines wide contents require no statistical relevance 
of the heart: ‘ i f  something is a heart, and it is functioning normally, it then 
pumps blood’. However, he then claims that such generalizations in 
physiology “[Dlo not provide deep insight into causal relations. If 
physiology contented itself with such statements, it would certainly be 
remiss. But these [Fodor’s] points do nothing to show that hearts are not 
taxonomically sigdicant kinds” (Burge, 1995, p.233). This chapter is 
concerned with the role contents play in providing ‘deep insight into causal 
relations’ rather than the issue of taxonomic practise in science. 
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with variables associated with intrinsic mental states and ensuing behaviour. 
Variables associated with the terms that constitute the relation that 
determines wide contents require no counterfactual relevance to variables 
associated with intrinsic mental sates and ensuing behaviour. Variables 
associated with the terms that constitute the relation that determines wide 
contents require no mediatory processes to allow for exchange of energy 
with intrinsic mental states and ensuing behaviour. There may be all sorts 
of non-relational changs that occur in variables associated with the terms 
that constitute a relation which are consistent with functional correlations, 
statistical relevance, counterfactual relevance and mediatory processes. 
However, relations themselves do not change despite appearancesto the 
contrary, and only appear to change because of the changes of the variables 
associated with the terms that constitute the relation. I would suggest that 
it is the changes in the variables associated with the terms that constitute 
these relations and underlying causal mechanisms that do the explaining in 
the sense that they further a deeper understanding of the events and 
processes. Furthermore, one can give an explanation only by explaining 
why the changes in the variables associated with the terms that constitute 
these relations do not violate the above explanatory constraints. Even on the 
loose conception of relations, relations alone cannot adequately explain in a 
manner that provides a deep understanding of processes or eventd3 
Therefore, it can reasonably be concluded that wide contents have no deeper 
explanatory relevance to intrinsic mental states and ensuing human 
behaviour. 
Hopefully this argument meets most of Wilson’s methodological concerns. 
This argument does not rely on one, single principle generalised over 
scientific endeavour such as the existence of specific functional correlations 
betweenvariables. It relies on a variety of constraints, including statistical 
or counterfactual relevance, which arguable equally applies to explanations 
within a variety of explanatory contexts. It does not rely on a priori 
constraints, just plausible pragmatic limitations that might be used to rule 
out certainvariables from the outset of a scientific investigation. All of the 
Representationist attempts to explain how loose relations cause, will be 53 
considered in more depth in the next chapter 
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above might be described as the causal explanatory argument against the 
wide representationist. 
One might construct a hierarchy of causal or explanatory principles starting 
with interactionism. This emphasises locality of causation. This might 
account for counterfactualism; why in counterfactual worlds there are events 
that have no impact on the occurrenceor non-occurrenceof other events. A 
further condition for having no causal relevance might be based on 
statistical relevance. An absence of interactions results in variables having 
no statistical relevance. Finally the identification of statistical relevances 
between variables might finally result in the identification of speclfic 
functional correlationsbetween variables, which gives us nomological laws 
that describe universal regularities. 
However, a preferredcausal explanatory theory might abandon any of these 
constraints at various levels; for example, the requirement of nomological 
laws might be abandonedin favour of statistical relevance, especially if the 
events to be explained are fundamentally indeterministic, or if one is more 
concernedwith application or policy, ratherthan underlying explanation. If 
one is trylng only to explain the occurrence, or non-occurrenceof events in 
terms of the occurrence or non-occurrence of other individual events, 
counterfactualism might be adopted. If one is looking for low-level 
mechanisms, such as how traits are transferred between parents and 
offspring, interactionism might be the preferredmodel of  explanation. All 
of this suggests a somewhat holistic approach to explanation where various 
models might be adopted depending on the explanatory context. What is 
curious, however, is that this holism is not sufficient for an explanatory 
‘free for all’ with no constraints. Each approach will place constraints on 
what counts as legitimate explanation. I have identified these, above. 
4.7 Conclusion 
A dilemma is presentedto the wide representationists: do they either adopt 
strict relations or loose relations as explanatorily relevant? If they adopt 
strict relations, they face serious problems explaining how the various terms 
that constitute that relation are explanatorily relevant with regards to each 
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other. These problems arise from four explanatory constraints considered 
above. The onus is on the wide representationists to explain why, if they 
want to appeal to strict relations, they need not meet the constraints of 
interactionism, counterfactualism, statistical relevance or functional 
correlations. A simple objection to any one of these explanatory models is 
not su&cient. 
If they adopt a looser conception of relations, the wide representationist also 
faces problems. How does the wide representationistjusm that their loose 
relations are explanabry in a way that provides a deep understandmg of 
events and processes that strict relations do not? They will arguably have to 
appeal to the variables associated with the terms that constitute the relation 
and show how they do not violate the above explanatory constraints by 
demonstrating the undelying causal mechanisms. The looser conception of 
relations allows for the terms that constitute the relation to be explanatory 
in a mannerthat meets the explanatory constraints; however, it is not clear, 
even on the looser conception, how the relation itself contributes in any way 
to a deep explanation that provides understandmg rather than mere 
descriptions of universal regularities. 
However, perhaps Ml justice has not been done to the specific wide 
representationistattempts to join the explanatory club. The next chapter 
considers in more detail the wide representationist appeal to loose relations 
as an attempt to salvage wide causation; however, the wide 
representationists only rebut a straw anti-wide representationism. All their 
points entirely fail to address a stronger anti-representationist position. 
Straw anti-wide representationismmaintains that no relational properties can 
be deeply explanatory. The real anti-wide representationist position 
maintains that there is a sense that relational variables could meet 
explanatory constraints, but the representational properties that consititute 
these relational variables can never be deeply explanatory. 
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Chapter 5: Wide Representationist Attempts to 
Join the Explanatory Club 
5.1 Introduction 
Either the representationistadopts an account of strict relations as having a 
causalor explanatoryrole or they adopt a loose conception of relations. If 
they adopt a strict conception they face serious problems confronting 
various plausible constraints on explanation. If they adopt a loose 
conception, they have to jus* why these relations are explanatory without 
appealing to the variables associated with the terms that constitute the 
relation or underlying processes that provide an understanding of the 
relation. But given this dilemma, how can philosophers claim that wide 
contents are explanatorily relevant? One strategy appears to be to set up the 
anti-wide representationistposition in a manner that is hardly conducive to 
plausibility. Once the absurdty of what might be described as straw- 
individualism is demonstrated, this putatively leaves ample room for wide 
contents as explanatory. 
First, the anti-wide representationist might be characterizedas holding that 
the variables associated with the terms that stand in certain relations to one 
another are never causally efficacious with regards to each other or a distinct 
third event. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the anti-wide 
representationist is not committed to maintaining that variables associated 
with the terms of a relation are never causally efficacious if a looser 
conception of relations is adopted. The anti-wide representationist merely 
needs to maintain that the terms of the relations associated with wide 
contents are never directly explanatory with regards to intrinsic mental states 
and ensuing behaviours. If the variables associated with the terms do have, 
for instance, statistical relevance with regards to each other, then it is not 
the relation that explains in the sense of providing an understanding of the 
statistical relevance. 
It is a feature, which will be developed further, that the kinds of examples 
usually grven to demonstrate the causal efficacy of wide contents rely on 
both the looser conception of relations and ‘third party perceptual 
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mechanisms’; these third party perceptual mechanisms bring together 
normally unrelated variables, making upparent&, non-local, statistically 
irrelevant and counterfactually redundant variables associated with distinct 
terms in a relation both interactive, statistically relevant and counterfactually 
relevant. Therefore, these variables, associated with the terms that 
constitute the relations that determine wide contents, might indeed be 
deemed to be causally efficacious, even with respect to intrinsic mental 
states and behaviour. But the variables associated with the terms are not 
causally efficacious in a manner direct enough to satis9 the hoped for 
explanatoryrole for the vaxiables associated with these wide contents on 
mental states and ensuing behaviour. By ‘direct’, I mean in the sense that 
the relation itself explains the statistical relevance between the terms that 
constitute that relation, or a third distinct event. Thus, the anti-wide 
representationistis not committed to claims such as ‘the environment never 
matters’. Appeals to third party perceptual mechanisms can be posited 
which make terms that stand in a speclfic relation such as properties of an 
environment, as well as causal hstories highly relevant. But, these indirect 
mechanisms provide explanatory relevance in a manner unsuitable for the 
role wide representationists want to place on relations as explanatory in the 
sense of providing an understanding of the events to be explained. 
The anti-wide representationist might be accused of entailing the absence of 
the existence of indirect causal mechanisms. There may be complex causal 
processes that result in the variables that are associated with the terms, 
which constitute the appropriate relation, being explanatorily relevant. But 
once again, the anti-wide representationist need not deny the existence of 
complex causal mechanisms, but these mechanisms are not conducive for 
the explanatory role of wide contents hoped for by the wide 
representationists who maintain that phenomenal character is entirely 
exhausted by a wide content relation, and that phenomenal character is 
explanatorily relevant to both neurological states and the ensuing behaviours 
of organisms. 
Finally the anti-wide representationistmight be accused of entailing that the 
best explanationalways appeals only to microphysical properties. But it is 
not clearwhy the anti-wide representationistneeds to entail such an account. 
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The anti-wide representationist is only committed to a variety of 
methodological constraints on explanation in a variety of explanatory 
contexts. Arguably the best explanation involves a working out of how 
what appears to be a violation of methodological constraints on explanation 
does not violate methodological constraints on explanation. Through h s  
resolution of how variables do not violate methodological constraints, more 
complete, deeper explanations are offered that do not appeal to even the 
looser conception of relations. 
5.2 Relations that matterand the relations that do not 
Some kinds of relational properties, for example, the relation of a particle in 
Alpha Centuri to the orientation of a &me on earth, are clearly relational 
properties that fail to meet the above explanatory constraints, and thus 
should be ruled out as explanatorily relevant; however, this, according to 
the wide representationist, ignores the relational properties that might 
matter. These relevant relational properties may be the most theoretically 
appropriate and the deepest explanatory properties. Here we have an 
immediate appeal to a looser conception of relations. 
However, an immediate question arises as to how the relational properties 
that are supposed to be causally efficacious with regards to certain specific 
effects are distinct from the relational properties that clearly are not, with 
regards to these certain specific events. Any such distinction between these 
hstinct types of relational properties appears to be grounded by the very 
same kinds of methodological considerations outlined above. Furthermore, 
any such attempt to determine why the variables associated with the terms 
that constitute the relation are causally efficacious, with regards to each 
other, by appealingto the above explanatory constraints, arguably results in 
the relation certainly not being the causally deepest explanation, or even 
necessary for the explanati~n.~~ If the wide representationist fails to 
This point might be justrfied on grounds similar to Kim’s (1993) causal 
exclusion principle. It seems that the event to be explained by the relation is 
overdetermined; either the variables associated with the terms that 
constitutes the relation explain the event; or the relation explains the event; 
however, the event cannot be caused by both. Surely the variables 




demonstrate why their relational properties are distinct from the mere- 
Cambridge properties, with regardsto certain specific events, then the wide 
representationist faces the challenge of meeting the above explanatory 
constraints. 
Two types of examples will be presented on behalf of the wide 
representationists as an attempt to show how wide contents might be 
explanatory; both appeal to a looser conception of relations. The first type 
of example appeals to explanations in biology as an attempt to show how 
relational properties can be causally efficacious (Wilson, 1997, pp. 192-3); 
however, I will argue that although there is a sense in which these relations 
might be deemed to be explanatory in a somewhat superficial manner, they 
only defeat a straw anti-representationism. The second type of example 
appeals to explanations in psychology (Yablo, 1997, pp.265); however, this 
example underestimates the relevance of shared intrinsic properties, so the 
example can not do the work for whch the wide representationist hopes. 
5.3.1 Moths and environments 
One explicit attempt to construct an explanatory scheme that appeals to 
wide contents is to make referenceto explanations in biology, specifically, 
explanations that involve interactions between creatures and their natural 
environments. Perhaps the kind of wide explanatory schema prevalent in 
these explanations is also applicable to wide contents (Wilson, 1997, p133). 
One example arises from consideration of the peppered moth.55 The colour 
of the environment might be both statistically relevant to the survival of a 
moth, as well as counterfactually relevant to the sunivability of a moth. 
If the anti-wide representationist is committed to holding that environments 
never matter, then actual examples like this might present an immelate 
challenge to the anti-represemtionist whereby the colour of an environment 
is both statistically and counterfactually relevant to the sunivability of 
moths. 
I am borrowing this example from Walsh (1998, p.632). 55 
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Consider the example of the camouflaged moth. Place the moth in a 
changedenvironment and its survivability decreases. Place the moth in its 
natural habitat and it will have a far greater chance of suxvival; therefore, 
relational properties, such as the sameness of the moth’s colour relative to 
the colour of its environment, is explanatorily relevant to survivability of 
moths. This kind of example might also be presentedas a suggestion as to 
how a creaturein a distinct environment, despite having identical intrinsic 
physical properties, will have Merent causal powers. Thus the above Twin 
Earth examples do little to establish the anti-wide representationist 
conclusion (cf. with the predator example in previous chapter). Perhaps wide 
explanations also have a role to play in psychological explanations of 
behaviour. But this example of the explanatory relevanceof relatims only 
defeats a straw anti-representationistposition. 
The moth example in no way violates the explanatory constraints outlined 
above. This immediately raises a question as to how the moth example 
salvages the hopes of the wide representationists who claim that 
explanations in biology will somehow suggest a new explanatory schema 
that accounts for the explanatory role of wide contents. When considered 
closely, the moth example does little to offer a new methodologcal 
constraint on explanation that meets wide representationistexpectations. 
The moth example makes the ‘sameness’ relation between the colour of the 
environment relative to the colour of the moth and the survivability of 
moths appear explanatory only because there are distinct variables 
associated with the terms that constitute the relation of sameness; and 
furthermore, there exists predatory organisms that have certain 
discriminatory mechanisms that detect when certain objects stand out from 
the background. The underlying mechanism gives us an understanding of 
why the relation offers a description that is explanatory in a superficial 
sense. One might argue that the predatoris sensitive only to differences in 
colouring and not to the individual colours of the moth and the 
environment separately. But a further question remains as to whether this 
type of detecting mechanism proves that relations, of a type that the wide 
representationisthopes to appeal to, can be explanatory in a manner that 
provides an understandingof the events to be explained. 
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When a predator eats a moth, this is hardly a ‘wide’ explanation for why the 
survivability of the moth changes. A predator eating a creaturealso has a 
somewhat obvious causal impact on the reproductive potential for that 
creature. Additionally, the kind of wide explanations cited, such as the 
colour of an environment relative to the colour of the moth, is not clearly 
explanatory in a way that the wide content theorist can apply to wide 
contents in psychological explanation because this exarrple relies on a third 
party detecting mechanism that provides the instantiating causal 
mechanism. 
Is there some causal mechanism that explains the change in survivability of 
the moth when its environment changes? There are local causal interactions, 
which explain the decreased survivability of the moth. Consider the 
properties of the predators’ perceptual systems. Further mechanisms can be 
spelt out involving reflectanceproperties of the moth’s wings and the bark 
of the trees, including the causal mechanisms leading to the predators 
behavioural response, when it spots, and eats, a moth. However, there are 
no direct causal mechanisms between the colour of the environment, the 
colour of the moth and the moth’s survivability. The causal mechamsms 
run indirectly through the variables associated with the terms that constitute 
the relation and the perceptual systems of the predators. The change in the 
colour of the environment is clearly a variable that is statistically relevant to 
the survivability of moths. But, the change in the moth’s survivability is 
only indirectly because of the change in moth’s environment. The 
survivability of the moth in the new environment does not change because 
of the relation between the colour of the moth and its environmea, but 
because of the change in variables associated with the colour of the moth, 
its environment and the underlying explanatory mechanism; i.e., a change 
in the behaviour of the predators. It is a further question as to the role 
relations play in the detecting mechanism of the perceptual systems of the 
predator, 
Concerning the survivability of the moth, there are counterfactual 
implications of a change in colour in the environment for the moth, but 
these also arise only because of the existence of the predators. If the colour 
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of the environment is a variable that changes relative to the colour of the 
moth, then one event, namely the chances of survival for that moth, also 
changes. However, this is so partly because of the presenceof the predators. 
To the extent that the survivability of the moth changes, it is not directly 
because of a change in a relation, but because predators can now detect the 
moth, only incidentally because of the change of colour in one term that 
constitutes the relation; i.e., a changein the colour of the environment. 
However, it might be claimed that all we have here is a difference of 
opinion about what variables we consider to be background assumptions, 
and which variables are explanatorily important. If we keep the predatm 
constant, but change only the colour of the environment relative to the 
colour of the creature, then the change in the environment is more 
important, and the sameness relation captures this change. After all it is 
more likely that a moth flies to a new environment, or an ecological disaster 
changes the environment, with the continued presence of the same predators, 
rather than predators suddenly achieving finer discriminability in their 
perceptualsystems. When explaining the colour of the moth, it is surely 
the colour of the environment that is relevant, instead of  the capacity for 
discrimination in the perceptual mechanisms of predators. But, to ident@ 
only one counterfactually relevent relational property, which ultimately 
relies on a change in intrinsic properties of one of the terms of the relation, 
ignores the other possible counterfactually relevant variables that might 
eventually lead to a deeper understanding. Single counterfactually relevent 
variables hardly provide a deeper understanding of the events to be 
explained, but instead a suggestion as to how descriptive laws might be 
constructed. 
To claim that relations offer a deeper explanation in the sense of providing 
us with an understandingof events is surely a mistake. If it is claimed that 
the colour of the environment, which is one variable associated with one 
term in the sameness relation, is the deepest explanation for the 
survivability of moths, this ignores the possibility of changes in predatorial 
discriminatory systems. But then it might be claimed that placing the 
emphasis on the predators as offering the deepest explanation ignores the 
colour of  the environment. Not so! Two terms are important to the 
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‘sameness’ relation, both the colour of  the environment and the colour of 
the moth. Furthermore, the importanceof both the colour of the moth and 
the colour of the environment is subsumed under an analysis of the 
discriminatory capability of  the predators while a single emphasis on one 
variable associated with the environment entirely ignores the relevance of  
the predators. The more complete the explanation, in terms of statistically 
relevant variables identified, the deeper the explanation. A lonely 
explanatory appeal to a relational property, which indirectly relies on 
intrinsic changes in one of the terms of the relation, combined with a 
functional correlation, at worst, ignores methodologcal constraints on 
explanation and offers, at best, incomplete explanations. 
It is a further aspect of the above example that there is some perceptual 
apparatus that brings together variables, as terms in a relation, which 
initially appearto bear no relevance to one another. To restate, if there are 
no predators, then the relation between the colour of the environment and 
the colour of the moth really has no bearing on the survivability of the 
moth. To return to Twin Earth, if there is some detecting mechanism 
within a creaturethat can track causal histories of Earthlings and finds 
Earthlings tasty when they eat twater, then variables that really have no 
relevancecanbe ‘causally linked’ and made relevant. Even in the example 
of the colour of the billiard table apparently having no relevance to the ball 
going into the pocket, one can tell a story whereby the first ball happens to 
be the same colour as the table; therefore, the, as yet unmentioned, player 
fails to clearly distinguish the first ball from the table, miss-hits the first 
ball, causing the second ball to miss the pocket. 
All these attempted solutions, which demonstrate that variables associated 
with wide contents might have some kind of explanatory relevance, rely on 
a third party detecting mechanism. Surely the wide representationist hopes 
that variables associated with these wide contents have a far more direct 
explanatory role to play concerning mental states and ensuing behaviours. 
These examples do show that the anti-wide representationist should not 
attempt to argue that the variables associated with the terms that constitute a 
relation, more loosely defined, are necessarily causally and explanatorily 
redundant with regards to every other event. This would indeed be a 
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mistake; this would be a straw-individualismthat the wide representationist 
often takes great glee in demonstrating to be false. But this is not the real 
anti-representationist position. The real anti-wide representationist need 
only arguethat even the looser relations which the wide content theorist 
appeals to are explanatoxypoor for explaining the events for which the wide 
content theorist wants these wide contents to be explanatorily useful. 
However, the above argumentpartly assumes that the predators are not part 
of the wide explanation. What if the predators are also part of the wide 
explanation? 
5.3.2 Moths and chameleons 
Explanations citing the selection pressures causally 
responsible for a given behaviour are wide, since selection 
pressures - such as the relative abundance of  competing 
species, the presence of particular environmental toxins, 
and the existing physical members of the species - do not 
supervene on the intrinsic physical properties of 
individuals (Wilson, 1997, p. 195). 
Robert Wilson suggests that the existence of ‘competing species’ might be 
part of a wide explanation, so he would, I assume, take the existence of 
predators to also be part of a wide explanation. But this is a straw analysis 
of ‘wide’. The anti-wide representationist can account for the collision of 
billiard balls as part of the explanation in terms of some kind of energy 
transmission between billiard balls that relies on intrinsic properties, but in 
no way claims that properties associated with the other ball are ’wide’. It 
is, thus, not immediately obvious how a predator eating a moth is a ‘wide’ 
explanation. 
However, to do full justice to Wilson’s account, it is worth developing 
furtherhis own example of a causally efficacious relational property. In the 
first biological example, I took the attempted appeal to the colour of the 
environment relative to the colour of a creature and the survivability of  the 
creature, independent of the intrinsic properties of a creature, as part of a 
justification for the causal efficacy of relational properties. Wilson instead 
of focussing on specific variables associated with the environment, such as 
colour, and the relation of sameness of colour to a creature, suggests that 
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degrees of specialization is relative to other creatures. And this relational 
property is causally relevant. 
Highly specialized species tend to extinction in times of 
ecological catastrophe. Roughly, a species is highly 
specialized if it adopts a limited range of survival 
strategies relative to other competing species. . . Being 
highly specialized is a property whose possession is 
causally responsible for species-wide extinction in certain 
circumstances: It is a causally efficacious property 
(Wilson, 1997, p. 124). 
Instead of just the moth, also consider the survivability of chameleons, 
which change colour depending on their surrounding environment. Once 
again the colour of the environment charges due to ecological change. 
Wilson is then claiming that, for example, chameleons are more adaptive to 
their environments; therefore, survivability is only relative to the 
survivability of competing species. This is acceptable, but is it really a 
relation that is the deepest explanation that provides us with an 
understandmgfor why a species tends to extinction? 
First, it must be assumed that the survivability of some of the individuals 
belongng to a more adaptive species is a variable that has some statistical 
relevance to the survivability of the inhviduals belongng to a less 
specialized species. Wilson explicitly acknowledges in the above quote that 
the individuals within the relative species are competing. Is this 
assumption a relationalproperty? Is this an assumption that can be ignored 
when assessing Wilson’s general claim as the deepest explanation? Certainly 
the assumption that the individuals within the two species are competing 
relies on interactive causal mechanisms, Assuming the survival of some 
creatureaffects the survival of another creature, a story can be told. In the 
changedenvironment, the hungry predator fails to spot the chameleon, but 
it spots the moth, and so it eats the moth. See the above explanation to 
explain why the predator spots the moth when the environment changes. 
The chameleon reproduces because the predator does not catch it and the 
‘baby boom’ chameleons eat all of the moths’ food, thus the moths starve 
to death. Or one of the profligate chameleons spots the moth, successllly 
sneaks up on the moth, and subsequently eats the moth. There appears to 
be nothing relational about these instantiating explanations. 
156 
The wide representationist is thus far attacking a straw anti-wide 
representationist who maintains that distinct terms in a relation are never 
causally efficacious with regards to one another, and environments never 
matter. It is simply not clear that the anti-wide representationist is 
committed to such a position. However, the anti-wide representatiaist is 
committed to claiming that the relational properties never explain changes 
in the variables associated with the terms that constitute the relation or 
distinct events in the deep explanatory manner hoped for by the wide 
representationist . 
5.3.3 Historical functions 
When considering the colour of the moths, should one explain this, in 
terms of  the chemical composition of the melanin within the moth, or in 
terms of the colour of the moth relative to its environment, or in terms of 
the successfulness of the trait in previous ancestors? The previous example 
has alreadyshown that the colour of the environment relative to the colour 
of the moth might be statistically relevant to the survivability of the moth. 
Given certain evolutionary principles, such as the inheritability of traits and 
’fitness’ of previous generationsof moths, the colour of the moth might be 
explained in terms of the previous generations of the moth. There are thus 
three possible explanations for the colour of the moth. First in terms of its 
currentfunction, i.e. its colour helps it to be camouflagedfrom predators: 
second, in terms of it’s historical function, its colour is a result of a selected 
trait that has been successfully selected for in its past: Third, in terms of the 
chemicalproperties of the wings of the moth and the reflectanceproperties 
of the wings of the moth. 
The best explanation, concerningthe colour of the moth probably depends 
on the mannerand the context in which the explanandum is constructed. If 
someone asks why objects such as, for example, the wings of this moth 
look grey, one might explain this in terms of chemicals and reflectance 
properties. If someone asks, assuming a very recent ecological change, why 
there are more grey moths than white moths in this area, then, the current 
survival advantageto being grey rather than white might be the appropriate 
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explanation. More grey moths successfully hid from the predators. If 
someone asks why there are more grey moths, given a constant environment 
over a substantial period of time, or a change in environment many moth 
generations previously, one might explain this either in terms of the current 
survival advantageof being grey, or how this was also applicable to fitness 
in the past and this trait was selected for through the evolution of previous 
generations” 
I’ll take the previous discussion of survivability of mob& within a current 
environment to be adequate in analysing why current functions do little to 
establish the explanatory relevance of the xelations that determine wide 
contents, perhaps hstorical functions do a better job. Once again, however, 
historical functions do not violate the methodological commitments 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. A relation between events can be 
constructed historically. These events may even have variables associated 
with them that have statistical relevance to variables associated with later 
events. But, it is in explaining the statistical relevancebetween the events 
or the variables associated with these events and the underlying causal 
mechanisms that the deeper explanation is offered. 
5.4 Levels of explanation 
Another strategy the wide representationist might adopt is to appeal to 
distinct levels of explanation. An appeal to a higher autonomous level of 
explanationmight be employed to rule out more detailed explanations, for 
example, those developed above as too detailed, while the more general 
explanations appealing to only the relations might be more appropriate. 
Wilson attempts to make a distinction between mere-instantiating 
explanations and higher-level explanations. The kind of explanations 
offered above that develop the causal mechanisms are mere-instantiating 
explanation. 
Sometimes an instantiating explanation, while spec@ng 
details about the actual causal processes by which an event 
occurredor i d e n w n g  the intrinsic properties of some 
See Walsh (1998) for a nice distinction between current and historical 56 
functions and how the best explanation might depend on the interests of the 
investigators. 
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cause, is not essential to a broader understanding of why 
that event occurred. . . I shall refer to instantiating 
explanations that are inessential to a broader 
understanding of the explanandum as mere& instantiating 
explanations. Sometimes lower-level explanations are 
merely instantiating explanations, and, when they are, 
corresponding higher-level explanations provide the causal 
information relevant for explanation. . . I am not 
implying that there are cases in which one offers a better 
causal explanation for a given explanation by avoiding 
talk of causal mechanisms altogether. Rather the claim is 
that the most informative level of descripon at which an 
explanation can be pitched need not be the one that 
provides the greatest amount of causal detail. In 
explanationsometimes less is more. After all if this were 
not the case, the best explanationsthat one could offer for 
any phenomenon involving material objects would be 
microphysical, and that is absurd (Wilson, 1997, p. 128). 
Wilson suggests a reductio against the anti-wide representationist, claiming 
that in order to offer the deepest explanation, the anti-wide representationist 
is committed to going smaller and smaller. Hilary Putnam (1975b, pp.295- 
7) illustrates the problem with an appeal to the micro-physical as the best 
explanatory strategy with lus example of why square pegs do not fit into 
round holes; the moral being that there is no point going microphysical to 
explain why pegs of  a certain shape do not fit into spaces of a different 
shape. 
However, the anti-wide representationist need not accept that smaller is 
always better, merely, that if explanations are offered, which apparently 
violate the methodological constraints outlined in chapter four, the 
explanations completeness might be improved by demonstrating how the 
supposed explanation does not violate these explanatory constraints. 
Because of apparent violations of methodological constraints apparent in 
Wilson’s examples, they are always going to be substantially flawed in 
terms of completeness. I would suggest that Wilson’s ‘deeper’ 
generalizations that appeal only to loose relational properties miss the 
importance of the methodological constraints outlined in the previous 
chapter. Only by meeting the explanatory constraints, will his relations be 
clearly distinguished fiom the strict relations he is so eager to reject. An 
appeal to the variables that constitute the terms of a relation is not a choice - 
it is a necessity, in order to provide an adequate explanation. The changes 
in relations cannot be divorced fiom the changes of the variables in the 
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terms that constitute the relation and the underlying mechamsms that 
provide a deeperunderstandingof the events to be explained. 
To illustrate further, another example of a relational property might be 
considered that is analogous to Wilson’s example of relative specialization. 
Consider two billiard balls heading, fram different directions, towards a 
pocket that can only hold one ball. One might explain why one billiard 
ball eventually sits in the pocket, by appealing to relational property: ‘the 
faster ball, gets the pocket’. Is this generalization really an appeal to a 
relationalproperty? If it is, one might immediately ask whether it violates 
any methodolopcal constraints. In terms of covering laws there is a simple 
equation that relates velocity with distance and time. It is immediately 
obvious that what initially looks like an appropriate deeper explanation 
ignores distance as an important variable. Besides, surely it is the 
properties associated with the objects that constitute the relation that explain 
why one ball gets to the pocket and the other does not. 
At time t l  there is a specific distance that those two balls are from the 
pocket. If, at any time aftertl, one ball is in the pocket, then the other ball 
cannot enter the pocket. Factoring in specific velocities and distances one 
can i d e n w  which ball gets to the pocket first. There are two balls with 
distinct causal paths that result in one of the balls sitting in the pocket at 
t2. These causal paths, however, intersect. The first ball to arrive at the 
pocket has some influence on the causal path of the other ball when the 
slower ball hits the pocket with the ball sitting in it. Without some 
interaction, the relative speeds of the balls have absolutely no relevanceto 
the causal paths of the two balls. For example, the velocity of the rotation 
of my dime has no relevance to the rotation of one of Jupiter’s moons 
despite the fact that one of the objects rotates faster than the other. Wilson 
needs to appeal to the variables associated with the terms that constitute his 
relations and the underlying causal mechanisms in order to motivate his 
distinction between strict and loose relations. Incidentally, it is the local 
interaction that makes the distinct properties associated with the balls 
relevant to the causal paths of the two balls, not the relAonal property. 
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On consideration, what initially appearslike a legitimate appeal to a relation 
as explanatoryfarfrom offers a deep explanation. Describing one ball as the 
faster and the other as the slower is a convenient way of distinguishing 
between what otherwise appear to be two balls with identical intrinsic 
properties; it also serves to roughly quant@ specific variables associated 
with the two balls. Assuming the distances from the pocket are the same 
when the two balls start, one ball having the greater velocity does have an 
effect on the other ball. However, a more complete, and dare I say better 
and deeper, explanation involves an identification of all the relevant 
variables applied to the objects that constitute the relation. Completeness 
does not always rely on the microphysical; however, it arguably does rely 
on laws, andor statistical relevance, andor counterfactual relevance, andor 
interaction. A mere appeal to an individual relation will probably result in 
the failure of idenmng all the relevant distinct variables associated with 
the terms that constitute that relation and at least in the above instance 
ignore the importance of some underlying causal mechanisms or local 
interaction. 
If one individual within a species is more adaptive than another indwidual 
withm a distinct species, then gwen a change in environment that 
indwidual belonging to the first species may have greater survivability than 
the individual within the other species. But the more adaptive individual is 
going to affect the individual within the other species only if the individual 
within the other species is competing for shared resources, or preying on 
that individual. Does a relational property explain this? No. Only 
instantiating mechanisms explain how individuals within one species might 
impact on individuals within another species and this non-relational 
assumption is essential to Wilson’s general claim. 
I would take issue with attempted claims that explanations in biology are 
wide or only appeal to relations, they certainly in no way violate 
methodological constraints on explanation, yet it is a feature of strict 
relations that they violate the above explanatory constraints. The appeal to 
looser relations ignores the importance of the variables associated with the 
terms that constitute the relation and the underlying mechanisms. An 
appeal to the efficacy of  wide relations, however, need not only rely on 
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biological analogies. Stephen Yablo (1 997) attempts to provide an account 
whereby explanathns within psychology might best appeal to wide 
relations. 
5.5 Recognising pictures 
When a modicum of extrinsic detail buys up an abundance 
of intrinsic, we have wide causation pure and simple 
(Yablo, 1997, p.372). 
But how is this to be construed so as to be consistent with the somewhat 
plausible argumentation going on above which apparently demonstrates: 
first, that the strict relations which determine wide contents are neither 
causal nor explanatorily relevant because they necessarily violate explanabry 
constraints; second, if the variables associated with the terms that constitute 
the looser relation are of explanatory relevance to one another, it is not the 
relation which pro\ides a deeper understanding of the relevance; if there is a 
third event, it is not the relation between the variables, associated with the 
terms that constitute the relation, which deeply explains the distinct, third 
event? 
It might be argued that offering an explanation of behaviour in terms of 
over-specific intrinsic properties is a poor alternative to offering an 
explanation in terms of wide contents. This reply is consistent with the 
adoption of a loose conception of relations whereby different beliefs explain 
different behaviours on the ground of differencesin the relations, but this is 
consistent with a change in the variables associated with the terms that 
constitute the relation. This, broadly speaking, is Yablo’s suggestion. He 
offers an account of causation based on proportionality. According to Yablo 
(1997, pp.258-9), there are two ways to go wrong in explanation: the first is 
to over-generalise, e.g. matter, ceteris paribus, conducts electricity, and the 
second is to under-generalise, e.g., pennies, ceteris paribus, conduct 
electricity. To get it right is to ident@ just enough of the relevant 
variables to explain something, too little and the explanation is under- 
generalised, but if too many variables are identified, and you are left with a 
false over generalisation. 
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Yablo argues that adjusting intrinsic prope~es can affect behaviour while 
leaving intrinsic properties alone do not. However, he goes on to argue that 
this is compatzbZe with the possibility of varying intrinsic properties a 
substantial amount whilst leaving behaviour intact. Additionally if the 
wide content of mental states is kept constant, then in the closest departures 
from reality behaviour will stay constant. 
If we distinguish ”what I believe/desire” from “how I 
believe/desire it” as factors in extending my hand, then 
adjusting the how-fhctor alone can affect my behaviour 
while adjusting the what-factor alone cannot7. . . But 
this is fully compatible with sayinf that many or most 
ways of mucking with my [desiref leave my behaviour 
in place, provided that I keep wanting water. And it is 
supremely compatible with the notion that I would still 
have extended my hand If I had wanted water in the way 
involving the least possible departure from actuality 
@. 265). 
To better illustrate Yablo’s (1997) account of wide causation it is perhaps 
best to consider his own illustrative example. It is problems with his 
example that demonstrate the flaws in his reasoning. A child when looking 
at a picture of its mother responds with a happy gurgle. Given an identical 
picture, the child responds with a happy gurgle. If one makes the picture 
fuzzy enough, then the chld will not respond. This, Yablo contends, is not 
what is interesting about children responding to pictures, yet this, according 
to Yablo is all that the anti-wide representationist has to say about the 
scenario. 
Adjusting the how-factor alone can affect Isaac’s 
behaviour - had the photograph been much fuzzier Isaac 
would have been baffled by it - while adjusting the what- 
factor alone cannot - leave the colours alone, and 
regardlessof the subject, Isaac grins (p.265). 
s7 Notice that Yablo accepts the point that identical duplicates behave the 
same way, but he thinks that this is irrelevant. 
The brackets are his. He distinguishes between wide contents and non- 
extrinsic properties, respectively, in terms of what one believeddesires and 
how one believeddesires. He employs square brackets to distinguish a 
sharedset or shared intrinsic property, or, in other words, an attitude with 





Notice that Yablo only identifies colours as the relevant intrinsic properties. 
Far more explanatorily relevant, according to Yablo, is that if the child is 
given a hugely different variety of pictures, which are still depictions of its 
mother, the child still responds with a happy gurgle. 
Isaac is a boy capable of tracking his [mother? through a 
huge variety of photographic images, and the image at 
issue here is not anythmg special or strange but the one 
his [mother] would have given rise to if the actual image 
were for some reason ruled out (p.265). 
Yablo then asks how many of the intrinsic properties of the picture have to 
be changed to extract a happy burbling response from the child. He 
contends that one could change the intrinsic properties a relatively small 
amount in order to make the child not recognise its mother, and yet one 
could change the intrinsic properties of the picture a substantial amount, 
and still elicit a happy response from the child. Very different pictures and 
poses of the child’s mother bring out the same behavioural response: 
Why Isaac should lose sight of his [mother] in the 
alternative-image world nearest to this one is hard to 
understand. Harping on the fact that a change in intrinsic 
properties is necessary and, if suitably dramatic, sufficient 
for a change in Isaac’s reaction only drives home the 
problem home: why should there be a dramatic change in 
the nearest alternativeimage world to actuality @.265)? 
To restate Yablo’s criteria for a good explanation, he maintains that just 
claiming that an identical picture will produce the same behaviour in the 
child is true, but does not really explain much. Changing the intrinsic 
properties of the photograph enough can effect a change in the behaviour of 
the child, but this is not enough to explain the behaviour being the same 
when a variety of pictures are presented to the child. According to Yablo, 
only an appeal to wide content adequately explains how a variety of 
substantially differert pictures, with respect to their intrinsic properties, 
prompt the same response from the child. He therefore concludes that it is 
the wide content of the picture, i.e., the fact that it is of the child’s mother, 
which is most relevant to explaining the child’s behaviour. 
The brackets are mine; Yablo describes what is depicted in the 59 
photographs as the child’s bubbe; I have interpreted this as the child’s 
mother. 
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Let us now consider whether this example violates any of the 
methodological constraints of explanation. First, what is the supposed 
relation that is argued to be causally explanatory? I take this to be the 
relation between the p i c m  and the child’s mother: aRb, where ‘a’ is the 
photographand ‘b’ is the child’s mother, and ‘R’ is the relation ‘picture o f .  
A distinctive feature of this relation is that one can change many variables 
associated with ‘a’, whilst keeping variables associated with ‘b’ constant. 
This reversesthe account of relations given thus far. It is the changing 
variables associated with the photograph of an unchanged object that causes 
a constant behaviour in the child. In the previous examples the variables 
that areassociated with the term whch cause the event to be explained are 
held constant whilst the variables associated with the ‘wide’ term are 
changed. In this case, the third event is the behaviour of the child - a happy 
gurgle. Yablo might be taken to be claiming that it is ‘R’ which best 
explains the behaviour of the child and not any variables associated 
specifically with ’a’; i.e., specific intrinsic properties of the picture. 
It is worth noting that one can easily break the relation between the 
photograph and the mother; perhaps the photograph is in fact of the baby’s 
aunt who happens to be hs mother’s identical twin sister. Arguably the 
child will respond in just the same way. How does Yablo’s ‘picture of 
relation explain this? He appears to acknowledge that this is a response by 
acknowledging that “keeping all the colours alone, and regardless of the 
subject, Issac grins” @. 265). But then he immediately claims that: 
Shouldn’t we then conclude that Issac’s behaviour is 
controlled more by the picture’s intrinsic colour properties 
than by its extrinsic, representationalones? And if [Isaac’s 
behaviour] 6ois controlled by the colour properties, then 
the very last thing we would expect is that a dzflerentlry 
coloured picture of his [mother] would still have lead [sic] 
Isaacto grin. 
And, yet, this is preciselywhat we would expect (p.265). 
The most seriously flawed aspect of Yablo’s argument is that he commits 
the intrinsicalist to maintaining that only the intrinsic colour properties of 
The brackets are mine. 60 
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the photographs are relevant with regards to Issac’s behaviour. It is true that 
focussing on an identity of all the intrinsic properties will result in 
behavioural identity, and this focus on an identical photograph resulting in 
the same behaviour ignores the possibly relevant causal explanation. But it 
is a mistake to assume as Yablo does that once coZour has been ruled out as 
the relevant intrinsic property, the wide content of the picture explains 
Isaac’s behaviour. Yablo needs to establish that no shared intrinsic 
properties between the distinct photographs explain Issac’s behaviour. Once 
he establishes this, he can then argue that only the relational property 
between the photograph and what it depicts explains Isaac’s behaviour. 
However, there are many plausible shared intrinsic properties, other than 
colour, that may well be applicable to the wide variety of photographs that 
all provoke the same response form Isaac. 
The points Yablo makes about the intrinsic property colour are plausible, 
but the damage has been done. He infers that if the intrinsicalist only 
appeals to the intrinsic colour properties of the photograph, then this 
intrinsicalist position entails that different coloured pictures will change the 
behaviour of Issac. But why can the intrinsicalist not appeal to other types 
of intrinsic properties that might be shared by a wide variety of 
photographic images? Next, he clams that the child does in fact respond to 
differently coloured pictures the same way. Let us also assume that 
experimental evidence is consistent with the constancy of behaviour of the 
child when he is presentedwith differently coloured pictures. We do expect 
the child to respond differently to differently coloured pictures. This is the 
implied reductio of the a b v e  claim. Yablo’s argument can be summarised 
as follows: the kind of intrinsicalist who keeps on harping on about how 
identical photographs produce identical behaviour entails the position that 
different coloured photographs produce different behaviours, but different 
coloured Photographs do not produce different behaviours; therefore the 
intrinsicalist position is false, and wide contents offer the best explanation. 
Through the above reasoning, Yablo commits to someone who dares utter 
such an obvious truth that a photograph of Isaac’s identical aunt will 
provoke an identical response, the inability to handle the more interesting 
truth that Isaac responds the same way to differently coloured photographs 
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of the same person. But the intrinsicalist does not need to only appeal to 
colour as the shared intrinsic properties that a variety of photographs 
possess that all provoke the same response; therefore, this line of reasoning 
certainly does not offer a reductio on the earlier claim that the photograph of 
the aunt does provoke an identical response in Isaac. 
Yablo’s focus on colour leads him to entirely ignore the intrinsic properties 
a variety of photographs and Isaac’s mother might share; for example, 
proportional distances between facial features6’ The explanation for why 
the variables associated with the photograph have something in common 
with the baby’s mother is not the relation, but some causal story about how 
variables associated with the mother are explanatorily relevant to variables 
associated with the photograph or even a set of Werent photographs of the 
mother. Does the relation between the photograph, or the set of 
photographs and the child’s mother explain a third event - the child’s 
behaviour? Yablo argues, yes. However, once again what has to be spelt 
out is how the variables associated with the photograph or a set of 
photographs, comes to cause certain responses of the child. Ths 
immedately poses the question as to how the child matches variables, 
associated with a photograph, with something it recognises. Does the 
relation between the mother and the photograph explain this? Arguably not. 
Could there not exist certain variables, associated with all of the 
photographs of the mother, and incidentally of the mother’s identical twin, 
which all the photographs share, other than merely the relation between the 
photograph and the child’s mother? These shared variables associated with 
the photographs might be small, but they might be important; therefore, 
according to the anti-wide representationist, it is not in the least hard to 
understand why Isaac should lose sight of his mother in the alternative- 
image world nearest to this one. Perhaps, as already suggested, the 
important, but smalZ variable that explains why Isaac can respond happily to 
a variety of Photographs is the proportional distances between all the facial 
featuresdepicted in the photo; i.e., the relative distances between the eyes, 
Whether this is right is irrelevant; the main point is that one has to do 
the experiments; one does not rest content with the ‘content’ of the picture 
explaining the behaviour of the child. 
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the ears, the nose and the mouth and the chin6’ Incidentally, the 
proportions maintained between features of a face is, somewhat obviously, a 
sharedvariableof both the photographs, the child’s mother and the child’s 
’identical’ aunt; furthermore, these proportions will be maintained through 
the causal process of the photograph’s construction. Yablo is merely content 
that one variable, the ‘picture o f  relation between a photograph, or a set of 
photographs, and an object best explains the child’s behaviour in this 
situation. However, what about this small but interesting proportionality 
variable that both the variety of photographs, and the child’s mother, share? 
Furthermore, an emphasis on only the relational property of the photographs 
ignores the fascinating account of as how children are able to recognise two- 
dimensional images and match them to familiar objects. 
What about the actual perceptual and cognitive abilities of the child? To 
merely explain the behaviour of the child in terms of the relation between 
the photograph and the mother ignores the arguably complex and essential 
story concerning both the perceptual and cognitive abilities of the child. 
Once again there is a detecting mechanism within the child that might be 
bringing together variables that initially one would have thought would 
have no normal statistical relevance. Somehow the child is clearly 
recognising some variables associated with a variety of photographs and 
linking them with variables associated with an object, which happens to 
bear some relation to the photographs. How the child does this is not going 
to be explained by only the picture relation that a set of pictures stand in, 
relative to an object that is depicted in these photographs. Any cognitive 
psychologist would be mad to accept this as an adequate explanation of the 
child’s behaviour. 
If an explan~on is given as to how a child recognises its mother, by sight, 
from a variety of different angles, then arguably this explanation will go a 
long way to explaining why a child responds to a set of distinct pictures in 
the same way. Notice this explanation makes no reference to relations 
Vertical proportions are maintained in profiles: forehead to eyebrows to 
eyes to nose to chin. Horizontal proportions are maintained when faces are 
looking down or up: ears to eye to nose to eye to ear. This entirely ignores 
the importance of shapes of features; however, I see no reason why they 
should be not shared by a whole variety of different coloured photographs. 
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between photographs and objects depicted in the photographs, although 
there may be intrinsic properties shared by the photographs and the mother. 
Maybe, as suggested, proportions between facial features are relevant for 
facialidentification. No doubt there might be variables associated with the 
shapes of specific features such as colour and style of hair, colour and shape 
of eyes or colour of skin. Relations between pictures and objects do not 
explain how children recogrise their mothers from a variety of different 
angles by sight, yet I suspect that whatever explains how a child recognises 
its mother by sight from a variety of angles, partly explains why a various 
group of pictures are all recognised by the child. 
This point about shared intrinsic properties is a small one but it is 
important given Yablo’s attempt to just@ that wide contents might be 
more suitable for causal explanation. He sets the anti-wide representationist 
up in a way that is hardly conducive to plausibility in hrs photograph 
example by committing them to a somewhat lame set of intrinsic properties 
- colour. By tlus one move, he then deems it sufficient to ignore the fact 
that identical photographs produce identical responses, despite the fact that 
the content relation between the photograph and what it depicts might be 
broken, yet th~s will elicit the same response fiom the child. But most 
importantly Yablo ignores the possibility that shared intrinsic properties 
explain the child’s behaviour. 
Casting the net wider, it is Yablo’s claim that beliefs and all intentional 
mental states likewise also often vastly vary with regards to their 
neurological properties, yet they often produce the same responses. This is 
similar to the traditional point the functionalists made long ago concerning 
the multiple realizability of functional states. Yablo is really just offering 
the same point in a Merent guise. The next chapter will consider in more 
depth the functionalist objections to type-identity theories and whether the 
Phenomenist can avoid these problems. 
5.6 Conclusion 
To conclude both this and the previous chapter, a dilemma is presented to 
the wide representationist: do they either adopt strict relations or loose 
169 
relations as explanatorily relevant? If they adopt strict relations, they face 
serious problems explaining how the various terms that constitute that 
relation are explanatorily relevant with regards to each other. These 
problems arise from four explanatory constraints considered in the previous 
chapter. If the wide representationist adopts a looser conception of 
relations, they also face problems. How does the wide representationist 
just@ that their loose relations are explanatory in a way that strict relations 
are not? They will have to appeal to the variables associated with the terms 
that constitute the relation and show how they do not violate the above 
explanatory constraints. The looser conception of relations allows for the 
terms that constitute the relation to be explanatay in a manner that meets 
the explanatory constraints; however, it is not clear, even on the looser 
conception, how the relation itself contributes in any way to a deep 
explanation. 
The anti-wide representationist need not maintain that the variables 
associated with the terms that constitute the relation are never explanatorily 
relevantin the sense that they fail to describe regularities; this would be a 
straw anti-representationism. The anti-representationist merely maintains 
that the wide representatbnist faces a problem in accounting for how these 
supposedly explanatory relations do not violate some of the explanatory 
constraints considered in the previous chapterwithout appealing only to the 
variables associated with the terms that constitute the Elation. In the cases 
of the biological examples cited, it is clear that the loose relations appealed 
to do not violate explanatory constraints because of often indirect complex 
processes that are identified when the variables associated with the terms 
that constitute the relationare identified and are found to be statistically or 
counterfactually relevant to other variables. The biological examples also 
appeal to third party perceptual mechanisms to bring together normally 
unrelatedvariables. It is not clearthat the wide representationist hopes that 
wide contents explain by an appeal to third party detecting mechanisms. 
An appeal to a simple cognitive experiment involving a child responding to 
a variety of photographic images also does not give adequate grounds for 
claiming that wide contents are causally explanatory. 
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In the picture example that Yablo cites, he successfully establishes the point 
that only claiming that identical pictures produce identical responses hardly 
offers a deep explanation for those responses. This point will be restated 
and developed in the next chapter as an attempt to demonstrate that the 
Phenomenist who wishes to maintain an explanatory role for phenomenal 
characteris required to adopt an identity theory that is problematic on 
functionalist grounds. However, Yablo’s example fails to demonstrate that 
there are no shared intrinsic properties of the photographs that explain the 
child’s similar response. Grantedthese problems might arise for Yablo 
because of the quality of hs example; however, it is perhaps revealing how 
his example fails to establish that extrinsic properties buy up an abundance 
of intrinsic. More plausible accounts of the relevant shared intrinsic 
properties might well buy up an abundanceof extrinsic. 
The phenomenist also confronts problems concerning an explanatory or 
causal role for phenomenal content or character. These problems will 
developed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Phenomenism and Causation 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapters four and five, it was demonstrated that the wide representationist 
fails to adequately offer an account consistent with wide contents having a 
role to play in deep explanations. Considerations concerning causation 
motivated Fodor to give hs narrow content accowt where narrow contents 
are functions that map from contexts onto truth conditions. However, 
although narrow content accounts help avoid problems concerning 
causation, in chapterthree it was demonstrated that arguably the best narrow 
content account of phenomenal character fails to adequately account for 
phenomenal character. Might one conclude that phenomenism is the best 
theory? Unfortunately not. It is not clear that the phenomenist is any better 
off with regards to some of the considerations concerning causation and 
explanation that were developed in the previous chapter. 
This chapter presents two dilemmas to the phenomenist as follows: The 
first gves the phenomenist the choice of adopting either a physicalist or a 
non-physicalist approach to phenomenal character; it will be argued that If 
the phenomenist wishes phenomenal characterto have a causal role, they 
should opt for a physicalist approach, but then they are confronted with the 
'knowledge argument' (Jackson, 1982). The second dilemma confronts the 
phenomenist who adopts a physicalist approach. A choice is presented to 
the phenomenist in terms of the variant of identity theory they wish to 
hold, either a token identity theory or a type identity theory; however, 
whichever identity theory they adopt they confront substantial difficulties. 
If the phenomenist adopts a token identity theory, explanatory and causal 
concerns are problematic, type-identity theories face problems grounded on 
concerns motivated out of functionalist objections. 
The wide representationist faces problems concerning the causal efficacy of 
relations. These problems were developed in the previous two chapters 
partly by the employment of twin-earth style examples. The phenomenist 
also faces a possible metaphysical speculation, analogous to the twin-earth 
scenarios, whereby the supposedly relevant variables change across two 
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individuals, but this has absolutely no causal relevanceto the behaviour of 
the two individuals - the inverted spectrum. According to a non-physical 
variant of phenomenism, an inverted spectrum might be supposed to be 
possible across two physically identical individuals, thus immediately 
resulting in deep causal and explanatory problems for phenomenal character. 
However, inverted spectrums might also be possible across two physically 
distinct but functionally isomorphic individuals. If the two individuals are 
functionally identical but their mental states have different physical 
realizers, then functionally isomorphic individuals might be physically 
distinct. According to the physicalist variant of phenomenism, the 
phenomenist i d e n ~ e s  phenomenal characterwith the physical realizers of 
these functional roles; thus spectum inversions might be possible across 
functionally isomorphic individuals. Accordmg to both physical and non- 
physical variants of Phenomensim, in inverted spectrum scenarios there is a 
changein either the physical or the non-physical intrinsic properties across 
the two individuals, but either way these changes have no relevance to the 
ensuing behaviour of the organism. 
On Twin Earth there is no change in the intrinsic properties of the two 
individuals, yet the mental states are supposed to be distinct, and the 
behaviours are arguably identical. When comparing Twin Earth to an 
inverted spectrum scenario, the non-physicalist variant of phenomenism 
faces similar problems. Two individuals might be identical with respects to 
all their intrinsic physical properties, yet they experience different 
phenomenal charactersor contents. But if they have identical intrinsic 
physical properties, then there is no reason to suppose that their behaviours 
will be any different; therefore, the differing phenomenal characteror content 
has no relevanceto the ensuing behaviours of the two individuals. This 
suggests that if a non-physcialist phenomenist employs inverted spectrum 
scenarios against the wide representationist, they are almost certainly going 
to face some of the causal challenges the representationist faced in the 
previous chapter. 
The physicalist variant of phenomenism is committed to some kind of 
identity theory between phenomenal characterand the intrinsic properties of 
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brains. However, this physicalist variant of phenomenism might be 
presented with a further challenge for two reasons, First, if the phenomenist 
opts for a token-identity theory, whereby a token phenomenal character is 
identical to a token intrinsic physical property perhaps in addition to a 
limited supervenience claim,63 then token-identity, if combined with mere 
superveniencebetween phenomenal character and intrinsic properties, is not 
sufficient for an account of intrinsic properties being deeply explanat~ry.~~ 
Token-identity and mere supervenience offer a limited claim that leaves no 
room for what might be described as explanatory Second, if the 
phenomenist opts for a type-type identity theory, where types of intrinsic 
properties are identical to types of phenomenal character, then the 
phenomenist gains explanatory ’power’ for intrinsic properties, but at the 
cost of well rehearsed functionalist objections to type-identity theories of  
mental states. 
This chapter further explores some of the above considerations thus 
presenting causal and explanatory challenges to both physicalist and non- 
physicalist variants of phenomenism. 
6.2.1 Explanatory gaps 
The first dilemma that confronts the phenomenist is motivated by what has 
sometimes been described as an ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine, 1993). It is 
perhaps appropriate that the phenomenist should also face objections 
There might be some debate concerning what is sometimes described as 
the ‘width’ of the supervenience claim. The wide representationist is 
consistent with one type of supervenience, a more ‘global’ supervenience. 
The phenomenist and the narrow content representationists maintain that the 
mental ‘locally’ supervenes on the intrinsic physical properties of an 
individual. 
This variant of phenomenism is perhaps compatible with a very loose 
formulation of functionalism. The functional role does not constitute the 
phenomenal character; instead the intrinsic physical properties that realize 
the functional state constitute the phenomenal character. 
how a property fits into the world of causes as outlined by the natural 
sciences. It is, however, establishing a deep explanatory role for these 
properties that this type of phenomenism is trylng to establish for 
phenomenal character or content. Arguably a form of functionalism that 
holds the realizers satisfies a weak criteria of physcialism but it is problems 
confronting how second order functional roles could have a causal role that 




It might be argued that a physicalist is just concerned with demonstrating 65 
174 
grounded on metaphysical speculation. The phenomenist faces an objection 
based on a ‘knowledge argument’ that arguably establishes this troubling 
‘explanatory gap’ between phenomenal character and the intrinsic physical 
properties that the phenomenist might take to constitute phenomenal 
character(Jackson, 1982, Levine, 1993). This argument, if successful, is 
sufficient for establishing both the non-physicality of phenomenal character 
and hence the deep epiphenomenal nature of phenomenal chaacter. 
Frank Jackson (1982) holds that phenomenal characteris both non-physical 
and epiphenomenal. His position somewhat starkly illustrates that if the 
phenomenist holds that phenomenal characteris not physical, they are going 
to face considerable problems accounting for a deep explanatory or causal 
role for phenomenal character. Jackson, however, embraces a non-causal or 
non-explanatory role for phenomenal character. Jackson proposed his 
’knowledge’ argument as an objection to any physicalist acaount: 
Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the 
smell of a rose, for instance. Therefore, Physicalism is 
false (p. 127). 
Acccording to Jackson, t h ~ s  failure of physicalism entails that phenomenal 
character is epiphenomenal. He demonstrates this ‘explanatory gap’ and 
supports the above brief argumentby the use of a metaphysical speculation - 
Mary’s Room. 
Mary is a scientist who only perceives in black and white. She studies 
colour in a room where there is no colour other than black and white and her 
only means of seeing the world is through a black and white television 
monitor. The intuition is that Mary could learneverythug of a third-person 
objective sort that there is to learn about colour, she could know all the 
relevant facts about the intrinsic physical properties and the physical 
processes, but given all this knowledge, she would never know what it was 
really like to experiencered. When she sees red for the first time she learns 
something new. 
What will happen when Mary is released from her black 
and white room or is given a colour television monitor? 
Will she learn anyhng or not? It seems just obvious 
that she will learn something about the world and our 
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visual experienceof it. But then it is inescapable that her 
previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the 
physical information. Ergo there is more to have than 
that, and physicalism is false @. 129). 
If this argument is successful and there genuinely is some kind of 
explanatory gap between phenomenal character and all intrinsic physical 
properties, then the phenomenist is left in the deeply unpalatable situation 
of embracing the absence of any explanatory role phenomenal characterhas 
to play in explaining behaviour. This is in contrast with Jackson who 
clearly is willing to embrace the epiphenomenality of phenomenal 
character? I will consider arguably the best line of response to this 
argument. If this reply fails, then there are at least prima facie grounds for 
maintaining that as the representationist faced problems in giving 
phenomenal content or character an explanatory role, so does the 
phenomenist. 
6.2.2 Modes of presentation 
Arguably, the best rebuttal to Jackson’s argument appeals to different modes 
of presentation - different ways that the same properties might be presented 
to an individual.67 For example, I could come to know the score of a 
“[Ilt is possible to hold that certain properties of certain mental states, 
namely those I’ve called qualia, are such that their possession or absence 
makes no difference to the physical world’ Jackson, 1982, p. 132). 
Dennett attempts to rebut Jackson’s argument by demonstrating that it is 
impossible to get clear on the intuition that Mary knows all that there is to 
be known about the physical facts. Therefore, because of this drfficulty, the 
argument fails to establish even the first premise. An alternative is to 
simply deny that Mary learns something new. This view can be seen in 
Churchland (1 989, Dennett (1 99 1) and Akins (1 993). This reply is however 
problematic because it blocks the fairly plausible intuition that knowledge 
of propositions still fails to allow the knowledge of the sort Mary gains 
when she sees red for the first time (Papineau, forthcoming). 
An alternative reply is to argue that Mary gains new abilities, but not new 
knowledge. This is perhaps analogous to learning the knowledge about 
how to windsurf, but until one actually learns to windsurf, one does not 
possess the ability. Mary can predict who experiences red, but until she 
actually experiences red she does not have the introspective ability to 
experience red. She does not learn something new; she merely gains a new 
ability. For two defenders of the ability response see Lewis (1988) and 
Nemirov (1990). However, if gaining the new ability is sufficient for Mary 
to gain new knowledge, then after she gains the ability Mary learns 
something new. She arguably not only gains the ability to introspectively 
detect whether an object is red without using her technical instruments, but 
she learns how to correlate being presented with red with her specific 




football game by watching the match in person, or I could know the score 
of the football game by reading it in the newspaper the next day. Either 
way, I would possess knowledge of the same property but under different 
modes of presentation. Perhaps when Mary leaves the room for the first 
time she comes to know something she already knew but under a different 
mode of presentation (Lycan, 1996). 
First, let us consider how Mary could know that an object is red. There are 
two ways of knowing that an object is red. Mary could know this either by 
an examination of the reflectanceproperties, or she could know this by 
using her own perceptual capacities. What Mary lacks is not knowledge, 
but knowing under a different mode of presentation. It is not surprising 
that Mary lacks the mode of knowledge of detecting some object to be red 
through experiencebecause she has never detected a red object through 
duectly peIceiving it. Mary does not learnsomething new when she comes 
to perceive red for the first time; she merely comes to know something that 
she already knew in a Merent way. 
But if Mary knew everytlung, surely she should know what it is like to 
know something under a different mode of presentation. Why can she not 
inferwhat it would be like to know a football score through reading it in a 
newspaper or seeing the game in person? Should Mary not already know 
what it is like to see red for the first time under a different mode of 
presentationif she genuinely knows all the relevant facts? 
Papineau (forthcoming) and Tye (1995b) suggest that Mary does not 
possess the phenomenal concepts necessary to know that an object is red 
under the mode of presentation that constitutes perceiving the object ‘as 
red’. The theoretical description she does know involves no phenomenal 
concepts, only material concepts; therefore, Mary cannot infer what it would 
be like to know the same fact under a different mode of presenlation. 
Essential to this line of response is that you cannot, from the entire 
to conceptualise the knowledge that an object is red she can come to think 
the new thought that she is having a phenomenal thought of this type (Tye, 
1999). This presumably gives her new knowledge. For more arguments 
against the ability response see Lycan ( 1996). 
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knowledge content of one mode of presentation, infer what it would be like 
to know the same knowledge under a different mode of presentation. There 
is a ‘conceptualgap’. 
Thus far the reply to Jackson has been run in a way that assumes that 
phenomenal characteris entirely constituted by intentional content and Tye 
(1995b) think that this helps him formulate his response to Jackson, but as 
Levine (1997, p. 105) argues, it is not clearthat the phenomenist cannot also 
run a similar defencejust as successfully against Jackson’s argument. 
If the knowledge that Mary is supposed to know is about the intrinsic 
physical properties that are supposed by the phenomenist to constitute the 
phenomenal characterof an experience, a similar argument can be run as a 
reply to Jackson. Mary knows under only one mode of presentation as to 
how intrinsic physical properties are type identified with phenomenal 
character. She could therefore know if a person were to experience a 
specific phenomenal characterof a certain type - including she, just as she 
could know if an object was in fact red. However, it so happens she has 
never come to posses the alternative introspective mode of presentaticn of 
herselfexperiencingred because her mental states have never been in that 
physical state (Papineau, forthcoming). She has not come to know what it 
is like to experience red because she has never previously possessed the 
necessary phenomenal concept (Tye, 1999). 
6.2.3 Modes of presentation fail to offer an adequate reply 
Joseph Levine (1997)’ however, thinks that any attempt to appeal to an 
introspective mode of presentation as a response to Jackson’s ‘knowledge 
argument’ has serious problems. If Levine is right, then arguably the best 
response to the knowledge argument fails and the phenomenist is still left 
with a troublesome explanatory gap. He argues that there always remains 
the question as to why one mode of presentation cannot be used to infer 
what it would be like to know that same knowledge under a Merent mode 
of presentation. He thinks that the only meaningful way to answer this 
question is to allow that the introspective mode of presentation in the case 
of qualia ascribes new properties, but this then entails that Mary really does 
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learn about some new properties over and above the physical properties that 
she already knew about. There is an alternative way of differentiating 
between modes of presentation and that is to appeal to a demonstrative or 
indexical mode of presentation. One might know lots about coffee cups, 
but one can also learn that this a coffee cup by pointing at it, thus applying 
the knowledge to a specific cup. But according to Levine, demonstrative 
modes of p r e s e n ~ o n  fail to have any real cognitive content so they fail to 
account for the explanatory gap. The only way to generatea gap that allows 
for one not to infer one mode of presentation from another is to allow that 
they ascribe different properties, but this then entails that all the intrinsic 
physical properties under one mode of presentation fail to capture all the 
properties that are available to be known. 
According to the mode of presentation reply to the knowledge argument, 
Mary does not possess the alternative mode of knowledge before she sees 
red for the first time. But she does not undergo the new mode of 
presentation, before she sees red, not because there is some property of 
mental states that she does not know about. She knows about all the 
intrinsic physical properties of mental states. To say that it is a 
phenomenal property over and above the physical property that explains the 
failure of a different mode of presentation is to concede to Jackson’s point 
that phenomenal properties are properties over and above intrinsic physical 
properties. But the only way that one can account for an individual not 
having access to a dstinct mode of presentation is because there is 
something about the intrinsic physical properties that precludes access to a 
different mode. Therefore the modes of presentation reply to Jackson’s 
argument fails (Levine, 1997). 
Levine illustrates this argument by replying to two examples a proponent of 
this reply to Jackson might draw upon. The first is an example of the 
morning and the evening star. There is clearly a sense, given an ignorance 
of astronomy, that one would have a knowledge of the star under two 
distinct modes of  presentation. Furthermore it is clear that one cannot infer 
that the star is the same under the distinct modes of presentation. But the 
reason why is because there are differencesin the properties that you ascribe 
to the star, one appears in the morning and the other appears in the evening. 
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[Tlhe difference consists in a difference in the properties 
ascribed: appearing in the morning in one case and 
appearingin the evening in the other. So this case can’t 
serve as a model for the explanatory gap, since the 
materialist opponent of the gap doesn’t want to concede 
that the introspective mode of prese-tion differs from 
the third-personmode with respect to the property of the 
qualitative state by which it representsit. For this would 
mean that the qualitative character is not the same 
property as whatever physical or functional property is 
characterisedby the third-person mode, and we are then 
left to wonder how the latter property gives rise to the 
former (Levine, 1997, p. 107). 
In this example it is fairly clear that a differenceof properties ascribed to the 
star explains why an inlvidual does not infer that the star that appears in 
the morning is the same star as the star in the evening. But, as Levine 
points out, it is precisely this appeal to distinct property ascriptions to 
jus* the distinct modes of presentationthat the person relying on distinct 
mode of presentations cannot appeal to in order to reply to the knowledge 
argument. 
However, the proponent of the mode of presentations reply to Jackson’s 
argument might adopt another example to illustrate how modes of 
knowledge might be distinct without an appeal to a difference in the 
properties that constitute the knowledge - the messy shopper.68 
The messy shopper is someone who walks around a shop following a trail 
of sugar. He eventually discovers that the sugar is leaking from hls own 
cart. The point of this example is that one could know all the relevant facts 
about trolleys, shops, and leaking sugar, but one would still fail to know 
that it was oneself that was leaking the sugar. But when one does realise 
that it is oneself who is leaking the sugar, one does not learn anythlng new; 
one merely applies the knowledge to oneself. One gains a demonstrative 
form of knowledge by coming to see that the messy shopper is in fact you. 
Furthermore, one cannot infer from all the theoretical knowledge that it is 
oneself that is leaking the sugar if one does not realise that you are not the 
shopper. 
Levine borrows this example from Perry (1979). 68 
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This might then be applied as a response to Mary’s room. No matter how 
much she knows theoretically about phenomenal characterit is not until she 
actually experiences this shade of red, through an introspective 
demonstrative mode of presentation, that she understands what it is like to 
experiencesomething under a different mode of presentation. Just as the 
messy shopper goes “aha,the shopper is me!” Mary exclaims: “aha, this is 
what it is like to experiencered!” Neither individual learns something new; 
they just demonstratively apply the knowledge to a specific example. 
However, Levine argues that the second example also fails to demonstrate 
that one can have different modes of presentation in the phenomenal case 
without appealing to a difference in the properties that form the content of 
that knowledge. 
In the qualia case, the apparent incommensurablility of the 
two modes of presentation produce a genuine, perfectly 
intelligible question concerning how or why the two 
modes of presentation apply to the same thing. In the 
messy shopper case there is no corresponding question. I 
don’t wonder how I could be the messy shopper, once I 
learnedthat my grocery cart is the source of  the leak 
(p. 108). 
Levine goes on to claim that there is no real cognitive content to 
demonstrative claims about experience, whilst in the case of experience there 
is clearly a new property ascribed in a manner disanalogous to 
demonstratively applying knowledge to one instance. 
Thereis no genuine property of ‘me-ness’ or ‘thisness’ to 
contrast with genuine properties like leaking sugar . . . 
Therefore there is no genuine cognitive content to 
questions like ‘how is it me that is leaking the sugar’?. . 
. However, becausebeing reddish or greenish is a genuine 
property, and my introspective mode of presentation is a 
property-ascribing mode, there is a perfectly contentful 
intelligent question to ask: what explains how a state 
satisfying the relevant theoretical description in physical 
or functional terms also instantiates being reddish 
(p. 108)? 
It is presumably the answer to this question that Mary should know given 
her extensive knowledge, but seeing as she does not, phenomenal properties 
are properties over and above intrinsic physical properties. 
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This analysis of Levine’s attempt to salvage the knowledge argument 
against arguably the most plausible way out of the knowledge argument on 
behalfof the phenomenist hardly offers a solid ground for the existence of 
an explanatory gap but it does offer perhaps prima facie grounds for 
thinking that the phenomenist has got a considerable burden to demonstrate 
as to why Mary does not learn sometlung new given an extensive 
knowledge of all the intrinsic physical properties. The knowledge argument 
is not the only grounds for maintaining that there is an explanatory gap 
between phenomenal characterand physical properties. 
6.3.1 Inverted spectrums and causal constraints once again 
In the inverted spectrum scenario two individuals are completely 
functionally isomorphic, yet they undergo mental states with distinct 
phenomenalcharacter. The phenomenist has a choice in accounting for the 
differencein phenomenal characteracross the two individuals in the inverted 
spectrum scenario as follows: first, to appeal to the physical intrinsic 
properties of the two individuals being different, hence the phenomenal 
charactersare Werent across the two individuals, but this has no impact on 
the firnctional roles of the mental states; or second, to appeal to non- 
physical properties, so the two individuals might be identical with regards 
to every intrinsic physical property, but they are different with regards to 
intrinsic non-physical properties. 
If the phenomenist appeals to an identity between phenomenal character and 
non-physical properties, then the phenomenist certainly faces considerable 
challenges accounting for causation between mental states and physical 
states. There are no differences in any of the intrinsic physical properties of 
the two individuals so there is no reason for maintaining that their 
behaviours will be different and there is certainly no reason for maintaining 
that the phenomenal character of the two individuals will have a deep 
explanatory role to play concerning the behaviours of the two individuals. 
The wide representationist faces subtle explanatory problems; however, the 
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non-physicalist variant of phenomenism faces obvious deep explanatory 
problems. 69 
6.3.2 Nomological laws, non-physicalist phenomenism and inverted 
spect rums 
If one assumes some lund of functional law-like correlation between 
variables associated with phenomenal character, which accordlng to the 
phenomenist are identified with the intrinsic non-physical properties of an 
individual, and variables associated with the behaviour of a creature, then 
this correlation might take the form of a nomological law that one might 
argue is required to meet the deductive nomological constraint on 
explanation. However, in inverted spectrum scenarios there are changes in 
one of the variables of the above correlation, yet the other variables that 
form the other part of the above correlationnecessarily do not change. This 
is because, according to the phenomenist, the intrinsic non-physical 
properties of one individual are dflferent across two indwiduals, yet 
variables associated with both the intrinsic physical properties of the two 
individuals and the behaviours of the two individuals are the same. The 
phenomenal characterof one individual’s mental states whilst he looks at 
grass is ‘green.’ The phenomenal characterof the other individual’s mental 
states is ‘red’ whilst he looks at grass. However, the intrinsic physical 
properties and the ensuing behaviour of the two individuals is the same. 
If there is change in one variable of a correlation whilst there is necessarily 
no change in another variable of the correlation, it is not clear how a 
correlation between the variables can possibly be constructed. If no 
correlations can be established between phenomenal character and behaviour, 
then no nomological laws can be constructed between phenomenal character 
and behaviour. Therefore, on a deductive nomological conception of 
explanation that relies on the presence of  nomological laws, phenomenal 
It might be suggested that differences in phenomenal character do the 
causal work (my examiners raised this point). This would give a causal role 
to phenomenal character, but notice that it would once again be relations 
that would be doing the causal work and not the intrinsic phenomenal 
properties that the phenomenist hopes will bear the explanatory burden. 
69 
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characterhas no deep explanatory role to play with regards to explaining 
behaviour. 
6.3.3 Statistical relevance, non-physicalist phenomenism and inverted 
spectrums 
The statistical relevanceconstraint on explanation requires that there at least 
be some kind of statistical relevance between variables associated with 
events, for changes in the events to be explanatory with regards to one 
another. In chapterfour it was discussed how relations, on one conception, 
requirethat one of the variables does not change whilst the other one does; 
thus making it difficult to see how variables associated with one of  the 
terms has any statistical relevanceto variables associated with the other term 
(other than the relational property). 
According to the non-physicalist variant of phenomenism, in the inverted 
spectrum scenario there is a change in phenomenal characteracross the two 
individuals, yet there is no change in the intrinsic physical properties and 
hence the ensuing behaviom of the two individuals. It appears that 
variables associated with phenomenal character have no statistical relevance 
at least in this one instance with regards to variables associated with the 
ensuing behaviour of the organism, nor is it clear how changs in non- 
physical properties could have any statistical relevance. 
6.3.4 Counterfactual relevance, non-physicalist phenomenism and 
inverted spectrums 
Crude Counterfactualism states that event A is not the cause of another 
event B if there exists a neaby possible world where A fails to occur, yet, 
B nonetheless still occurs. 
Inverted spectrum scenarios are set up in such a way that if variables 
associated with the non-physical phenomenal character of an individual’s 
mental states are different across two individuals, then this difference results 
in absolutely no changein the intrinsic physical properties of an individual 
and the behaviour across the two individuals. However, this applies only to 
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two physically identical individuals who are pre-supposed to behave in the 
same way within the same possible world. The non-physicalist 
phenomenist could still maintain a counter-factualcausal account for the 
phenomenal experiences of an individual given a close possible world 
whereby some phenomenally distinct individual resides who is physically 
identical, but behaviourally distinct. 
In order to present a counterfactualaccount of causation as an objection to 
the non-physicalist phenomenist, what is required is the demonstration that 
in all nearby physically identical possible worlds where the phenomenally 
distinct individual lives, the subsequent behaviour of this individual is 
necessarily identical. However, the non-physicalist phenomenist only 
requires a differencein behaviours of these two individuals (despite physical 
identity) in some possible world. To merely assume otherwise begs the 
question against the non-physicalist phenomenist. 
The phenomenist could still maintain that there is a possible world where a 
physically identical individual resides and were that individual to not have 
that same non-physical phenomenal experiences, that individual would not 
behave in the same way. I suppose at this point we have to concede the 
possibility of the non-physicalist phenomenist consistently maintaining a 
counterfactualaccount of causation, but is this really plausible? 
Do the phenomenal states of the individual in the nearby possible world 
somehow bypass the intrinsic physical properties of the indiviual at tl 
before the subsequent behaviour of the individual at tz? If there is any 
physical differencein the two inhviduals at tl, then physiological identity 
is no longer maintained across the distinct possible worlds and we cannot 
assume it is the phenomenal difference that accounts for the difference in 
beha~iour.~' Furthermore, even if the non-physicalist can sustain a 
counterfactualcausal account there remains substantial problems concerning 
the causal mechanisms of interaction. 
The indeterminism of the universe might be sufficient for a difference in 
behaviour across the possible worlds, but the non-physicalist phenomenist 
requires the difference in behaviour to not be a result of indeterminacy, but 
the phenomenal difference between the two individuals as thecause. 
70 
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6.3.5 Interactionism, non-physicalist phenomenism and inverted 
spect rums 
Interactionism requires that there be local interactions that mediate between 
events for the events to be deemed causally efficacious. One might argue 
that there has to be some kind of exchange of energy for the interaction to 
be a ‘genuine’ causal interaction. This is arguably where an appeal to non- 
physical properties presents even more substantial difficulties for presenting 
a causal or explanatory role for the phenomenal. 
It might be assumed that the non-physical properties I have been attributing 
to the phenomenist is in fact compatible with some kind of physicalist 
account, perhaps consistent with what has sometimes been described as 
property dualism.71 I will consider this to be a variant of physicalist 
phenomenism that will be considered in the next sections. The non- 
physicalist phenomenist under discussion genuinely holds that phenomenal 
characteris substantively non-physical. The individuals who are spectrum 
inverted relative to one another genuinely possess substantive non- 
physicality responsible for their differences in phenomenal characterdespite 
molecular identity. It is simply not clear how any such phenomenal 
charactercould have an interactive role. 
6.4 Summing up causal constraints against the non-physicalist 
phenomenist 
It appears that the very argument that poses a problem to the wide 
representationist presents deep explanatory concerns to the non-physicalist 
phenomenist. The epiphenomenal nature of a phenomenist who rejects 
claims that phenomenal charactercan be explained in terms of the physical 
is perhaps not disputable. Jackson does not think that this 
epiphenomenality is a problem. However, for any of the arguments against 
the wide representationistthat were considered in the previous chapters to 
Property dualism has the benefit of accounting for how mental states can 71 
enter into causal roles, but there remains the problem of  whether they can 
ever play a deep explanatory role. Furthermore, property dualism face a 
problem of causal overdetermination (Lm, 1993). 
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have any substantive weight, the phenomenist must maintain some kind of 
causal or explanatory role for phenomenal character. 
The physicalist variant of phenomenism attempts to i d e n w  phenomenal 
characterwith intrinsic physical properties. The above arguments were 
partly motivated against any physicalist account of phenomenal character. It 
appears that, at least with regards to nomological laws, statistical and 
counterfactualrelevanceand interaction, the physicalist phenomenist has an 
advantage over both the non-physicalist phenomenist and the wide 
representationist. However, in the cases of inverted spectnuns that rely on 
differences in the intrinsic physical properties that realize the Same functions 
of the mental states, it is not clear that the phenomenist who identifies 
phenomenal character with intrinsic physical properties is necessarily 
successful in giving an explanatory role for phenomenal character. 
The affirmation of mere supervenience between phenomenal character and 
intrinsic physical properties is not sufficient to establish a deep explanatory 
role for phenomenal character(I(lm, p. 190, 1997). It is arguably this deep 
explanatory role for phenomenal characterthat the phenomenist needs to 
establish in order to claim that their account is superior to the wide 
representationist. A dilemma can be presented to the physicalist 
phenomenist as follows: either they hold a variant on a tokenidentity theory 
between phenomenal character and intrinsic properties of an individual’s 
mental states combined with the aLTirmation of mere supervenience between 
phenomenal characterand intrinsic physical properties; or they maintain a 
typeidentity theory between types of phenomenal characterand types of 
intrinsic properties. If the phenomenist adopts either option, then problems 
arise. 
6.5.1 Token-identity, supervenience and phenomenism 
If the phenomenist opts for a variant on token-identity between phenomenal 
characterand intrinsic properties, combined with mere supervenience, then a 
187 
72 deep explanatory role for phenomenal characteris lost. 
arguably requires more. Consider the following claim: 
The phenomenist 
P1 People intrinsically, just like you, when they are presented with a ripe 
tomato, experience the same phenomenal character; and, if they want to 
describe its colour, say: “look at the red tomato.’’ 
This claim is consistent with a token-identity theory of phenomenal 
charactercombined with mere supervenience. One can only infer fiom P1 
that if someone is intrinsically identical to you, they will have the same 
phenomenal characterand will behave the same way. Crucially, however, 
P1 does not explain why the person says: “look at the red tomato,” in terms 
of the phenomenal characterof the individual’s mental states. Notice that 
P1 does some work in Block’s presentation of the Inverted Earth argument; 
helping us to infer that the phenomenal characterof the individual’s mental 
states do not change.73 Consider t h ~ s  next claim: 
P2 People in intrinsic state of type P, when presentedwith a ripe tomato, 
experiencea phenomenal character; and, if they want to describe its colour, 
ceterisparibus say: “look at the red tomato.” 
Where P is some shareable aspect of the intrinsic properties of an 
individual’s mental states. P2 is still consistent with a token-identity 
theory where a specific type of intrinsic property is correlated to a token 
phenomenal character. Notice that t h s  claim, P2, cannot be inferred fiom 
P1. P1 has plausibility, but fails to give a deep explanatory role for 
phenomenalcharacter. Even P2 is ambiguous between two further claims. 
P2 is consistent with an indwidual having a token phenomenal characterof 
some type or other supervening on an intrinsic property of type ‘P’ that 
results in the individual exclaiming “look at the red tomato.” Arguably the 
I have drawn on Yablo’s argument, where he demonstrates that the 
Individualist also faces explanatory concerns; however, he runs the above 
propositions in terms of beliefs about water and water drinking (Yablo, 
Ethe  lenses are part of the environment, there is a sense in which the 
individual’s mental states still function correctly (dwith bubbled scenario). 
If the visual processing is tampered with at a deeper layer, then we can 
conclude that the Earthling substantially misrepresents all his colour 
experiences. 
12 
1997, pp. 290-1). 
73 
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phenomenist who wishes phenomenal characterto have a deep explanatory 
role, with regards to behaviour, requires that all individuals who exclaim 
“look at the red tomato” not only share a type of intrinsic property, but also 
share a type of phenomenal characterthat causes the exclamation: “look at 
the red tomato” 
This is a somewhat elaborate way of claiming that if we want to explain 
behaviours, such as describing the colours of objects by appealing to the 
intrinsic properties of an individuals mental states, then only claiming: “if 
two individuals who are physically identical, then they will behave the 
same way,” does little to offer a deep explanation. As Kim (1997) 
concludes : 
Mind-body supervenience itself is not an explanatory 
theov, it merely states a pattern of property covariation 
between the mental and the physical, and points to the 
existence of a dependency relation between the two 
@. 190). 
An explanation might be offered by claiming that ‘if two individuals share 
intrinsic properties of a certaintype, then they will behave in the same way, 
and this type of intrinsic property shared by the two individuals explains 
why they acted in the way that they did. ’ Token-identities, combined with 
mere supervenience, are neither sufficient for offering a deep explanation in 
terms of intrinsic properties, nor are they of any use as premises in an 
argument, which might be presented, to support the real kinds of identities 
the phenomenist requires; i.e., type-type identity between phenomenal 
characterand intrinsic proper tie^.'^ If the phenomenist wants phenomenal 
characterto have a deep explanatory role, then it is only the shared type of 
intrinsic properties that explains shared behaviour.75 Token-identities 
combined with mere local supervenience might serve to rule out wide 
This is a strong claim that attempts to rule out any multiply realized 
functional role as being deeply explanatory, but it is presumably exactly 
this claim that a m ’ s  objections to second order functional roles attempts to 
undermine on the grounds of overdetermination (1993). It does appear to 
allow that these mctional roles explain, but the explain only in virtue of 
the realizers that realize those functional roles. 
71\lotice that inverted spectrums violate an appeal to shared type-identity as 
an attempt to explain behaviour because according to the inverted spectrum 
scenario, two individuals could have differing types of phenomenal character 
and hence Mering types of intrinsic properties, but this is of no relevance 
to the ensuing behaviour. 
74 
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representationism; but token-identity with mere supervenience does little to 
establish a deep explanatory role for phenomenal character. Type-identity 
theories offer a deep explanatory role, but type-identity theories face a 
formidable problem: they appear to be overwhelmingly improbable! 
6.5.2.1 Type-identity, phenomenism and multiple-realizability 
There is arguably no good reason to maintain that the Same types of 
behaviour are going to be explained by some shared type of intrinsic 
properties across indwiduals. Why even suppose that intrinsic types of 
physical properties are going to be shared across species and even aliens? 
This point still resonates loudly in the literature against the type-identity 
theorist. As Hilary Putnam ( 1 9 7 5 ~ )  argues: 
Consider what the brain state theorist has to do to make 
good his claims. He has to spec@ a physical-chemical 
state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in 
pain if and only if (a) It possesses a brain of a suitable 
physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that 
psycho-chemical state. This means that the physical- 
chemical state must be a possible state of a mammalian 
brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are 
mollesca, and certainlyfeel pain), etc. At the same time, 
it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the 
brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel 
pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be 
nomologically certainthat it will also be a state of the 
brain of any extra terrestrial life that may be found that 
will be capable of feeling pain before we can even 
entertainthe supposition that it may be pain (p.436). 
Putnam ( 1 9 7 5 ~ ) ~  although willing to claim that an identification of such 
type-identities between mental states and intrinsic physical properties is 
possible, thinks it highly unlikely: 
[I]f we can find even one psychological predicate which 
can clearly be applied to both a mammal and an octupus 
(say ‘hungry’), but whose physical-chemcal ‘correlate’ is 
different in the two cases, the brain-state theory has 
collapsed. It seems to me over-whelmingly probable that 
we cando this (p.437). 
By ‘multiply realized’it is meant that the same psychological states can be 
implemented by a wide variety of physical states. If the phenomenist 
maintains that phenomenal characteris type identical to physio-chemical 
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states, then psychological states are not multiply realizable. However, it is 
‘over-whelmingly probable’ that mental states, and preswnably the 
accompanying phenomenal characteqare multiply realized. Therefore, these 
theories of phenomenal characterare highly improbable. 
Putnam’s alternativeis not to i d e n w  mental states with physical kinds: 
but instead to idenm mental states with functional kinds. But, then, if 
we are to assume that only physical realizations implement these functional 
kinds, it appears that we need to return to a mere supervenience relation 
between intrinsic physical properties and the phenomenal. The phenomenist 
is caught in a loop between maintaining a token-identity theory and a 
physicalist functionalism combined with a mere statement of supervenience 
that implies no real explanatory power or if there is explanatory power this 
only arises from the properties of the states that realize that functional role, 
and an account that maintains a type identification between mental states 
and physical states that explains the supervenience relation, but cannot 
account for the truth of multiple realizability. 
6.5.2.2 Escaping the loop 
One way of avoiding this di,~mma, for the pllenomenist, is to argue that 
mere supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, combined with 
functionalism, is sufficient for some kind of explanatory role for the 
phenomenal. But if the phenomenist wants these functions to be causal, he 
is caught on the horns of another dilemma: either to i d e n w  these 
functional states with a heterogenous disjunction of intrinsic physical 
properties that realize that functional states, or to arw that these functional 
states are irreducible to underlying physical states. 
If the functionalist opts for a reductive functionalism, whereby the 
functional state is nomically equivalent to a heterogeneous disjunction of 
physical realizers, then this functionalist faces the problem of explaining 
how heterogeneous disjunctive properties can possibly enter into causal 
explanations. But why are disjunctive properties unsuitable for 
explanation? 
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One might suggest that such disjunctions are unsuitable for explanation 
because they are infinite. But why argue that infinite disjunctions are 
problematic for reduction (Block, 1997, p. 1 lO),  and hence explanation? 
Furthermore, why assume that functional properties are nomically 
equivalent to injnite disjunctions (Block, 1997, pp. 1 10- l)? 
Arguably the real reason why heterogeneous disjunctions make bad terms in 
explanations is because heterogeneous disjunctions are not lunds (Fodor, 
1974). They are not kinds because heterogeneous disjunctions are not 
projectable Wrn, 1992). By this it is meant that one cannot make future 
projections about heterogeneous disjunctions because the confirming 
evidence for one of the disjuncts need not have any relevance to the other 
disjunct. Block (1 997) develops the claim that heterogenous disjunctions 
are unprojectable by the use of an example: 
Consider the putative law that people who have arthritis 
are helped by Ibruprofen.. . Now pick another disease at 
random, say Lupus, and consider the putative law that 
people who have either arthritis or lupus are helped by 
Ibruprofen. This putative law has a heterogeneous 
disjunctive property (arthr~tis or lupus) in its antecedent. 
Does that prevent it fiom being well confirmed by the 
same data that confirmed the original law? Ea& person 
who has arthritis also has either arthritis or lupus. So I f  
the disjunction is projectable, then each datum that 
confirms the original law also confirms the disjunctive 
law. Now we have the principle that if P is “well” 
confirmed and P entails Q, then the evidence that “well” 
confirms P also confirms (though perhaps not well) Q. 
But the claim that people who have arthritis or lupus is 
equivalent to the conjunction of the following two laws: 
People who have arthritis are helped by Ibruprofen 
People who have Lupus are helped by broprofen 
And if the law with the disjunctive antecedent is well 
confirmed by the data that confirms the first of these laws, 
then the second is confirmed by the same data. But we 
have no information about lupus in this data base at all, 
so the assumption that the disjunction is projectable leads 
to a ridiculous result. Conclusion: the heterogeneous 
disjunction is unprojectable @p. 1 13 -4). 
Given the prior assumption that properties that are not projectable are not 
kinds, and if a property is not a kind, it is not going to be suitable as a 
term in an explanation, then the above argument successfidly demonstrates 
at least a prima facie concern with including heterogenous disjunctions in 
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explanations. Therefore, the functionalist who argues that functional 
properties are nomically equivalent to heterogeneous disjunctions faces a 
problem concerning how these functional properties can be explanatory. 
But can the functionalist somehow reject that functional properties are to be 
identified with a heterogeneous set of disjunctive realizers? As Putnam 
(1  97%) once asserted: 
Granted. . . the brain-state theorist can save himself by 
ad hoc assumptions (e.g. defining the disjunction of two 
states to be a single ‘physical-chemical’state), but this 
does not have to be taken seriously (p.437). 
The cost of not taking the identity of the functional state with the 
disjunction seriously is that the non-reductivist functionalist faces a 
problem explaining how functional properties are cglsally efficacious (Um, 
1993). It is surely only in virtue of the physical states that realize the 
functional properties that the functional states enter into causal relations 
with other propertiesor events. If it is assumed that the functional state M 
is the cause, in addition to the realized state P, then there is a problem in 
that too many causes are candidatesfor a third lstinct effect P*. This is an 
expression of Kim’s causal exclusion problem. 
Suppose . . . that mental property M is causally 
efficacious with respect to physical property P*, and in 
particular that a given instance of M causes a given 
instance of P*. Given the Physical Realization Thesis, 
this instance of M is there because it is realized by a 
physical property, say P. . . .What reason is there for not 
taking P as the cause of P*, bypassing M and treating it 
as an epiphenomenon?. . . [I]f we insist on M as a cause 
of P*, we run afoul of  . . . ”the problem of causal 
explanatory exclusion.’’ For we would be allowing two 
distinct sufficient causes, simultaneous with each other, of 
a single event. This makes the situation look like one of 
overdetermination, which is absurd. And ex hypothesi, it 
is not possible to regard M and P as forming a single 
jointly sufficinet cause, each being individually necessary 
but insuficient. And given the assumed irreducibility of 
M, we cannot regardM as identical with P, or as part of 
it. The exclusion problem, then, is this: Given that P is a 
sufficient cause of P*, how could M also be a cause of 
P*? What causal work is left over for M, or any other 
mental property to do? M’s claim as a cause will be 
weakened especially if, as we would expect in real-life 
neurobiological research, there is a continuous causal 
chain, a mechanism, connecting P with P*. It is clear 
that the exclusion problem cannot by resolved within the 
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framework of nonreductive physicalism (IOm, 1993, pp. 
354-5). 
The usual reply from the non-reductive physicalists is to embrace some kind 
of causal compatibilism; whereby hgh-level properties are deemed to not be 
reducible to any low level properties, yet are still deemed to be causally 
efficacious. In the last chapter we examined similar attempts, by wide 
representationists, to appeal to the explanatory power of high-level relaional 
properties, independent of the relevance of the variables associated with the 
terms that constitute the relation. 
One possible example that the non-reductive functionalist might give is the 
generalization: “dormative substances, if ingested before driving, cause 
traffic accidents” (Antony & Levine, 1997, pp.92-3). According to Antony 
and Levine th~s  generalizationis ‘realization independent. ’ It really does 
not matter how the dormativity is realized in the individual, thls dormative 
property raults in the greaterchanceof a driving accident (p.93). 
However, the specific type of dormativity induced by the drug might well 
have some statistical relevanceon the type of accident. Arguably marijuana 
results in a very different driving behaviour than alcohol, which in turn 
results in different types of driving accidents, yet both induce dormativity. 
Once one identifies the variables of a very loose generalization more 
carefully, it quickly becomes clear that the specific effects of dormative 
drugs might well be relevant to specific types of driving behaviours, and 
hence different types of driving accidents. It is only when very loose 
generalisations are considered that one can hedge the realizations. 
Furthermore, if two distinct types of drugs cause the very same types of 
behaviour in an indwidual, then perhaps there is some property that these 
drugs share that result in the identical behaviours of the two individuals. 
6.5.2.3 Limiting the realizations 
It appearsthat the best line of argumcnt for the phenomenist is to ident@ 
phenomenal character with intrinsic properties, accept the possibility of 
multiple realizability, but attempt explanatory damage control by limiting 
the level of multiple realizability. Multiple realizability might be limited 
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by demonstrating that if there are multiple realizations, the physical 
realizalizationsthat constitute the disjunction are not as heterogeneous as 
the fimctionalist often likes to suggest (Block, 1997). 
Kim (1997) argues that if you consider just one class of system, fix the 
physical constitution of that system, and fix the laws of nature, this fixes 
the intrinsic properties that realizes a function in that system. 
Although the realizationrelation can shift . . . it is also 
important to note its constancy: Once the systems 
physical constitution and the prevailing laws of nature are 
fixed, that fixes whether or not P realizes M in that 
system. That is to say, if P realizes M in system s, then 
P will realize M in all systems that are subject to the 
same laws and are relevantly similar to s - that is, in 
respect of all nomic properties. If, as most of us would 
accept, the microstructure of a system determines its 
causal/nomic properties, it follows that, with laws held 
constant, the realization relation remains invariant for 
systems with similar micro-structures. 
Consider a class S of systems sharing a relevantly similar 
microstructure. Biological conspecifics may constitute 
such a class. 
[Tlhis means that the physical realization provides an 
explanation of mind-body supervenience. The mental 
superveneson the physical because every mental property 
is a second order functional property with physical 
realizers. And we have an explanation of mental-physical 
correlations: Why is it the case that whenever P is 
instantiated in a system, s, it also instantiates mental 
property M? Because having M consists in having a 
property with causal specification D, and, in systems like 
s, then, having M consists in having P. It isn’t that when 
certain systems instantiate P. mental property M 
magically emerges or supervenes, and that this 
psychophysical correlation must be taken as a brute 
unexplainable fact. It is rather that having M, for these 
systems, is just having P, or P is one of  the ways of  
having M. This must, by any reasonable standards, be 
sufficient to warrant the reductive claim that having M, 
for these systems, is “nothing over and above” having one 
of its physical realizers@. 197). 
By limiting the class of systems considered, one might consider only the 
human species as the system under consideration Wm, 1992); this arguably 
vastly limits the possible realizations a specific mental state can take.76 
As Terrence Horgan (1997) points out, notice how close this is to 
Armstrong’s (1 984) solution: “It may be granted for the reasons just 
discussed, that it is implausible to i d e n w  the type pain with a certain 
76 
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However speclfylng the class of system under consideration raises a rather 
perplexing question: how large a class of systems should one consider 
whilst still maintaining a narrow enough class whereby the realizers are 
limited? Should one consider realizersof mental states in only yourself? In 
your family? All humans? All primates? All mammals? Any a priori 
speculation on such matters is arguably suspect to doubt. Perhaps there are 
better ways to limit realizersother than by narrowingthe class of systems to 
be considered. 
Block (1997) suggests limitations on the realizers by arguing that the 
disjuncts that realize a functional state might not necessarily be as 
heterogeneousas the functionalist so often suggests. It is easy to get carried 
away by the vast arrayof possible realizersof a specific functional state. He 
characterisesthis point with hs Disney principle. 
In Walt Disney movies, teacups hnk and talk, but in the 
real world, anythmg that can do those things needs more 
structure than a teacup. We might call this the Disney 
principle: that laws of nature impose constraints on ways 
of making something that satisfies a certain description. 
Theremaybe many ways of making such a thing, but not 
just any old structurewill do. It is easy to be mesmerized 
by the vast variety of Merent possible realizations of a 
simple computational structure say that of an and gate, 
which can be made out of cats, mice and cheese as well as 
mechamcal or electrical components. But the vast variety 
might be cut down to a very few when the function 
involved is mental, like thinking, for example, and even 
when there are many realizations, laws of nature may 
impose impressive constraints. . . . The reductionist may 
say that cutting down on the possible realizations still 
allows heterogeneous realizations, but this idea ignores 
the fact that constraints impose similarities (p. 120). 
It is the similarities between the realizersof functional states that Block 
suggests should be emphasised. For example, the fact that two chemicals 
realize dormativity in an individual suggests not the amazing and vast 
neurophysiological process. But what a b u t  the more narrowly conceived 
type: pain in human beings? It is quite plausible that it can be identified 
with some single sort of neurophysiological process. And if even that 
identdication turns out to be too optimistic, it will presumably be possible 
to find still more narrowly conceived sub-types: pain in human beings of 
the sort Y, . . . and so on, where the identification can finally be effected 
(p. 162). 
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heterogeneity of the realizingdisjuncts, but that perhaps there is some 'real' 
property that these two chemicals share (ibid p. 127). 
6.5.3 Summing up the objection to the physicalist phenomenists 
The physicalist phenomenist suggests that phenomenal character should be 
identified with the intrinsic physical properties of a mental state. But can 
intrinsic physical properties play an explanatory role with regards to 
behaviour? Wide representationism was posed a challenge on the grounds 
that relations a~ not suitable for deep explanations, but do intrinsic 
physical properties fare any better when it comes to explaining behaviour? 
Consideration of causal mechamsms, is certainly problematic to the non- 
physcialist phenomenist who wishes to maintain the explanatory role of 
phenomenal character 
If the phenomenist opts for the mere supervenience of phenomenal character 
upon intrinsic physical properties, this falls far short of offering an 
explanatory role for intrinsic properties. If the phenomenist presents a type- 
type identity theory, they gain explanatory power but at the cost of 
considerable implausibility, due to concerns about multiple realizability. 
The question remains as to whether the phenomenist can steer a course that 
allows for the phenomenal being identified with intrinsic physical 
properties, whilst maintaining an explanatory role for these intrinsic 
properties, whilst allowing for multiple realizability. Non-reductive 
functionalism entails multiple realizability but is inconsistent with 
i d e n w n g  phenomenal character with intrinsic properties. A reductive 
functionalism allows for the identification of phenomenal character with 
intrinsic properties, but the resulting heterogeneous disjunction of realizers 
are also not conducive for an explanatory role. 
The final suggestion is that the physicalist phenomenist opts for a reductive 
functionalism that allows for the possibility of limited realizability. The 
realizing disjuncts that constitute the functional roles are not to be 
considered as heterogeneous, but largely homogenous. What needs to be 
emphasised is the commonalities between the properties that realize the 
disjunction, and not how the realizersmer. This account gives a very clear 
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explanatory role for the intrinsic properties, both with regards to the fact 
that they implement a functional role, and how they are part of a shared set 
of nomologically possible realizersthat through their commonalities explain 
why they belong to that set, but not only because the realizersplay the same 
functional role. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered some explanatory problems that face the 
phenomenist who attempts to appeal to intrinsic physical properties in order 
to just@ how phenomenal character can play an explanatory role in 
behaviour. The knowledge argument and the non-physicalist variant of 
inverted spectrum scenarios suggest a strong pro-phenomenist intuition 
concerning the presence of phenomenal character but this phenomenal 
characteris of a sort that remains fundamentally irreducible to any intrinsic 
physical properties. The ensuing epiphenomenalism is arguably untenable 
for any phenomenist who wishes phenomenal character to have a deep 
explanatoryrole. Given that the arguments of the last chapters against the 
wide representationist were grounded on the assumption of a causal 
explanatory role for phenomenal character, if the phenomenist embraces 
epiphenomenalism, then the arguments of the last two chapters that were 
levelled against the wide representationist are entirely redundant. 
However, the physicalist phenomenist also faces problems concerning the 
necessity of appealing to some kind of  type-type identity theory to give 
phenomenal characterthe desired explanatory role. Mere supervenience only 
offers a dependency relation but stops well short of  a deep explanatory role 
for phenomenal character. But if the phenomenist adopts the type-type 
identity theory, the phenomenist has to face the traditional objections from 
the functionalist theories based on multiple realizbility. Some attempts to 
reconcile the problems of multiple realizability with a plausible identity 
theory were considered on the grounds of limiting the realizers and 
appealing to shared intrinsic properties of the realizers. However, even if 
this recomilliation can be successfully achieved, the physicalist 
phenomenist still has to face the problems of the explanatory gap generated 
by Jackson’s knowledge argument. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Oveniew 
How does subjectivity relate to the determinants of 
content? How should our theory of what an experience is 
like connect with our theory of what it is of) . . . The 
whole question of consciousness and content needs 
thorough examination (McGinn, 1989, p.63) 
This thesis has barely begun to do justice to a thorough examination of the 
relation between intentional content and the phenomenal content or character 
of mental states. It has attempted to critically evaluate two approaches to 
this issue. The first tries to claim that the phenomenal content or chaacter, 
in Colin McGinn’s words ’what an experience is like’, is entirely 
constituted by intentional content or ‘what it is of - tlus theory is 
representationism. The second theory, phenomenism, maintains that 
phenomenal content or character is sometlung more that mere intentional 
content. 
Two generaltypes of considerations constituted the two parts of the thesis. 
The first part attempted to consider metaphysical speculations to attempt to 
establish the superiority of one theory over the other. The metaphysical 
speculations did not, however, conclusively establish either theory to be the 
best as is perhapsnot surprising, but they did serve an invaluable heuristic 
role in cl-ng distinct types of representationism as they attempted to 
respond to these metaphysical speculations. The second part of the thesis 
evaluated the two theories on more ’concrete’ grounds. Explanatory and 
causal constraints were considered and applied to both theories under the 
assumption that the theory that could give some kind of  causal or 
explanatory role to phenomenal characterwould be the best theory. Both 
theories were found to face problems on causal or explanatory grounds. 
The more substantive conclusions that arose out of part one were that a 
semantic style of representationism does not do justice to phenomenal 
character; narrow content theories of content fail, and teleological accounts 
of content face substantial problems accounting for phenomenal content. 
However, Inverted Earth fails to establish the falsity of  representationism. 
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Semantic theories fail because it is not clear how linguistic roles could have 
a substantial effect on the phenomenal characterone undergoes when one 
inserts colour inverting lenses and joins a distinct linguistic community. 
Narrow content theories fail because it is possible to construct a scenario 
whereby distinct narrow contents result in shared phenomenal content or 
character. Teleological accounts have problem in accounting for determinate 
phenomenal contents. 
Various replies to Inverted Earth were consibzred problematic. alor’s 
attempt to demonstrate phenomenal re-inversion on empirical grounds was 
problematic. Unnoticed phenomenal re-inversions are highly unlikely. 
Lycan’s attempt to ground unnoticed phenomenal re-inversbn on the failure 
of transitivity is irrelevant. Lycan, Lalor and Tye’s appeal to failure of 
memory is ad hoc. Finally unnoticed phenomenal re-inversion is 
problematic because of the likelihood of  converging discriminatory 
capabilities in a perceiver as distinct colours follow their paths to re- 
inversion. Ths was demonstrated by considering an indwidual undergoing 
a phenomenal reinversion whilst looking at a patch of  purple next to a patch 
of yellow. 
Inverted Earth fails because of an ambipty exploited between the lenses 
being part of the Earthling or part of the environment. I f  the lenses are part 
of the environment, then there is no problem with the intentional content of 
the Earthling’s mental states staying constant. The Earthling never shara 
an environment with Invertlings; furthermore the lens scenario is analogous 
to the painted, bubbled or goggled scenarios that present no problem to the 
representationist. If the lenses are part of the Earthling the argument 
exploits an ambiguity concerring the phenomenal constancy of the 
Earthling’s mental states. There is a clear sense in which the phenomenal 
content or characterof the Earthling changes and the argument does not 
adequately acknowledge this. T h s  is easily demonstrated by considering 
what an Earthobject would look like to the Earthling if it were brought to 
Inverted Earth or if the Earthling was to return to Earth. 
The more substantive conclusions of part two were that wide 
representationismhas a serious challenge to face in giving wide contents a 
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causal explanatory role. The wide representationist needs to establish a 
solid distinction between strict and loose relations. A variety of pragmatic 
constraints on strict relations having an explanatory role were considered. 
Loose relations meet explanatory constraints but arguably the deepest 
explanation is p e n  by appealing to the variables associated with the terms 
of the loose relation or underlying causal mechanisms. A specific reply was 
given two examples in the literature that were presented as an attempt to 
demonstrate the causal relevanceof relational properties; however, both were 
found inadequate. The failure of Yablo’s example of the photograph was 
particularly revealing, and Wilson’s example of the relative adaptive 
abilities of distinct species offered a poor generalizationthat may well have 
pragmaticuse but hardly offers a deep explanation. 
If phenomenism appeals to non-physical intrinsic properties, then it has an 
even more serious problem giving phenomenal charactem explanatory role. 
If it appeals to intrinsic non-relationalphysical properties, then it either has 
to face problems that confront type-identity theories; or if it attempts to 
offer a variant cm functionalism with token identity and perhaps mere 
supervenience, then it has to account for how second order functional 
properties have a causal role to play. 
In trylng to give some kind of physicalist response to problems concerning 
’explanatory gaps’ the phenomenists and the representationists of a 
physicalist type might well stand united. It is not clear that the 
representationist has an advantage in overcoming ‘explanatory gaps’ and 
they still have to contend with problems concerningthe causal efficacy of 
relationalproperties. The best bet for the phenomenist is to opt for some 
kind o f  physicalist account if they want to give phenomenal character a 
causal or explanatory role. 
7.2 Future strategies for the representationists 
As for a possible future direction for the representationists, I would suggest 
that they attempt to abandon any account of narrow content as constituting 
phenomenal content or character. The main problem the wide 
representationists confront is cl-ng the nature of the relational properties 
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to which they appeal. I suggest that an explicit appeal to loose relations 
offers a better approach, but this to a large degree undermines the failure of 
local superveniencethat an appeal to strict relations entail. The loose 
relations allow for no constraints on the changes in the variables associated 
with the terms that constitute the relation. The appeal to biological 
examples are often misguided and the attempted demonstration of how 
relations cause often rely on complex indirect causal chains that can arguable 
do little for the wide representationist in terms of giving them a direct 
explanation of the relation between phenomenal character and intentional 
content. I would also suggest that going general in terms of explanation is 
often a poor strategy in that it results in poor explamtions that ignore the 
deep explanatory power gained by meeting basic methodological constraints 
of explanation. 
Some of the hostility directed towards the representationist is perhaps 
motivated out of a feeling that they are abandoning or attempting to change 
basic presuppositions concerning explanatory practice. This is perhaps most 
clearly shown by Yablo’s example where he attempts to explain why a child 
responds to various photographs; his inferredbest explanation of the child’s 
behaviour is because of the intentional relation the picture stands in to the 
child’s mother. This might be a practical suggestion at the common-sense 
level but it would be terrible science to accept this as a deep explanation for 
the child’s behaviour. Surely useful experiments could be done by 
changingvariables associated with faces to detect how far and in what way 
shared intrinsic properties of a variety of photographs can be changed and 
how these changes relate to the child’s response. 
I suggest that the wide represtmtationist take more care in their selection of 
examples if they want to offer examples that clearly demonstrate how 
relational properties might serve a deep explanatory role. Wilson’s example 
of relative speciesisation is better than Yablo’s, but it arguably relies on 
complex indirect causal chains that are perhaps not available to the 
representationistwho wishes to explain the direct phenomenal content of 
mental states. I would contend that the anti-representationisthas deep and 
substantial methodological objections to the wide-representationist 
approach. It is only in understanding how deep these methodological 
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motivations run that the wide representationistwill be able to come up with 
an adequate explanatory account for wide content. 
7.3 Future strategiesfor the phenomenist 
As suggested earlier the phenomenist’s best argument against the wide 
representationist is a causal or explanatory objection so it makes 
considerable sense for the phenomenist to accept some physicalist variant of 
phenomenism. The phenomenist then has to confront the ‘explanatory gap’, 
but then so does the representationist if they want to adopt a physicalist 
account. 
The physicalist phenomenist also has to offer some theory that maintains an 
identity theory between phenomenal character and intrinsic physical 
properties that accounts for strong intuitions concerning multiple- 
realizability. Type-type identity theories have problems dealing with 
multiple realizability, but best offer a deep explanatory role for phenomenal 
character. I have already suggested that arguably the phenomenist’s option 
is to attempt to limit the realizers that a causal function can take; 
furthermore, this emphasises some of the methodological explanatory 
constraints that were leveled against the wide representationists. If a variety 
of intrinsic types of physical properties realize a functional role the 
phenomenist should focus on the shared intrinsic properties that a variety of 
realizersshare. 
Finally one last suggestion is to speculate a physically realized functional 
role for phenomenal characterthat explains why the two most plausible 
theories of mind face deep causal and explanatory problems. This strategy 
turns most of the argumentation of the second part of this thesis on its 
head. Instead of t y n g  to just@ the two most plausible accounts of the 
relation between phenomenal characterand content, one might suggest that 
it is because of the apparent epiphenomenal nature of phenomenal character 
that these theories of phenomenal charater gain their plausibility. If the 
phenomenal characterof mental states appears epiphenomenal, this explains 
Jackson’s willingness to endorse an ‘explanatory gap’ and the 
epiphenomenality of qualia. If phenomenal character appears 
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epiphenomenal, this explains the intuitive plausibility of the inverted 
spectrum scenarios that motivate the phenomenist position. If phenomenal 
character appears epiphenomenal, this perhaps partly explains why the 
representationist latches onto relational properties to attempt to explain 
content. As arguedin chaptersfour and five it is a feature of relations that 
they tend to allow no role for deep explanation, or if they explain, it is only 
in terms of the variables associated with the terms that constitute the 
relation. If phenomenal character actually has a role that gives it the 
appearanceof epiphenomenality, then this not only explains why it is so 
hard to give phenomenal charactera causal or explanatory role, it explains 
why two of the most plausible theories of phenomenal characterface deep 
causal or explanatory problems. 
This account does not support an actual epiphenomenalism of any type. It 
merely attempts to explain the appearance of epiphenomenality. The causal 
or explanatory problems are not in fact an entailment of the two accounts, 
but indeed essential to the two accounts. Once the apparent 
epiphenomenality of phenomenal characteris explained then a cogent theory 
of the relation between phenomenal charactemd content might be offered. 
7.4 Final speculation 
One possible role for phenomenal character that explains its apparent 
epiphenomenality could be a role that gives phenomenal character an 
inhibitory function. If the intrinsic properties that realize this hct ional  
role serve to block responses to stimuli, then this arguably explains the 
appearanceof epiphenomenality. If one dwells on the phenomenal character 
of a thought, one might realize that the phenomenal characterarises out of 
the words that are not spoken. The content of the thought arises from the 
content of the words that would have normally constituted the speech act 
that never occurred. If one hums a tune in one’s head, the content of the 
internalized mental state is the song that is never actualized. The 
phenomenal characterarises from the inhibition of the action that never 
materializes. Why does one not hear another person’s thoughts? The 
process that blocks the spoken words that would normally arise from that 
mental state constitutes both the content and the phenomenal chaacter of 
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that person’s thoughts. From a third person perspective it is notoriously 
hard to see an internal process that by its very nature blocks the only means 
to gaining access to that process. 
Pain presents a particularchallenge to this theory because it is usually taken 
to be the paradigm case of a phenomenal state that clearly has a somewhat 
direct causal role in promoting action. One solution is to suggest that there 
are various pathways a stimulus can take to provoke a response, perhaps a 
cognitive blocking occurs that send the pain down a more direct pathway 
thus provoking a direct response. Alternatively what should be emphasized 
is the possibility of having substantial damage inflicted on oneself yet one 
need not respond automatically to the damage given a greaterpriority. 
Perceptual experiencespresent a challenge to this theory because there is no 
clear action being blocked by the myriad of visual input that one receives 
just by looking around the room. In the case of perceptual experieIce 
perhaps the cognitive bloclung is occurring not just before the output, but 
also at the end of the input processing. If all the visual information is at 
some point simultaneously cognitively blocked at the end of the processing, 
this then explains the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience. 
Cognitive blocking could have a variety of roles to play, at the end of an 
input or just before an output, or to send a stimulus down a distinct causal 
pathway, but whatever the stage in the process, it is the inhibition that 
accounts for the phenomenal. The content is either explained by the 
informationcontainedby the stimulus or the content of the overt action 
blocked by the cognitive inhibition. 
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